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In the historical study of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, the
ft
ft









self-destructive anarchy, is probably the most neglected.
ft
4
The four Caliphs who reigned during this period of instability
m




their rule was little more than an irrational interlude in
ft
the history of 'Abbasid domination. However, this thesis is
• , ,
ft
an attempt to demonstrate that, on the contrary, both the
ft
ft
decade itself and the consequences resulting from the internal
« •








Certain new materials still in manuscript form were
*
used, but, in general, the study relied on the standard
histories of al-Tabari, al-Ya'qubl, etc., and from these it
*
was attempted to extract and organize the information
ft
relevant to the problems presented by the period.
ft





abundant, much of it recorded in first-hand accounts, from









materials also clarify the complicated course of events and
ft
ft
the shifting alliances and hostilities among the various
ft *
ft
participating parties. Studied in this way, the period
throws into prominence the serious defects innate in the.
ft
ft *
internal structure of the Caliphate, in its conception of
ft ft
power as well as in the way this power was used. The
fact that it was able to overcome these weaknesses was
due to certain constitutional changes which obliged the
4
9 • +
Caliphs to enforce their authority over Iraq rather than
over the Empire as a whole, thus providing the basis for
a national Iraqi state. In this respect, the anarchy
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When the definite article ?al* is preceded by a vowel,
» '
✓
the 'a' in al is not elided but remains as 'al1.
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The Caliphs of the Period
Introduction
CHAPTER I





























A. Their Attitudes towards the Caliphs
4
1. The Relations between the Caliphs and
their military leaders up to the
9
Reign of al-Muntasir
2. The Role of the Turkish Generals in
the period 21+7-256/861-870
















The Turkish Soldiery in Samarra
The Introduction of the Turks into the
'Abbas id Army




A. The Attitudes of the Caliphs towards













C. The Position of the Turkish troops
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B. The Attitudes of the other military
I
groups towards the Turks






The Revolts in the Provinces
A. Al-Sawad 228
1. Baghdad









































The rise to power of the 'Abbasid family, the rulers
4




addition to superseding the Umayyad dynasty, constituted
at its inception a great revolution in Islam, by claiming
to inaugurate a new era of justice, piety and happiness.
4
The 'Abbasids proclaimed that their right to the Caliphate
4
was based on genealogical grounds arising from their close
4
relationship with the Prophet; The Banu Hashim were the
4
4 4
common ancestors of 'Abbas (from whom the 'Abbasids took
4
their name). The 'Abbasids used religion as a means to
*
s
an end for their political goals, and for the first time
»
4




religious connotations, and subsequently became well-known
by these names. To quote a few examples: al-Mansur "the
one who was supported (by God)"; al-Mahdi "the one who
trusts (in God)"; al-Musta'in, "the one who seeks the
4
help (of God)"etc., Moreover, the Caliph was 'the shadow
0
4 •
of God on earth', 'the Caliph of God', and not of the




the Arab Nation, the Arabs in leading positions, but the
4
0
dynasty, as the administrator of Islamic unity - ultimately
0
therefore, Islam itself. By adopting these and other
4
means the 'Abbasid Caliphs succeeded in gaining the
0




On several occasions this served to help them maintain
%
1









especially at the beginning of the second part of their
reign, immediately after the murder of al-Mutawakkil
• • »
2^7/861.
Clearly the victory of the 'Abbasids signified a
decline, to a certain extent, in the Arab influence.
Regional differences became more marked as time went on;
in the transition to national states, the importance of
0
the Arabs as a racial and military unit declined visibly.
4 ♦
Thus the 'Abbasids succeeded in weakening Arab tribal
4
solidarity and winning the support of other racial groups,
i.e. Persians, and later on the Turks. These new elements
^ ' •
after having been encouraged to extend their influence in
ft





Despite the outward harmony and apparent integrity
ft
of the ruling family, there was bitter internal conflict
ft
ft
which flourished from the very beginning of their rise to
power and became increasingly serious as time progressed.
The main reason which lay behind the 'Abbasids' internal
disagreements was the struggle for power between the
• ft
ft
Caliphs and their potential successors. It is the
ft




for the deterioration of the situation within the Caliphate
*
during the period under consideration.
ft
ft
It is evident that the Caliphs had only the support
4
ft
of the powerful courtiers to rely on, in securing the
ft
succession of their own favourite sons. Consequently thes








realized that they could best maintain their position of
power by encouraging disunity within the royal family.
9
Thus, immediately after the death of the Caliph Htfrun
al-Rashld, the power seems to have been transferred from
%
the hands of the Caliphs to their viziers and to the other
9
courtiers who wished to increase their influence at the
9
9
expense of the 'Abbasids, leaving the Caliph as merely the
*
s
titular head of state.
'N
A 9
It is with al-Mu tasim's ascent to the throne that the
9
n 9




scene, having been introduced in great numbers into the
9
9
service of the dynasty during the reign of al-Mu'tasimfs
*
immediate predecessor. In order to maintain the religious
A
policy of al-Ma'rauri, and to suppress the traditional
sources of recruits to the army, i.e. the Arabs and the
9
9
Persians, al-Mu'tasim continually increased the number of
♦
these foreign mercenaries - at first using t'hem as body-.
9 9
9
guards and later allowing them to penetrate to various
9
9
insignificant posts. The introduction of Turks into the
army began a new phase in the history of the *Abbasid dynasty
I
9
which was notable for its anarchy and disintegration. The
9
*
Turkish officers elevated themselves to power shortly after
their recruitment, and soon became the virtual masters of
the Capital during the period under consideration. This
9
was partly due to the sympathetic attitude of the Caliphs
S
9




between the soldiery and their leaders, with whom they at






It is not easy to make a true and coherent assessment
of the position of the 'Abbasid Caliphate during 214-7-256/
9
861-870, without a comprehensive presentation of the




mercenaries. Therefore, any analytical study of this
4
period must concentrate on the development of the
situation in the 'Abbasid Caliphate as it evolved from the
reign of al-Mu'tasim, because the instability of the
political life of the Empire during the period following.
■ al-Mutawakkil's murder was a direct consequence of the
0
0









Capital, the Turks had not considered taking over the
Caliphate for themselves or even attempted to transfer it
to another Arab family. This was mainly due to the
B
%
divine right which surrounded the 'Abbasid family to rule
the Muslim community on the one hand, and the lack of
0
interest among the Turkish generals to take over the
*
Caliphate for themselves, preferring rather to maintain
0
their powerful position, on the other.
%
0
It must be remembered that the Turkish mercenaries
» t
0
were not united, but that they characteristically showed
jealousy and envy. However, they did not feel secure
9
0
because of the strong opposition which they had met both
from various military groups and from civilians as well.
4
This, together with the disunity amongst themselves, led
0
to the decline of their.interim power.
«
For the purpose of any analytical study of the 'Abbasid
0
Caliphate from 2I4.7-256/86I-87O we must consider the situation
of the Caliphate in terms of the 'Abbasid family and its
%
role in the state; the attitudes of the powerful army
| »
officers towards both the Caliphs and their viziers who
I
ft
suffered more than the 'Abbasids from the supremacy of the
Turkish officers; and the position of the Turkish
ft
ft
mercenaries, as a separate group from their leaders. In
S
addition to the above, consideration must be given to the





themselves; to the various other elements in the army and
ft
to the amma. Finally in order to assess the true
political situation in the Empire which affected the
position of the Caliphs in the Capital, a special essay
ft
ft
has been devoted to the revolts in the provinces. These
.revolts initiated the period of disintegration within^ the
ft
ft •
Caliphate and as a result several of its provinces succeeded
ft ft
ft
in obtaining their autonomy. In consequence the Caliphate
ft
from then on concentrated mainly on the region of Iraq, but
• « I
♦
still continued to exercise a spiritual influence over the
I
more remote provinces.
In spite of the obvious importance of this complex
ft
ft
situation in the history of the 'Abbasid political institution,
as well as to its social and cultural development, a
ft
surprisingly small amount of scholarly attention has been
ft
devoted to it. It should be pointed out that neither
this period nor any of the four Caliphs involved, nor the
ft
position of the Turkish mercenaries, has been the subject
r
of a detailed study; whenever this period is mentioned, it
is only presented in brief, in a sentence or two within a
ft
more general context, and is generally described as a period
ft
4
of anarchy, chaos and disintegration. Therefore, this study
•












has been undertaken with the intention of filling the gaps
and of presenting a coherent presentation and interpretation
J m
9




This dissertation attempts to.view the position of the
4
9
'Abbasid Caliphate during this specific period in its proper
historical perspective and. to outline the. ramifications of
f
.its influence, particularly on the politico-sopial life of
4
9
the Empire. In so doing it is hoped that subsequent
studies may ultimately reveal the influence which this
period brought to bear on the further political evolutions
of the 'Abbasid.dynasty. Clearly, it would be presumptuous
4
4
to claim that the conflict among the 'Abbasid family arid the
4





rise to power were the sole elements governing the future
development of the politico-social and economic life of the
4
Empire. That development, we hasten to point out, involved
•
•
many complex factors. But, nevertheless, the development
4
4
of the political life of the 'Abbasid Caliphate which
4 9
initiated many changes, may, among other origins, have roots
4-












SURVEY OF THE SOURCES
ft
. •
The second 'Abbasid period can be considered one of
#




survived in various fields. The sources may be classified
in the following way: a) general historians; b) local





Although the common interest of these historians was
ft
to survey the whole period within their general field, they
are the main source of information for this study. It is
ft
simpler to classify the general historians chronologically;
- .
and according to their importance to our field or research,
ft








Muhammad b. Jarlr Abu "Ja'far, an Arab historian and
ft
p
traditionalist, was born in 225/839 at Amul in the province
ft
ft
1. Fihrist, pp. 326, 351; Baghdad, 11,163-69; Sam'anI, Kitab
al-Ansab, London, 1912, fol. 3&7a; Wafayat, I, 572-78;
Yaqut, VI, I4.23-62; IJajji Khalifa, Kashf aL-Zunun, ed. by
G. Fluegel, Leipzig, 1837, II, 114-29; GAL, 1,114.2, 1814.,
189; SI, 217; P. Rosenthal, A History of Muslim Historio¬
graphy, Leyden, 1968, pp. l3l4-~35* also the index;
D.S. Margoliouth, Lectures on Arabic Historians, Calcutta,
1930, pp. 103-12; HME, index; al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, ed. by





2. Amul was the capital of the region of Tabaristan during the
'Abbasids, though its Tahirid governors geneiaLly resided
at Sariya. Yaqut, Buidan, I, 35k-> ke Strange, The Lands
of the Eastern Caliphate, Cambridge, 1905, p. 37-
8
of Tabaristan and died in 310/922. He began to devote
himself to study at a very early age and is said to have
4
4
known the Qur'an by heart by the time he was seven. After
4
his early education in his native town his father, \*ho .was
4 4
"I
quite'wealthy, provided him with funds to visit Rayy and the
surrounding area. Prom there he went to Baghdad where
4
Abroad b. 9anbal (d. 214-1/855)* under iirhom he had intended to
4
9
study, died shortly before his arrival. After a brief stay
A
in Ba§ra and Kufa he again returned to Baghdad where he
4
remained for some time before setting out for Egypt.
A
Although our sources do not mention his visit to Samarra,
4
A
there is a brief indication in his historical work which
4
p
clearly indicates that he had been in that city.




which is his "History of the Prophets and Kings", Ta'rikh
4
al-Rusul wa al-Muluk.^ The book begins with the Creation
and continues to the year 302 A.H. Prom the beginning of




order according to the Hijra Calendar, usually stating




reign. He procured his material mostly from oral tradition,
✓
which he had ample opportunity to gather on his extensive
1. Rayy was located in the north-eastern of the Jibal
. province. In the l).th (10th) century Rayy appears
to have been the chief of the four capital cities of
this province. Yaqut, Buldan. II, 892-901; Le Strange,
pp. 2114.-17.
9
2. Tab., Ill, 1512.















travels. His travels were mainly prompted by the desire
4 4
9 4
for knowledge (talab al-rilm). and by the desire to study
under distinguished scholars. He also used, literary sources,
*
r
namely a book by Abu Mikhnaf, Kitab Akhbar Ahl al-Basra, and
• •
the Slra of Muhammad b. Ishaq. Al-Tabarx did not arrange
4
3
his material into a connected account of historical events
4
4
but rather contented himself with collecting the available
4
4




dictory accounts as they were given to him. He therefore
avoided any responsibility for the reliability of the
traditions collected by him but this does not necessarily




it a special status and makes it more significant mainly
due to his reliability in preserving his. material exactly




Tabards material is based mainly on his own observation.
. • • • *
%
Thus, he could be regarded as the main source of information
4




those of either contemporary or later general historians.
0 ♦
Al-TabarPs narrative of events fails to provide a
#
clear and coherent picture of the political situation of
the Bnpire•during the early 'Abbasid reigns. His main
4
0 '




he does not always succeed in mentioning certain accounts
which have been accessible through other contemporary or
« 4 4
♦
































Al-Tabarl lays more emphasis on the eastern part of the
Empire than on the western parts such as Syria, Egypt and
ft
North Africa. He sometimes mentions briefly the affairs
J
ft













is made of the widening historical and cultural horizon of
pthis period which he must have observed.
Although al-Tabarl always presents more than one version
of a particular event, he provides the account with a list
4
of authorities which render it both comprehensive and trust-
<
worthy. For this period he rarely states the main source
%
of information, usually starting his account with 'It is said'
or 'It is mentioned* or the like. In spite of all its
•
•
shortcomings the historical account of al-Tabarl's history
ft
ft













895) was an Arab historian and geographer. He was a
»
moderate and pro-'Alid but his feelings did not influence
ft
his historical writing.^" He belonged to a family of clerks
1. Al-Jazira is the name used by Arab geographers to denote
the northern part of the territory situated between the
Tigris and Euphrates. Le Strange, pp. 86-III4.; EI , s.v.
Djazira.
ft
2. F. Rosenthal, p. 13k.
• • •
ft
3. Yaqut, II, 156; GAL, I, 226; SI, I4.O55 F. Rosenthal, pp.
l33-3ks D.S. Margoliouth, pp. 125-27; HME, index; EI ,
s.v. al-Ya'kubl; ZMDG, XL, 1886, pp. 189-203; ZMDG,
XLI, 1887, I+I5-I1I4..
lj.. EI"*", s.v. al-Ya'kubi.
and travelled quite often to various places, which enabled
0
him to obtain diverse material about the places he visited.
His Ta'rlkh?" beginning with the creation and extending to
9
259/872, is one of the earliest sources of Islamic history.
The arrangement of the material according to reigns -
9
unlike al-Tabari's year by year account - resembles that
which is adopted in modern works of an analogous nature. In
0
his historical work astrological details are given for the
commencement of each reign whence experts would be able to
0
0
see how the course of events followed the conditions of the
planets at its inauguration. At the end of each reign he
0
recorded various lists of facts. First he included the-
0
names of the people who most influenced the sovereign,
followed by those who led the pilgrimage each year, then
4
0
he proceeded to list the names of those who were responsible
A





Al-Ya'qubi's account of the 'Abbasid period are clear
s
and coherent although they tend to be rather short. He does
not often mention his sources but it is obvious that he did
0
not limit himself to the same sources of information as
0
did'al-Tabarl. Al-Ya'qubI brings to light many interesting
0
0
points which contribute to a better understanding of men and
0
politics in that period. He does not present the affairs
♦




provinces of the Empire, for his main concerns seem to have
0
1. First publishing was by M.T. Houtsma, 2 vols., Leyden







been Syria, Egypt and Hijaz. This may have been due to
the conditions and the time, and to his attempt to avoid
I
I
any oppression which might have befallen him had he
ft




Unlike al-Tabari, he does not present the existing
divergent opinions but gives the accounts from his frequently
partial point of view. Al-Ya'qubl's historical accounts would
*
4
have been of more advantage if he had paid more attention to
the affairs of the central government. But, even with these
ft
minor weaknesses his history is still considered the main
t
ft
source of this study together with that of al-Tabari.
ft «
ft
Reference has also been made to al-Ya'qubi's other
- - 1 -
works such as Mushakalat al-Nas li Zamanihim and Kltab al-
4
— O —
Buldan. In the latter al-Ya'qubi describes how he
%




what his informants told him and took notes on the history.
4
of the Muslim conquests as well as on the administration,
ft
economic history, and the contemporary situation of each










When dealing with contemporary general historians in
the field of research, one must not forget the works of such
1. El. by W. Millwar, Teheran A.H. 1323; then Beirut 1962.
ft
2. Ed. by A.W. Junboll, Leyden, 1961; De Goeje, Leyden, 1961.
ft






others as Ibn Qutayba, Abu Muhammad Abd Allah b. Muslim
t
(d. 276/889),1 al-Dinawari, Abu Hanifa Ahmad b. Dawud
(d. 282/897)»^ an<* Ibn al-A'tham al-Kufl (d. 3rd/9th century).^
Although they are very concise in the material they offer
concerning the early 'Abbasid period, their accounts shed
0
light on the real politico-cultural situation of the 'Abbasid
9
9
Caliphate. It must also be remembered that most of the
9
9







The fourth century A.H. which came to be considered
as the peak of the 'Abbasid cultural activities provides us
with several distinguished historians such as al-Mas 'udl.^"
9
Abu al-Hasan 'All b. al-Husayn (d. 3^5/956) was an Arab
historian and geographer and one of the most versatile
0
authors of the fourth century A.H.'' While still young he'
0
travelled extensively, visiting most of the Muslim provinces




travels were certainly stimulated not by a thirst for
9
adventure but by a strong desire for knowledge. Al-Mas'udl
1. Kitab al-Imama wa al-Siyasa,.Cairo, 1322, 1327, 1387 A.H.,
is ascribed to Ibn Qutayba, according to de Goeje, Riv.
Stud. Or., I, 14.15 —14-21» it was probably written in his
life-time by a MagribI or an Egyptian. GAL, I, 187; EI1,
s.v. Ibn Kutaiba.
2. Al-Akhbar al-Tiwal, ed., by V. Guirgass, Leyden, 1888;
then by 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Amir, Cairo, I960.
3. Kitab al-Futuh, Ahmad III library, Ms. No. 2956, Istanbul.
I4. Fihrist. pp. 219-20; Yaqut, V, llj.7-lj.9; GAL, I, lip.^35
Nicholson, A Literary History of the Arabs, Cambridge,
1953, PP* 352-5lt.; Rosenthal, pp. 108, 109, 135-3&5
HME, (index); EI1, s.v. al-Mas'udi.









wrote several books, the most important of which is Muru.i
al-Dhahab wa Ma'adin al-Jawhar. Before going into the
historical accounts in this work, al~Mas'udl describes the
%
form of the earth, the cities and the noteworthy geographical
ft
phenomena, then the treatment of pre-Islaraic Arabs, stressing





discussion of all foreigners known to the Muslims of the
ft
fourth century A„H. In his Muru,i al-Mas'udi always refers
ft
_ p _
to other books of his, such as Akhbar al-Zaman, and al-Kitab




into detail, especially for the period in question. Concerning
the early period of Islam he lays more emphasis on opinions
• ft ►
dealing with 'All than with those of the prophet.3 His pro-
ft
'Alid sympathies can be seen in his use of the terra
ft
M
'martyred1 (ustushhida) to describe the murder of this
» • 1
♦
Caliph while in other instances, as on the murder of the
Caliph 'Umar he uses the term 'murdered* (outila).^ Moreover
C
ft
al-Mas'udi so often gives more emphasis to the 'Alid affairs
|
than those of the state. For example, he devotes almost
the whole chapter on the reign of al-Musta'in to the revolts
• •
in Kufa and other regions which were of 'Alid leanings.^
ft
ft





1. Ed., with French trans, by C. Barbier De Maynard, 9 vols.,
Paris, 1861-77. Then in I4. vols., Cairo, 19)4.8.
2. Printed in Cairo 1939 and then Beirut, 1386/1966.
3. Muru ,j, IV.
Muru.i, IV, 191, 288.
5. Muru.i, VII, 330-363.
.1 15
with superficial enquiries and accepts both tales and
b
legends which attract his attention without any criticism.
This sometimes impairs the trustworthiness of his account,
4
which, is all the more dangerous as his.elegant style may
4 1 «
4
induce the reader to accept his accounts and details.
•
.
Al-Mas 'udl's method of arranging his material, from
9
I «
the death of the prophet, is according to the accession of
9
each Caliph, and then he proceeds in his presentation of
4
the events which coincide, with the reign of that Caliph or
which draw his attention. Then at the end of each Caliph's
reign he mentions the names of the important persons who died
during that particular period. He sometimes enriches his
accounts by presenting several selected poems linked with
9 •
9
the events. His Muru .i cannot be described as a coherent
4
analytic history because he was incapable of finishing a
subject he had begun, continually diverging from his main
%
theme, by simply referring to either Akhbar al-Zaman or al-
Kitab al-Awgafr or both at the same time. Nevertheless, we
still owe to him a good deal of valuable information concerning
9 l
the Muslim Empire and the Muruj contributes a great deal of
knowledge of the subject under discussion.
F
v
Although al-Mas'udi's Muru.i does not reach the standard
of either al-Tabarl's Ta'rlkh or al-Ya'qubl's Ta'rlkh, it is
m
* +
still regarded as one of the most important Muslim universal
4
histories, and the three of them were by no means the only
accounts that grew in the fertile beginnings of early Islam.^





Al-Mas'udi's other work is Kitab al-Tanbih wa al-Ishraf^" in
»
$





a detailed account but to make a simple and brief
t
0
presentation of the significant secular or religious events
0
until his time.^ Despite its scanty contents the book
»
brings to the attention many interesting points mentioned
4





Other near-contemporary historians are: al-Mutahhar b.
Tahir al-Maqdisi^ (d. 355/966), Hamza al-Isfahani (d. 3^0/
970),^" and Ibn Miskawayh-' (d. I4.21/IO3O). All of them
except Ibn Miskawayh provide us with very scanty material
«
%
but nevertheless remain of great interest and bring to our
|
notice numerous fresh accounts untold by early historians.
0
Their works along with those of the early historians, enable
9
us to form a coherent picture of the politico-social and
9
economic situation of the 'Abbasid Empire. Ibn Miskawayh
*4
differs from the other near-contemporary his'torians in that,
9
unlike them, he provides a more detailed account of events,
4
9
probably taken from that of al-Tabari or uses the sameOf
sources as the latter. Miskawayh in volume 6 of his work
#
Ta.iarib al-Umam arranges his material according to the
9
4
1. Ed. by De Goeje, Leyden, 1891|J reprinted in Baghdad, n.d
(
2. Tanbih, pp. 14.-5•




I4.. Ta'rikh sini Muluk al-Arj, wa al-A'nbiya', printed in
Leipzig, I8I4.I4.; Beirut, n.d.
.5. Ta.iarib al-Umam, vol. VI in Kitab al-'Uyun wa al-ffada'iq
fi Akhbar al-gaqafiq,.Leyden, 1871.
17
accession of each Caliph. His work in general is very
important because of the similarity to al-Tabari's accounts,
ba ck ground
3. Later Historians
At the close of the fifth century A.H. there is the
9
ft
manuscript f\|o. 2360 of Ta'rlkh-i Dawlat-i 'Abbasiyyat,
1
Bayazid library, Istanbul. The work, by an anonymous author,
ft
comprisesll20 folios. It begins at the time of the Prophet
✓
and proceeds with the Caliphs, according to the accession of
ft
ft
each until the reign of the Caliph al-Mustanjid (559/1163).
ft
ft





this period, as he himself states, was due to his unexpected
ft
departure from Iraq which prevented him from obtaining
2
fresh and reliable material.
The author seems to have felt sympathetic towards the
4
4
'Abbasid family and to have considered them the rightful
rulers of the Muslim Empire, calling their dynasty "the
ft
victorious state", al-dawla al-qahira. His sources were
9 ft
probably written material which afforded him the opportunity
ft
to select whatever attracted his attention. Most of his
accounts are similar to those of al-Tabari and other early
4 ft
ft
historians but he put forward accounts of many interesting
1. There is another copy of this manuscript entitled, al-
Anba' fi Ta'rikh al-Khulafa', Ms. al-J%tih library Wo.
9189, Istanbul. Dr. Q. al-Samarra'i, of the University
of Leyden, who has been involved in editing this manuscript,
believes that the author is al-Imranl (d.5"7°T^il7^-ll8l4.).
*




events which we do not find in the work of other general




powerful Turkish officer and the Caliph al-Muhtadi which was
9
4
due to the former1s tyrannical actions towards the non-
Turkish subjects.^ The manuscript's major defect is the





mentioning any sort of conflict among the members of this
s
family. He praised, for example, the Caliph al-Mu'tazz
*
for his gracious attitude towards his brother al-Muwaffaq,
ignoring the enmity between this Caliph and his two
9
p





does not affect the value of his manuscript too badly and
9
*
so it is often worthwhile comparing his accounts with those
of the early sources.3
4
4
Later historians such as Ibn al-Jawzx (d. 597/1120),
%
Ibn al-Athlr (630/1232), Abu al-Fida'(d. 733/1331)» al-
V
I ♦
Dhahabi (d. 71^6/13^6), Ibn Kathir (d. 77^/1371)» Ibn Khaldun
%




2. Cf. fol. 60a.
#
3. This study does not ignore the importance of the under¬
mentioned manuscripts, which in one way or another contri¬
buted a great deal of new information: Al-Quda'i, Muhammad,
b. Salama b. Ga'far (d. I4.5I+/IO62), 'Uyum al-Ma 'arif fl Funun
Akhbar al-Khulafa', Ms. Ahmad III, library No. 2898.* Istanbul
Ibn al-Abbar, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allih (d. 658/I26O), I 'tab
al-Kuttab, Ms. B.M. Or. 661j.l, Ta'rikh Ba'd al-Nabl Ila
Tamam al-Khulafa' al-'AbbasiyyIn, (Anonymous) Ms. M.M. No.
1OI4. Ta'rlkh, Cairo; Ibn Nubata, shams al-Din (d. 750/13^9)
Kitab al-IktifaJ min Ta'rlkh al-Khulafa', Ms. M.M. No. 57
Ta'rlkh, Cairo, and Sibt Ibn al-JawzI, Mir*at al-Zaman
(vols-. IX, X) Ms. M.M. No. I4.66, Ta'rikh, Cairo.
19
(d. Bk5/14-^2) and al Suyuti (d. 911/1505) depend heavily on
early sources for their information and their accounts of
the early fAbbasid period are more often a summary. Despite
this defect they are. still of some value to the student of
9
early 'Abbasid history, and their material to a greater or
I
lesser extent can be compared with that of the early
historians.
Ibn al-Athlr and later Ibn Khaldun for example, give
9
very detailed accounts' of the affairs of the western
9
provinces of the Empire and they felt obliged in their works
to fill the gap which al-Tabarl for instance had left. More-
*
over they provide us with very clear accounts of the
9 • »
Khawarij revolts in al-Jazira which our early historians seem
9




probably written material such as the work of Abu Zakariya
al-Azdi1 (d. 331^/914-3) Ta'rxkh al-Mawsil. 2
B) Local Historians
.General chronicles such as those of al-Tabari and al-
9
Mas'udl concentrate on the imperial province of Iraq and
.) ♦
its surrounding districts; mention is made of the distant
provinces only in connection with significant incidents
9
or rebellions. Even then, the information they provide
4




information derived from local histories such as Ta'rlkh
1. GAL, SI, 210; F. Rosenthal, index; M. Canard, Histoire .
de la Dynastie des Hamdanides, Algiers, 1951* I* 17J
Al-Azdi, Ta'rlkh, ak-Mawsil, vol. II, introduction; EI^
s.v. al-Azdi.
9
2. Ed. by A. Hablbah, Cairo, 1387/1969."
20
/ "I v ^ ™ O
Tabaristan and Ta'rikh-i Sistan becomes mope vital. But
t . ,,
9
one must be very wary in accepting their accounts because
of their sympathetic feeling toitfards their own region. It




supplied by local historians is rarely of the kind to
t
satisfy the quest of the general historian. Although some
4




regime, a very clear idea of the situation can"be obtained






A great deal of information in the early part of this
*
study has been gleaned from Ta'rikh al-Mawsil by al-Azdi.
Much fresh and useful material can be obtained from this
♦
#
work concerning the other provinces of the Empire, especially
the central part, despite the fact that the author's main
object was to write the history of al-Mawsil and Jazira.
/
j
Other local historians who cover the western provinces
9
9
for instance include the following writers. Al-Kindi^ (d.
%
350/961) Kitab al-Wulat wa Kitab al-Qudat^" covers the
'Abblsid period till almost the middle of the fourth century
A.H. Al-Maqrizi^ (d. 81+5/lI4J4.I-2) Khitat^ contains various
1. Ed. by A. Iqbal, Tehran, 191+1; an abridged translation
by E.G. Brown, Leyden, 1905.
2. Ed. by Malik al-Shu'ara' Bihar, Tehran, 1311+ A.H.
3. GAL, I, 11+9; SI, 229-30; P. Rosenthal, pp. 162-63; EI"*",
s.v. al-Kindi.
1+. Ed. by R. Guest, "E.J.W. Gibb Memorial series" vol. XIX,
Leyden, 1912.
5. Suyuti, Husn al-Muha^ara, Cairo, 1882, I, 321; GAL, I,
[+98; II, 385 SI, 305; A. al-'Azzawi, Historians of Iraq,
I, Baghdad, 1376/1957, 231-32; ■ P. Rosenthal, pp. 155f, '
171, 175; EI1, s.v. al-MakrizI. *





kinds of information on governors, local revolts, the
attitude of the Dhimmis to**rards the Muslims and a chapter
ft
on religious sects. It is a very comprehensive analytical
work on Egypt. Ibn Taghrl Bardl^" (d. 8714-/111-69) al-Nu.jum
— P
Zihira fi Muluk Misr wa- al-Qahira^ is mainly concerned
with Egypt from the time of the Arab conquest. However.
ft
A
like some other local historians, he gives some brief
information concerning other provinces. Ibn al-kdTm^ (d.
660/1261) in his Zubdat al-Halab fi Ta'rikh Halab^' does not
confine himself to the history of Aleppo, but extends his
A
work to include the whole region of. Bilad al-Sham which,
despite his scanty material, renders his book of special
ft
importance in dealing with the area.
ft
As far as the eastern provinces'are concerned, the
%
works of Ibn Isfandiyar and the anonymous TaJrikh-i Sistan
t
s
are of some value in the study of the early 'Abbas id period
ft
especially when dealing with the affairs of the eastern
9 t
9
provinces, and their relations with the capital.
1. Al-Sakhawi, al-l'lam bi al-Tawbikh, Baghdad, 1963, pp.
305-308; Shadharat. IX, 317; Ibn lyas, Bada^i' al-Zuhur
III, 1+3; gajji Khalifa, I, 356; GAL, II, 1|1; 511, 39.;
A. al-'Azziwi, I, 2I4.5-I+8; EI^ s.v. Abu 1-Mahasin.
2. Leyden, I85I and then Cairo 1929-39.
3. Al-Sakhawi, p. 125; Yaqut, VI, I8-I4.6; Hajji Khalifa, I,
200; GAL, I, 332; SI, 568-9; S. Dahan, "The origin and
development of local histories of Syria", HME, pp. 108-17
A. al-'Azzawi, pp. 77~835 Rosenthal, pp. 156ff;
EI^ s.v'. Ibn al-'Adim.





The biographical works are important to this study
because they not only contain information of a personal
nature about many of the personalities of the 'Abbasid era,
to
♦ I
but because they also provide interesting accounts of their
political and social careers. Typical examples of these
are the works of al-Khallfa b. Khayyat (d. 240/864.); al-
to
Khatlb al-Baghdadi (d. 1^.63/1071); Ibn Khaliikan (d. 681/
• «
to
1282); Ibn 'Asakir (d. 571/1176) and Ibn Shakir al-Kutubi
0
(d. 761j/1363).
The work of al-Baghdadi"*" TaJrxkh Baghdad^ is also of
to
special value because the author's main subjects were the
*
personalities of Baghdad. Therefore after dealing with the
topography of Baghdad, he proceeds to give biographical
data on all important personalities who visited, lived in,
to
or even passed through, the city. The biographies of al-
• ♦ 9








The work of Ibn Khaliikan,3 Wafayat al-A'yan^ is
1. Wafayat, I, 23-32; Muntazam, VIII, 265-70; Ibn Kathir,
. XII, 101-103; Yaqut, I, 2l+6-60| GAL, I, 329; SI, 562;
P. Rosenthal, index; HME, index; EI^ s.v. Al-Khatib al-
Baghdadi.
2. Published in Cairo, 14 vols., 1349/1931.
3. Ibn Hajar, al-Durar al-Kamina. Ill, Heyderbad, 1373/1954*
233; Ibn Kathir,.XIII, 301; Shadharat, V, 370ff; GAL,
I, 326-28j SI, 561; de Slane's introduction to his
translation of Ibn Khallikan's work; P. Rosenthal, pp. 82
84; A. al-'Azzawi, pp. 95-102; HME, index; EI^, s.v.
Ibn Kha 11 ik in.
4« Translated into English by M.G. de Slane, I4. vols. London,
I843-I87I; published in Cairo, 2 vols., 1299/1882; then
Bulaq 1888; Beirut 4 vols., then ed. by I. Abbas, -




arranged alphabetically because in the words of the author
himself, "It is easier than arranging it chronologically.""''
He deals with all kinds of people but excludes the companions
of the Prophet and the Caliphs because, also in his own.
2
words, "There is too much information about them." Ibn
Khallikan'3 method is to state several sources for each
biography included in'his work. This suggests that his
*
material*is selected from well-known works.
%
9
Abu al-Faraj al-Isfahini^ (d. 356/967) Maqatil al-
h
Talibiyyin^" occupies a special place in this category, simply




in one way or another from the early period of Islamic
*
history until the reign of the Caliph al-Muqtadir (21+6-311/
908-932). Though the author itfas pro-'Alid (Zaydite) he
does not seem to have been biased in his historical
information as he names his various authorities and gives




recognizes the leader of the revolt in Hijaz during the
4
reign of al--Mu'tazz as an 'Alid, he avoids presenting his
• «
revolt in detail simply because of the rebel's tyrannical
5
actions.-^
•1. Wafayat , I, 2. ■«
2. Wafayat, I, 3. .
3. Wafayat, I, 1+21-22; Yaqut, V, 11+9-68; Baghdad, XI,
398-1+00; GAL, I, 11+6; SI, 225-6.
1+. Published in Tehran 1307 A.H. and in Najaf, 1353 A.H.
%






Literature is an important, category of material in the
|
*
study of early 'Abbasid history, and the following writers
s




RasaJil, illustrates the true circumstances in which the
army was placed during the period under consideration.




structure of the army, it must not be taken as indisputable
fact mainly because of - the period in which it was written.
'Abd Allah b. al-Mu'tazz^ (d. 296/908) the author of
Rasa'il Ibn al-Mu'tazz^1" who was contemporary to the period
and a. descendant of the royal family,, gives a very analytical
• •
and comprehensive picture of the political situation of the
t
Caliphate. He clearly illustrates the influence of the
4
Turkish officers at the court and-the harsh circumstances
9
9
which had been forced on the Caliphs by these officers after
the murder of al-Mutawakkil.
Other literary works differ in their contribution to
this study and typical of these are the works of Ibn 'Abd
Baghdad, XII, 212-22; Yaqut, VI, 56-80; Ibn Kathir,
XI, 19-20; M.K. Ali, Umara* al-Bayan, Cairo, 1355/1937J
GAL. I, 152, 3^2; SI, 239, 2-1-03; EI2 s.v. Al-D.iahiz.
2. Ed. by A.S.M. Harun, 2 vols., Cairo, 138lj./l961f.-
3» Fihrist, pp. 168-69; Muntazam. VI, 8I1-88; Ibn Kathir,
XI, 108-110; GAL, I, 79-80; SI, 128-30; A.K. Zakx, Ibn
al-Mu'tazz al-'Abbasi, Cairo, 1965; EI2, s.v. Ibn al-
Mu'tazz.
♦ 6
I4.. Ed. by M. A.M. al-Khafajl, Cairo, l365/l9ii-6.
5. Ibn al-Mu'tazz, Rasa*11, pp. 82-83.
25
♦
Rabbih1 (d. -328/9kO). al-'Iqd al-Farid;2 al-Silli3 (d. 335/
91+.6) Akhbar al-Buhturi^" and Abu al-Faraj al-Isfahan'i's
•
■
Kitab al-Aghani.3 Although all these works deal mainly
with prose and poetry, they provide us with numerous account
%
s
of certain historical events. The most significant of thes
is the struggle for succession amongst the members of the
4














The important geographers include Ibn Khurdadhbih (d.
300/912), al-Istakhri7 (d. 3^6/977), Ibn al-Faqlh8 (d. 3^5/






1. Tha'alibi, Yatimat al-dahr, I, 300-301^.5 Ibn-Khaqan,
MafcmaJj al-Anfus, Istanbul, I302/I88I4., pp. 51-53J Wafayat
I, 32-33J Yaqut, II, 67-725 Suyuti, Bughyat, p. I6I5
GAL, I, 15i|., SI, 250-2515 EI2, s.v. Ibn 'Abd Rabbih.
2. Published in Cairo, V, vols. 191|1|--191|.6.
3. Fihrist, pp. 215-I65 al-Sam'ani, fol. 3575 Wafayat, I,
51-555 Hajji Khalifa, index5 GAL, I, II4.3, II4.5.
Ij.. Ed. by al-Ashtar, Damascus, 1378/1958.
5. Published in 20 vols., Bulaq I285/I8685 Leyden, 21 vols.
1888. Tables by I.Guidi. Leyden, 1895-19015 Cairo, 20
vols., 133i|./l9l65 and Cairo, 1927.
ft
6. Kitab al-Masalik wa al-Mamilik, ed. by de Goeje, Leyden,
.1889.
7. Kitab al-Masalik wa al-Mamalik, ed. by de Goe.je, Leyden,
I87O5 Kitab al-Aqalim, Baghdad, n.d.
8. Kitab al-Buldan, ed. by de Goeje, Leyden, 1885.
4
9. Kitab al-Masalik wa al-Mamalik, ed. by de Goeje, Leyden,
■ 1873; §urat al-Ard, ed. by J.H. Kramers, Leyden, 1938.
10.Ahsan al-Taqasim fi Ma'rifat al-Aqalira, ed. by de Goeje,
Leyden, 1906.
26
and Yiqut1 (d. 626/1228). Although they deal mainly
with the geographical description of the various provinces
► s
and cities, they provide us with some historical information
which sheds light on the position of. the Islamic Empire
0
especially after the recruitment of the Turkish slaves to
the army Indeed, their work may in certain cases help
us to understand the sort of relationship which existed
*
♦ «
between the capital and the different provinces of the
• )
♦
Empire. • In addition to the above named geographers, mention




which certain historical facts can be verified, in
• t
y •
particular those concerned with the central government. •
V
0








SURVEY OF THE CONFLICT AMONG THE 'ABBASID FAMILY-
ft
*
Preliminary to any description of the situation of the
'Abbas id family in the period under consideration, some
t
attention should be paid to the rivalries and alliances
4
which characterized its internal structure since the very
date of the establishment of the dynasty. This instability
within the family itself contributed in a large measure to
r
4
the insecurity of the Caliphs occupying the throne at any
given time since the reign of al-Hadi (169-170/785-786);
ft
in fact, evidence of it can be seen in the very first years
of the dynasty when al-S'affab (132-136/71+9-15b) ignored the
ft
right of his uncle 'Abd Allah to succeed to the Caliphate
and nominated instead al-Mansur (138-158/751+-775) and 'Isa b.
Musa respectively as his successors.-'- When 'Abd Allah sought
ft
to assert his claim a civil war broke out in which he was
V
supported by various military contingents from Khurasan,
Syria and Jazlra. Therefore, al-Mansur was forced to rely
%
on the support of Abu Muslim al-Khurasanl despite the
dislike and distrust he felt for him.
ft
Abu Ja'far al-Mansur, who ascended the throne in 136/751-1-
faced a very critical situation throughout the Empire, ■
1. Tab., Ill, 87. It is recorded that 'Abd Allah felt
entitled to the throne on the basis of al-Saffall's promise
that whoever from among the 'Abbasids pursued and killed
Marwan II, (127-132/71+1+-750) the last Umayyad Caliph,
would be his successor. Tab., Ill, 92-93J Azdi, p. 163.
ft
2. A1-Khalifa, Ibn Khayyat, Ta'rikh, ed. by A. al-'umari,
Baghdad, I386/I968, II, 1+37; Tab., Ill, 88; Azdi,






caused by his uncle's revolt and the enmity between the
f
Caliph and his powerful general, Abu Muslim. Moreover,
it is said that 'Isa b. 'Abd Allah b. ■ 'Abbas demonstrated
ft
4
the oath of allegiance to himself instead of 'Abu Ja 'far
*
I
al-Mansur but when /Abu Muslim arrived in the capital people
*
4







When 'Isa remained alone and Abu Ja'far entered the
city, 'Isa apologised for his misconduct, pretending that he
wanted to control the army and maintain the security."^" In
ll|.7/76l|., after having vanquished his uncle 'Abd Allah and
%
other rebels in the provinces, the Caliph felt rather more
ft
secure on the throne, and he directed his attention to
&
depriving 'Isa b. Musa from his place as second in line of
ft
succession. Al-Man§ur seems for a long time to have had
the intention of making his son, al-Mahdi# heir-apparent,
9
ft
depriving his nephew 'Xsa b. Musa of the succession. When
ft
9
al-Mansur suggested this to 'Isa, the latter rejected it out
of hand, and the Caliph was so displeased that he dismissed
4
'Xsi from the seat of honour on his right, and treated him
o





1. Ibn Qutayba, al-Imama wa al-Siyasa, II, I33~3k'°
Dinawari, al-Akhbar al-Tiwil, p. 375; cf. Yaqubi, III,
85J Azdi, p. 161. Abu Muslim tried to persuade 'Xsa
to be the Caliph instead, but he refused to do so. Ibn
ft
al-A'tham, al-Kuf1, Kitab al-Futuh, II, 235a.














stratagems which were used by the Caliph to persuade his
i/ *
nephew to step down, and also, the treatment which the
other members of the family met with during his reign.^
0
Al-Mansur finally succeeded in securing the consent .of 'Isi
9
0
b. Musa in recognizing al-Mahdi as the next successor.^
• •
Anwar G. Chejne considers the correspondence between al-
0
$
Man§ur and 'Isi b.. Musa at this time to be indicative of the
<
V i
thinking underlying the 'Abbasids* view on the succession,3





'Abbasid family since the initial establishment of their
#
rule. In 151/768 a1 -Mansur, hox>rever, renewed' the oath of
- ■
0
allegiance guaranteeing his son and 'isa'b. Musa as his
M
successors respectively.^ The reason behind this
9
9
divergence seems to be the desire of the Caliphs to pass on
the authority to their direct progeny. It seems that they
9
• '
did not pay much attention to the friction caused thereby and
0
which, as we shall see, was to. result in the removal of all
\
real authority from their hands into those of more capable
9
elements in the administration.
9




death reached the capital, Ja'far - the eldest son of al-
9
Mansur'- proclaimed himself the Caliph instead of hisd *
« . *
brother al-Mahdi. But when the latter shortly after arrived
in Baghdad the former submitted to his authority and excused
, 9
1. Yaqubi, III, 96; Tab., Ill, 125-127; Azdi, pp. 200-201.
9
0
2. Ibn Khayyat, II, i|52; cf.'Dinawari, p. 382.
4
,
3. Anwar G. Chejne, Succession to the Rule in Islam. Lahore,
1960, . p. 82.
9






himself for his misconduct. Barely.one year after his
accession to the Caliphate, al-Mahdl 158-169/775-785
0
followed the precedent set by his father and endeavoured
0
9





to 'Isa b. Musa, who had made his residence in Kufa,
4
demanding that he appear before him.^ This 'isa refused
0
*









presence of many witnesses, comprising Hashimites, mawali,
4
Qurashites, viziers, secretaries and judges.3 The Caliph




possible, arid for this reason he ordered the statement of
•
»
abdication to be read publicly in the main mosque. There-■
4
upon in 160/776 homage was paid to his son Musa as crown-





1. Ibn Qutayba, II, 151* But it is reported that Ja'far died
in the year 150/767. Azdi, p. 211.
2. Yaqubi, III, 107; Tab., Ill, 97lj--6; Azdi, p. 238.
3. Azdi, p. 238. On one occasion al-Mahdl became impatient
_ _ •
:• and wrote to 'Isa saying that if he did not comply xtfithA
>
the request and resign, so that the oath of allegiance
could be made to Musi and Harun, his sons, he would deem
4
it lawful to treat him as a rebel. On the other hand,
♦
if he consented to the request, he would be given in return
that which is more profitable and more immediately useful
than ttie Caliphate. Tab., Ill, I4.681 Anwar G. Chejne,
p. 87,
0
ij.. Al-Ya'qubi includes it with the events of the year 159/775
and simply mentions that, shortly after, Harun was
proclaimed as the successor of al-Hadl. The price paid
for this resignation was estimated to be one million





The clash of wills and temperaments among the members
ft
ft
of the royal family became apparent as the question of




remained closer to the Capital than his younger brother,
Harun, who was sent away on expeditions against
v
ft
Byzantium. But shortly afterwards, in 162/778, the caliph
had Harun proclaimed second in line to the throne.
N. Abbott, in her socio-political study of the period under
consideration, suggests that al-Hadl, who had every prospect




could hardly be expected to be enthusiastic over Harun®s
ft
heirship, especially as he felt that the undercurrents of
P




The harmony which might be expected between the Caliph
ft
and his sons did not last for long because hew promotions
*
*
became involved in the dispute over the succession.
Khayzuran, for example, who was the favourite wife of al~
Mahdi, wished her younger son Harun to be the first in
line of succession. He was also supported by the
t
1. Dinawarx, p. 382j Harun came in for such considerations
ft
as a result of his successful campaign against the
4
Byzantines, which resulted in the favourable treaty of
163/782 with the Empress Irene. Moreover, one should
not overlook the influence of Harun's sympathisers
ft
especially that of his mother Khayzuran and the Baramika.
Tab., Ill, 1, Ii.9l4.-95 , 503-5; • Azdi, pp. 21+3, 21^6. ' Al-
Azdx states that al-Mahdl proclaimed Harun as successor
to al-Hadi in 166/782. Azdl, p. 2Ij.7.
2. N. Abbott, Two Queens of Baghdad, Chicago, 191+.6. p. 69.
32
*
Baramika. A'1-Mahdi seems to have come under pressure




and his son, al-Hadi, drifted further apart. In consequence,
it was decided to send al-Hadi on an expedition to the region
9
of Jurjan, east of the Caspian sea. There is certain
evidence to show that the Caliph" and his son held divergent
p
views on the policy to be pursued in this region. During
*
this campaign the conflict between the two grew wider and
deeper. In the meantime, al-Mahdl had to place Harun ahead
4
of al-Hadi in the line of succession. And .in 169/785-86,
he sent some leading members of the royal family to inform
4
0
his- son of the new arrangement, but the delegation failed*
to win al-Hadi's agreement. The Caliph then sent a group
1. Harun received his first instruction and training at the
hands of Khalid b. Barraak, and his connection with the
family of the latter, especially with the Khalid'3 son
Yahya, was to continue into his own Caliphate. "It was .
claimed that there were certain foster-relationships
between the Baramika and the 'Abbasids, one of them being
that of Harun and Fa$l b. Yahya. N. Abbott, p. 635 EI^,
s.v., Baramika. Moreover, Yahya was the real manager
and administrator of Harun^ governmental affairs. Tab.,
II, 5k5>
m
2. Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, 'Iqd al-Farid, Cairo 1293/1876, I, 70.
It was clear that al-Mahdl relented in his opposition to
Ibrahim al-Harrani, whom he now allowed to accompany al-
Hadi. He might have been partly responsible for al-Hadl^s
attitude towards his father, which is in evidence shortly
after, when the Caliph summoned Ibrahim to the capital and
al-Hidi rejected the demand. Tab., Ill, 583; Kamil, VI,
70; Fakhri, pp. cf. Yaqubi, III, 112; Azdi, pp.
253-25^ and Dinawarx, p. 382 who do not mention that any
kind of conflict existed between the Caliph and his son.
They simply stated that the Caliph died during his
expedition to Jurjan.
33










Mahdl set out to subdue his stubborn son in person, but did
1
not reach him, because of his sudden death. N. Abbott
sees al-Mahdx?s death as an end of one period of Khayzuran's
ft
life, and the beginning of another, saying that behind him







The atmosphere of intrigue and distrust was to affect
the family relationships of the dynasty throughout the future
m
years, influencing thereby .the politico-religious institution
ft
on which the state was based. It is noticeable that until
ft
< ft «
this time the struggle for the succession was confined to
individuals of direct 'Abbasid descent, i.e. the Caliph and
his sons or uncles, though there were others behind the
%
scenes who were encouraging the parties in one way or another.
ft
The Caliph always sought to keep the power in the hands of
his favourite son up to the period under consideration, when
ft ♦
the main reason for the conflict in the Empire seems to
ft
have been exclusively the problem of succession.
•
•
At the time of al-Mahdi the courtiers seem to have
gained a direct influence in governmental affairs.^
1. Tab., Ill, 523; Kamil, VI, 5k-
2. N. Abbott, p. 76.
3. The blind poet Bashshar b. Burd, partly out of his
personal grievances and partly out of public indignation,
composed a scathing verse that not only devoured the
Caliph and his vizier but had political and dynastic
ft
implications. "0 Sons of Umayyah," cried the poet, "wake
up". Too long have you been asleep. Verily, Ya'qub b.
Dawud is the Caliph. 0 People, your Caliphate is ruined!
Look for the Caliph amidst the wineskin and the lute."
Tab., Ill, [j.87-90, 508-1; Jahshiyari, pp. I85-6; Fakhri,





Their influence led the Caliph to change his earlier
nomination to the succession, and to designate his younger
son as a first heir apparent, instead of the eldest.
♦ »
Ultimately the Caliph's plan was foiled by his sudden
death. Nevertheless, this action by the Caliph was to open
. s
a liew phase in the history of the family and the involvement
✓
of the secretaries and courtiers in this conflict became '
inevitable. Moreover, for the first time in the history of
9
♦
the family the Caliph-elect knew in advance that a rival, in
this case his own brother, might try to overthrow him.
Until the end of al-Mahdi's reign the Caliphs could be
t •
%
considered the dominant figure in the policy of the Empire;
and even though his policy might be supported by certain
9
9
personalities, they remained behind the scene and superficially




During the reign of al-Mahdi, especially in its later
phase, the policy of the court was influenced by courtiers
and self-interested individuals. Al-Hadi's accession, in
169/785, caused great discontent among those who favoured
his brother Hirun. When the inhabitants of the capital
received the news of the Caliph's death while al-Hadl was
1. It is reported that Raytah, the Caliph's other wife,
gave him two sons, 'Ubayd Allah and 'All, bom in
II4.5/762 and lij.7/76^, respectively. Though both boys
grew to manhood, held important positions, and outlived
their father, neither of them, despite their mother's
9
royal descent, was ever considered for the Caliphate.
Tab., Ill, 550-51; Baghdad, X, 311; XII, 5k> cf-









l-l 2still on campaign in Jurjan, riots broke out in the city.'1
Khayzuran sent for both Rabi' b. Yunus and Yahj^a b. Barmak;
4
the former answered her summons and was placed in control
9
of affairs, while Yahya remained aloof, fearing al~Hadifs
^
9
displeasure should he appear to be co-operating with
Khayzuran. Al-Hadi himself suspected his mother of being
♦
behind the plot to replace him by Harun who enjoyed the
support of Yahya. But Yahya had already advised Harun
I 9
to accept al-Hadi's right to the succession and to pay him
due homage.^" Harun, however, with the help of his
dignitaries had succeeded in quelling the riot, and bribed
4
the army into good behaviour by offering them two years'
pay.5 ■
»
As soon as the Caliph al-Hadi arrived in Baghdad, he
9
■ decided to appoint Rabi' b. Yunus as his first vizier,
4
despite the warning letter which he had sent to Rabi',
t
threatening him with death. Moreover, the Caliph allowed
Yahya to continue the administration of the property of his
- « A
brother, Harun, who was now next in line of succession.
. . %
9
1. The province of Jurjan lay at the south-eastern corner
of the Caspian and consisted for the most part of the
broad plains and valleys watered by the two rivers Jurjan
and Atrak. Le Strange, p. 376.
2. Tab., Ill, 5k5~k6; Karoil, VI, 58-59.
3. Supra p.32,.footnote, I.
ij.. Yaqubi, III, 113; Tab., Ill, 5k5l Azdi, p. 257. Muruj,
VI, 261; Kamil, VI, 51+; Baghdad, XIII, 21-22.
5. Tab., Ill, 5^4-6. Another narrative by Fa<Jl. b. Sulayman
indicates that the pay was for eighteen months only.
• Ibid., 51+7.
6. Tab., Ill, 514.6-14.8; Muru j, VI, 265; Kamil, VI, 59-60;
Jahshiyari, p. 197; N. Abbott, pp. 79-80; cf. Anwar





During the first few months of his reign, al-Hadi
♦
4
apparently allowed his mother all the privileges and free¬
dom she had enjoyed under.his father; for instance, she
#
*
used to entertain Ya^ya, RabI' and several other retainers
1 — w
at her house. Later al-Hadi grew suspicious of her
♦1
activities and a letter was sent to her, warning her not to
4
entertain any more visitors from among either the generals
p
or the statesmen. The Caliph went even further and
*
bitterly criticized his mother for actions which he regarded
as exceeding the bounds of feminine modesty, and for her
4
4
improperly lavish generosity. The Caliph stated that it
a
4
was not dignified for Ttfomen to interfere in affairs of state,
s
and commanded his mother to concentrate on religious
%
observances and to accept the sound role required of her
4
sex.-^ The Caliph then called together his generals and
>
excused them for paying so much attention to his mother's
orders. On hearing of this public humiliation, Khayzuran
• reacted strongly, dissociating herself from all he might do,
4
vowing that she would never again speak to him. She did in
•
«
fact keep her vow and was never again in his presence until
his death.^
4




mother and son were openly at war, each plotting the down-
4




1. For details concerning the role of Khayzuran at the court
see N. Abbott, pp. 51+ff-
2. Tab., Ill, 569; Muru.1, VI, 269-70; Kamil, VI, 68.
3. Tab., Ill, 569-71; Muru.1, VI, 282-83.





successful, went to al-Hadi; the second, swift and final
round brought victory to Khayzuran. Between the two rounds
- - 1




The Caliph's policy towards the succession seems to
4
have been influenced by certain courtiers whose own fate
depended completely on the Caliph and his future successor.
ft
These dignitaries took advantage of the situation and
* ♦
encouraged al-Hadi to exclude his brother from the line of
succession, nominating his nine year old son Ja'far, instead.
« ft




certain about his loyalty. This is clearly apparent even
«
from the events which took place in the early years of his
reign.^
In any case, the Caliph succeeded for a while in
isolating Harun by threatening everyone who attempted to
associate with him; but Yalaya and his son Fa$l did not
ft
break off their connections. When al-Hadi invited Yahya
S
to his palace to discuss the matter of the succession, the
ft
ft
1. N. Abbott, p. 92. It is related that al-Hadi went so far
as to send his mother a dish of poisoned rice, but
Khayzuran discovered his plot. Al-Hadi, awaiting results
sent to enquire how his mother liked the dish and was dis¬
appointed to learn that his plot had failed. Thwarted in
his purpose, he sent back this reply: "You did not eat it
for had you eaten it, I would certainly have been rid of
you now. When did a Caliph ever prosper who had a
(living) mother?" Tab., Ill, 570-71; TBN, fol. 59a;
Kamil, VI, 68; N. Abbott, p. 10^..
ft
2. Yaqubi, III, 115; Tab., Ill, 571ff» Personalities such
as Yazid b. Mazyad, Muhammad b. Farukh al-Azdl, 'Abd Allah
b. Malik and 'All b. 'Xsa who were among the most
intimate friends of the Caliph.





latter stressed the dangers of encouraging the renunciation
s
of allegiance to the succession and establishing a precedent
which might easily lead later to the harm of his son, Ja'far
ft
Finally Yahya advised the Caliph to retain his brother as
first in line, and nominate his sc>n as second in succession.
The. Caliph seems to have yielded to Ya£yaf3 arguments and
ft
commended him for his excellent advice, implying that he
would follow it. Yahya further suggested to al-Hadi that
ft
he should wait until Ja'far came of age and then he could
ft
p
summon Harun and make him renounce the succession.,41 What-
ever may have been al-Hadifs true intention, his generals
were adamant that Ja'far should be nominated the Caliph's
successor instead of Harun. Yahya grew fearful of the
suspicions of al-Hidi and apparently kept himself aloof
from Khayzuran, so as to avoid further complications from
ft
that quarter.
Intrigues and plots became the normal political
^ ft
activity of the capital, with two clearly distinct groups
engaged in the struggle - the Caliph and his supporters on
one side and Harun, the Baramika, Khayzuran and their
✓
ft
factions on the other.^ When Yahya felt he was becoming
ft
isolated from the affairs of state after the death of the
%
1. Tab., Ill, 373—7ij-S Kamil, VI, 65; Jahshiyari, pp. 202-1
cf. Anwar G. Cheine, p. 91. Al-Azdi states that Yahya
claimed to have important things to say, therefore the
ft
Caliph allowed him to speak. Azdi, p. 260.
• 4
2\ Tab., Ill, -5711.-5; Muru.i, VI, 281, Kamil, VI.
ft
.3. Tab., Ill, 575-
i|.. Tab., Ill, 572ff.
39
I
vizier RabI' b. Yunus, he intrigued to have one of his own
%
*
trusted men appointed as secretary to the new vizier,
ft
Ibrahim b. al-Harrani, in order to be kept informed of new
1 - - —
developments. Yahya at the same time recommended to Harun
9
that he absent himself from the capital on the pretext of
4
2'
going on a hunting trip.- Even this deepened the
*




opposition to Yahya, suggesting that he had ulterior motives
in removing Harun from their observation and with the help
of. certain governors they were planning to murder Yahya for
ft
*
partisanship towards Harun, in order to maintain their own
0
■5
supremacy. When the Caliph again approached Yahya to
#0
*




latter would not change his position and both he and Harun
I
were imprisoned on the grounds of having plotted revolution.4"
ft
Harun, however, was condemned in public as unfit for the
succession. The generals were planning to kill both Harun
9
and Yahya; however, the sudden death of the Caliph brought
ft
this plot to naught.
C. Brockelmann considers the death of al-Hadi as one
of the early defects through which the 'Abbasid dynasty
finally perished. E.A. Balyaev emphasises the importance
of the courtiers* rivalry and considers it the main reason
ft
1. Tab., Ill, 572 & 598; Jahshiyari, pp. 199-200.
*
2. Tab., Ill, 575; Muru.j, VI, 281.
3. Tab., Ill, 598, 600.
[j.. Tab., Ill, 599-600; Muru,j, VI, 280-81; Kamil, VI, 69.
ft
5. C. Brockelmann, History of the Muslim Peoples, tr. by
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soldiers under the command of General Harthama b. A yun,
4 9
9
rushed towards the palace and threatened the young Prince
✓
Ja'far. whom al-Hadi had appointed as his successor. Then
Ja'far submitted to their terms and publicly abdicated the
4
4
Caliphate on the following morning, declaring that it belonged
to his uncle Harun and that he did not have any claim to it.3
9
This statement, however, shows clearly that the Caliph's
s
power had decreased, and the real masters of the Empire were
I




reason for the weakening of the Caliph's position was the9
* 1
conflict with his family concerning the succession, which
• •
allowed the courtiers, generals, and statesmen to play a
4
9
free hand in government affairs on the one hand and to
9 •
4
increase their supremacy on the other.
4
9





endured many hardships in his struggle for- power, even
ft




troubles he had himself experienced, once he became the
ft
Caliph, he followed the same policy as his predecessors with
regard to the succession. Though not unaware of the
dangerous consequences which such a policy could"produce,
9 ♦
Q
he could not overcome his natural desire to maintain the
ft
♦
1. E.A. .Belyaev, Arabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate in the
m
*
Early Middle Ages. tr. by A. Gourevitch, London, 1969,
p. 198.
A *
2. EI , s.v., Harthama b. A'ytJn.









Caliphate within his own progeny, not only nominating them
as his successors, but in fact, dividing the Empire for
4
4 '
their benefit. The Caliph, at the time of his accession,
9
was content to follow his mother's advice and relieve him-
40
self of certain responsibilities by entrusting them to
0
Yahya.^" Later, however, after the death of Khayzuran,
in 173/789, this humiliating situation began to xtfeigh upon
him, the more since the desire to impose his own will
P
increased. Professor Watt considers this change-in
attitude as the beginning of the Caliphs' search for a solid
basis for their pox-jer, adding that it initiated the conflict
between the autocratic bloc and the constitutionalists.^ In
*
%0 # f
175/792, al-Rashld nominated his five year old son, Muhammad
(later al-Amin) as his successor and it was generally
0
• believed that the Caliph was influenced in this by the fact
0
0
that the boy was of pure Arab blood, as well as by his
<
affection for his mother, Zubayda.^" More senior 'Abbasid
0
1. Tab., Ill, 6O3-I4.1 Muru.i. VI, 288; EI2, s.v. Baramika.
? v
2. EI, s.v. Baramikaj C. Brockelmann, pp. 11^-115. Al-Azdi
reports that in this year (173/789) al-Rashld announced
the appointment of his son as governor of Iraq and al-Sham.
Azdi, p. 270, but we do not.know which son.
0
3. W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh,
1968, p. 85.
I|.. Tab., Ill, 610-11; Dinax^arl, p. 383J Kamil, VI, 83.
Regarding al-Rashld's relationships with other members
of the family, it was said that he was honoured by his
half brother Ibrahim b. al-Mahdl as a result of the
influence of Ja'far b. Ya^ya: Tab., Ill, 673» Al-Rashid






pretenders denounced this nomination because of Muhammad's
immaturity, but the Caliph eventually got his wish when al-
Padll b. Yahya, at the'persuasion of Zubayda, secured the
allegiance of Khurasan to the young Crown Prince, after
which other provinces followed suit.-*-
4
In 182-83/798-799, al-Rashld repeated his own experience
under al-Hadl by nominating his son .'Abd Allah (later al-
— o
Ma'mun) as second in the line of succession, the reason
being, we are told, that 'Abd Allah's natural wit exceeded
that of his brother Muhammad. But after the decision, al-
9 *
Rashid seems to have been worried about the future of his
s
%
sons, aware of the jealousy and antagonism of al-Amin towards
his brother, which was instigated by his mother and the
Hashimit es.
Zubayda was jealous of al-Ma'muin, especially after he
4
%
had been designated second in line of succession, and she
A




consequence of this al-Ma'mun was appointed to the governor-
4
ship of Khurasan which was on the whole the most turbulent
4
4
province to control. The Caliph, however, was aware of
•
• « «




1.' Yaqubi, III, 117; Tab., Ill, 611; Baghdad, IX, 138-39;
O
_
EI , s.v. Baramika; cf. Anwar G. Chejne, pp. 93—91(-•
2. Dinawari, pp. 3®3s 3&5* of. Ibn al-'Ibrl, The Chronography
of Bar Hebraeus. ed. tr. by E.A. Wallis Budge, Oxford, 1932
I, 122. He states that al-Rashid did hot declare al-
Ma'mun as successor but only al-Amin and al-Qasim.
•
,
3. Yaqubi, III, 122, Tab., Ill, 6I4.7 & 652; Muruj, VI, 323-25;
Karail, VI, 110.
I4.. It is clear that the rivalry between the half-brothers, so
opposed in natural gifts and character and yet both so
close to their father's heart from the start, began to be








against his son. He therefore allocated to him considerabl
0




ambitions, and protested to the Caliph himself. Al-Mas'udi
*
9
describes the Caliph's reaction, stating that he quite
4
evidently lost his patience, and rebuked his wife severely .
✓
P
for meddling in the affairs of his Empire. At the same
9
time he pointed out that al-Ma*mun had greater need for
9
9 *
military forces than al-Amin. The Caliph dismissed her
complaint with the words, "We fear for 'Abd Allah at the
9






Although al-Rashid was in more complete control of the
*
*9 4
affairs of the state, and the dynasty than his- two pre-
9
9
decessors had been, even he could find- no acceptable
0





harmony in the realm. He foresaw the dangers which the
•
•
dynasty might have to face after his death, and he sought
9 9
i
to identify each of the sensitive provinces with a member
9
9
of the 'Abbasid family. Thus in- 186/802, he designated
t
another son, al-Qasim, as third in line to the throne, and
4 9
1. Muru.i, VI, 325-26-; cf. Dinawari, p. 38!].. E.A. Belyaev




of exploitation of the working masses by the local feudal
0
lords and the upper classes in the cities, p. 199. But
Belyaev seems to have been influenced by his own belief
and tried to draw an analogy between the present politico
economic life of his country with- that of the 'Abbasid
9
period.
2. "Muru,i, VI, 325.
3. Ibn Qutayba, II, I73-7I].; Muru.i, VI, 325-26; cf. '
N. Abbott, p.- 187.
1




In this al-Rashid might have been inspired not only by
9
the wish to safeguard the succession of his own sons against
0
many 'Abbasid and 'Alid contenders, but also by the desire
- ?
to insure 'Abbasid authority over the provinces.
g
9
In the same year the Caliph went on a pilgrimage to
4 *
• *
Mecca, accompanied by.his three sons, and he took advantage
of the occasion to demand from each an oath and a written
9
declaration that they would respect the order of succession
that he had laid down. Failure to comply with this oath.
>
would incur the severest penalties, short of death, permitted
by the law of Islam.^ Al-Rashid ordered that these documents
/
should be hung on the door of Ka'ba,and that copies be sent
to all provinces so that every individual in the Empire
1. Al-Amln held, according to the decree of al-Rashid, Iraq,
Migr, and all western provinces; Al-Ma'mun regained the
area from Hamadhan to the eastern border of the Empire; •
Al-Qasim held Jazira, and the frontier lands facing
Byzantium. Tab., Ill, 652-53? Dinawari, pp. 385-86.
Ibn al-A'tham says that al-Rashid had not intended to
nominate al-Qasim as a third successor but it was
suggested to him and he, indeed, appreciated the idea.
Ibn al-A'tham II, 253b; also Azdi, pp. 302-03.
P - -
2. EI j s.v. Harun al-Rashid.
3. In the first of these documents, al-Amm acknowledged
al-Ma^mun's right of immediate succession to himself,
9
and his virtually absolute sovereignty over the eastern
half of the Empire; in the second one, al-Ma'mun took
j
recognizance of these rights, and declared in turn his
loyalty and obedience to his brother as Caliph, whether
or not the latter had respected his obligations. Tab.,.
Ill, 657-667? Ibn al-A'tham, II, 25l+b? EI^, s.v.
al-Amin.
k5
would know of them."*"
0
In 189/805 the Baramika fell from power, but were
0
almost immediately replaced by another family of Persian
origin. Fa<Jl b. Sahl who had been the secretary of Ja 'far
b. Yafciya, had come into close contact with Harun.
b
According to D. Sourdel, the Baramika played no major role
*
-* P
in the nomination of al-Ma'mun as second in succession.
But Fa£l b. Sahl seems to have employed a considerable
influence in seeking to bring him to the Caliphate, and he
became his most trusted adviser and an aspirant to the
vizierate. 3
During the latter part of al-Rashid's reign
lines were already drawn: al-Amm was supported by his
mother and Fa$l b. RabI', while al-Ma'mun's cause was
championed by the Sahl family.^" It was clear that, this
0
0
time, the struggle for the throne was accompanied by the
4
struggle for the vizierate as well.-* This could be regarded
9
as a turning point in the history of the royal family. And
it indicates that the split among the 'Abbasids had reached
a crucial state which in the future became manifest in civil





Ambitions to the succession among members of the dynasty
1. Yaqubi, III, 122-127; Tab., Ill, 65l|.-667; Kamil,
VI, 117.
2. EI2, s.v. Bararaika; cf. Tab., Ill, 7I4J--
3. Tab., Ill, 709; Fakhri, p. 166; EI2, s.v. Fadl. b
Sahl.
Ij.. Cf. Anwar G. Chejne, p. 10lj_.
5. Cf. EI2, s.v. al-Amin; EI2, a.vi Fadl b. Sahl.
1+6
j
were 'the focal points for political partisan activity by
diverse sections of the community, and once having put
4
their candidate into office each of these groups used its
-
•
authority for its own purposes.
In 189/805 also, al-Rashld attempted to settle this
r
dissontion between his two sons and their sympathizers by
re-affirming the decision which had been agreed upon concerning
1
the succession. Shortly after, a rebellion in the eastern
*
part of the Empire brought, at this time, further upset to
the peace of the Empire, and al-Rashld led a military
2
campaign in person to suppress it. The Caliph had decided
to take his two viziers on the campaign and leave his three
heirs behind, but Fa$l b. Sahl advised al-Ma'mun to find
• 9
some way to accompany his father, and this he succeeded in
I
doing.3 The purpose behind this plan was that if al-Rashld,
4




would be away from the capital and be secure in his
eastern provinces. It was clear that violent trouble over
the succession was anticipated, and the immediate objective
P
of al-Fadl in such an event, was the safety of alrMa'munin
a situation where he could make adequate preparations for
9
his own challenge.^-
1. Yaqubi, III, 129-30; Tab.,. Ill, 7OI4..
2. Tab., Ill, 730-31; Dinawarx, p. 387.
3. Tab., Ill, 730-31J cf. Dinawarij p. 3^71 Azdi, p. 312.
Ibn al-A'tham reports that -when al-Rashid felt seriously
sick his son al-Ma'mun was summoned, and appointed as
leader of this.military campaign, then dispatched
towards Maru. ' Ibn al-A'tham, II, 256a.
JL|.. Tab., Ill, 730-35; 'Kamil, VI, H4J.-IJ42; cf. R. Levy,













contained the seeds of an explosive political situation.
9
The contracts he had made demanded a great deal of
I
sincerity and loyalty on the part of both al-Amln and al~
4
Ma'mun. Moreover, one should not overlook a de facto
division of the Empire, which exerted some influence on
to to
to
the relationship between the brothers. This situation
to
to 4
was also intensified by the antagonism and rivalries of
to
the dignitaries' who wished to secure their own ambitions.
#
It was under such circumstances that al-Amin ascended the
to
throne in 193/809, while his brother al-Ma5mun was in Merv
(Maru).1 Al-Amln (192-198/809-813) had already
to
* •
prepared letters containing instructions to al-Ma'mun (203-
218/819-833) and other important men who were on campaign
*
with his father, and entrusted them to one of his secret
9 to
to
agents, who was to deliver them in the event of Harun's
to
2 -
death. Although al-Ma'mun accepted al-Rashid's testament,
|
to
paying homage to his brother as Caliph, and recognising
4




letters made him suspicious of his brother's intentions.
1. Azdi, p.. 317; Ibn Qutayba, II, I7I4..
2. Tab., Ill, 763-72,* Kamil, VI, 152-53.
3. Tab., Ill, 773? Jahshiyari, pp. 289-90; Al-Azdi
to
indicates in one of his accounts that al-Ma'mun took
to
the homage for himself only on the ground, that when al-
Rashid had felt seriously sick, he had designated the
|r
✓
Caliphate to his son al-Ma'mun instead of al-Amxn.






His attitude seems to have been encouraged by al-Fadl b.
9





During the first year of al-AmInss reign little
9
' t
correspondence took place between himself and al-Ma'mun,
9
who remained in the eastern provinces as governor, and
sent precious gifts, including furniture, vessels, musk,
2animals and weapons to his brother in Baghdad.
In the same year al-Amln approved the right of his
9




the provinces which al-Rashid had allotted to them in his
%




dismissed from his post as governor of his provinces and was
4 9
replaced by one of al-Amin's generals.^- In 19J+/810, al-
Amin. introduced the name of his own son, Musa, into the
4
Friday prayer, an action which led to a deterioration in the
9
5
relationships between the brothers* and which can be
g
considered as the beginning of the clash between them, in
» »
as much as it implied the violation of the Meccan document.
9
L
which had ?already been signed by both parties. Moreover*
i
1. Tab., Ill, 773; Jahshiyari, pp. 289-90: Al-Ma'mun
became more suspicious when al-Amin refused to let his
' •
4
family leave for Khurasan. Tab., Ill, 787-88; Jahshiyari
4
p. 290.
2. Tab., Ill, 7751 Kamil, VI, 155; of. Tanbih, p. ijJ+5.
9
3. Supra, p. footnote I.
4
l+. Tab., Ill, 776; Azdi, p. 318.
5. Tab., Ill, 776; Jahshiyari, p. 290; Kamil, VI, 15&;
cf. Azdi, p. 319.




this action was to create a new phase in the history of the
ft
discord in the royal family, which would 'lead finally to a




war. Thus al-Rashid^ ill-advised testament was behind the
J
ft
civil war when he attempted to give his son al-Ma'mun an
ft
independent position."*"
Al-Amln's introduction of his son's name into the
« •
Friday prayer was followed by a brisk exchange of diplomatic
ft
ft
correspondence between the two brothers, who were supported
respectively by the vizier al-Fadl b. Rabi ' and the future
vizier al-Fadl b. Sahl. Therefore, the rivalry between
0
the two provinces, i.e. Iraq and Khurasin,.became extremely
dangerous and strict security measures were introduced,
o
including the control of travellers and merchants.
Al-Amxn went even further and deprived a1-Ma *mun of
ft
his right as first in succession, and nominated his own
♦
ft
son Musa instead. In the following year 195/811 a decree
ft «
was passed that' prayers must only be said in the name of the
II
Caliph and his son as successor. It was on the advice of
al-Fadl b. Rabi' that al-Amln removed his brother from his
t
1. H.A.R. Gibb. "The Caliphate and the Arab States",
ft
History of the Crusades, Vol. I, ed. Setton and Baldwin,
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955» 82.
2. Tab., Ill, 776ffs Jahshiyari, pp. 291-98. This
correspondence did not last for long, and al-Amln tried
in vain to persuade his brother to leave his province
and come to Baghdad. Behind these exchanges were not
the brothers themselves, but the two Fadls who wanted to*
_ •
maintain their supremacy. Al-Amxn and his supporters
aimed at putting an end to al-Ma'mun.
3. Tab., Ill, 782-83.







rightful place in the succession and substituted his own
son."*" The struggle for power between the brothers, which
♦ »
was encouraged by self-interested dignitaries,developed
into a civil war which degraded the 'Abbasids in the eyes
of their subjects.
When the news reached al-Ma'mun in Khurasan that he
> »
had been deprived of his right to succession, he renounced
S
t
his loyalty and obedience to the Caliph and called himself
_ — O




to suppress any attempt at revolt on his part the Caliph
#
despatched the general 'All b. 'Isa b. Mahan as head of a
%
campaign against Khurasan. 3 Serious as this open break
4
« ♦
between the two brothers was, in respect of the fortunes
0
of the dynasty, no less did it affect the integrity of the
Empire, for now Khurasan and Iraq were set one against the
other, and Persian and Arab were virtually invited into
conflict.^" The campaign was a failure and cost the general
1. Tab., Ill, 777J Jahshiyari, 290; EIs.v. Fadl b; Rabi':
Fadl was also encouraged by the general 'All b. ''Isa b.
Mahan. Tab., Ill, 777; Yaqubi, III, I38; cf. Al-Azdi
who stated that the senior members of the 'Abbasid family
*
who stood by al-Amin were the people who advised al-Amin
to deprive his brother from the line of succession, and
nominate his son instead. Azdi, p. 319; see also Ibn
Qutayba, XI 175.
•2. Tab.,.Ill, 797.
3. Tab., Ill, pp. 796-97; Jahshiyari, p. 293; Dinawari,
pp. 393-9I|..
0
1^. The civil iirar' has been interpreted, on doubtful evidence,
as a national conflict between Arabs and Persians, ending
in the victory of the latter. It was more probably a
continuation of the social struggle of the immediately
preceding period, combined with a regional rather than
national conflict between Persia and Iraq. B. Lewis,






his life, weakening the situation of al-Amxn and strength-
— o
ening that of ,al-Masmun. Moreover, al-Amln's supporters
✓
were disunited and began to have doubts about persevering
4
*
in their allegiance to the Caliph. Such an attitude was
clearly demonstrated when a group of dissatisfied soldiers
dethroned al-Amxn and announced their allegiance to al-Ma'mun.
Al-Aram, however, was detained for two days in one of the
royal palaces, although after some heavy fighting among his




During the civil war which followed, al-Aminss governor
ft
of Mecca and Medina, Dawud b. 'Isa al- 'Abbasi, paid
• •
-
allegiance to al-Ma'mun, who, according to 'Isa, had the
|
right to oppose his brother because the latter neglected the
testament issued by al-Rashld.^- In this he was supported
ft
9 ft
by others who were aware of the disposition of al-Rashid.^
1. Yaqubi, III, 138-39; Tab., Ill, 796ff.; Azdi, pp. 322-23;'
ft
R. Levy, p. 72°, cf. D. Sourdel, "La Politique Religieuse
du Calife 'Abbaside al-Ma'mun", REI, XXX, 1962, p. 37*
2. Yaqubi, III, 138; Tab., Ill, 787-88; Jahshiyari, p. 290.
3. Ibn Khayyat, II, 5OI4.; Yaqubi, III, II4.0—ip.> Tab., Ill,
8l4.8-l;.9, 851; Azdi, p. 325-
J4.. ffif. p. 14.3. footnote I. It was reported that Basra followed
the same line of policy towards al-Amin, and in 196/812,
people there paid homage to al-Ma'mun, and the governor
al-Mansur b. al-Mahdl was the one who administered the
oath of allegiance; so, also, did Kufa with its
governor al-Pa^l b. 'Abbas b. Musa b. 'Isa. Tab., Ill,
856-57; Azdi, p. 325.
ft
5. Tab., Ill, 860-63; Kamil, VI, I8I4.-85; cf. Yaqubi,
III, H4.O-I4J..
I
While the conflict between the two brothers worsened,
certain other members of the 'Abbisid family left. al-Amln
|
0
and joined al-Ma'mun on the same grounds. Notable among
these were al-Qasim b. al-Rashid, who was third in succession
9
*
and al-Mansur b. al-Mahdij later, when the situat-ion—had
deteriorated gravely, some other members of the family,
including Ibrahim b. 'al-Mahdi, who later was to become
Caliph, joined al-Ma^mun against, his brother."'" The climax
of this struggle was the murder of al-Amin in 198/813 and the
9
recognition of al-Ma'mun as the Caliph by the victorious
p
army. The outcome of this war was to weaken not only the
9
9





a xsrhole, reducing them to a minor status and excluding them
4
later from the imperial army. • —
The Caliph, despite the theoretical absolutism implicit
in his office, now shared his power with his courtiers,
who were ultimately to become the real rules of the Empire,
*
while he was merely a tool in their hands. Nor did al-
Ma'mun's victory signal the end of the rivalry and jealousy
among the members of the royal-familyOn the contrary,
4
there now began a period of intense intrigue amongst the
tf
powerful elements of the Capital, in which the members of the
4
9
. 1. Yaqubi, III, l!jJ.-l|2; Tab., Ill, 911+5 Karnil, VI, 171+5
cf. Azdi, p. 328.
2. Ibn Khayyat, II, 505j Yaqubi, III, 11+15 Azdi, pp. 329-31
3. Muruj, VII, 67 & 78. In 198/819, after al-MaJmun became
Caliph, he denied his brother al-Qisim his right to
4
9
■succession as al-Rashid had commanded. Tab., Ill, 659,
762J Azdi, pp. 331_32; cf. Ibn Khayyat who states that
the dismissal of al-Qasim took place in 201/817, shortly
after the announcement of 'Ali al-R.ida as successor to the







'Abbasid family, and their ambitions for the succession,
#
9
were used to further the purposes of the parties who lent
4
4
them their support. The dynasty was still without
principles of succession."*"
J
The people of Baghdad were angry at the transference
of the capital to the eastern provinces, and in their eyes
_ 4
al-Ma'mun was seen as a tool of the eastern people and the
p
enemy of the house of -Abbas.c Therefore, the senior members
9
of the 'Abbasid family were determined to depose him, and in
9 I
this, perhaps, they had the support of the inhabitants of
Baghdad who tried to persuade al-Mansur b. al-Mahdi to take
over the Caliphate but he refused. When the anti-Ma'mun
-
gathering insisted, al-Mansur agreed to be the governor of
4
Baghdad on the condition that they would continue to recognize
4
9
al-Ma'mun as the real Caliph. ^
4
The nomination of 'All al-Rida, in 201/817 as a
successor to al-Ma'mun created an uproar in Baghdad.^
4
I
Therefore, Ibrahim al-Mahdi (201-203/817-819) was appointed
as Caliph instead of al-Ma^mun and Ishaq b. Musa b. al-Mahdi
4
was designated as his successor.'' During his first Friday
9
9
prayer, a few 'Abbasid notables paid Ibrahim their homage;
1. Cf. D. Sourdel, Islam, tr. by D. Scott, New York, 1961].,
p. 21]..
2. Anwar G. Chejne, p. 116.
3. Tab., III, 1001.
I].. Ibn Khayyit, II, 508; Azdi, p. 3i^2.
5. Tab., Ill, 1011].; other sources do not indicate Ishaq
as successor to Ibrahim. Ibn Khayyat, II, 508;
4




for example, 'Ubayd Allah al-'Abbas b. Muhammad al-Hashimi,
*
4
. al-Mansur b. al-Mahdi9 and all the Banu Hashim.^ When






in Baghdad he decided that he would have to return, but
« 9
before he entered the city he had his favourite vizier.Padl
b. Sahl murdered and in 203/819 his successor 'All al-Rida.^
*
Knowing of his approach, Ibrahim b. al-Mahdi went into
hiding and did not reappear for eight months.^ Later, when
0
he presented himself before the Caliph, he was discharged,
and simply returned to his normal life as a poet.^- Ishaq
, * . •





The Caliph, after overcoming most of the obvious'
4 •
I
dissentions within the family, seems to .have felt secure-
0
and confident of his ability to suppress any revolt which
might be provoked in the future.. Therefore, he appointed
0
0
his brother Ishiq, (later al-Mu'tasim), as governor of the
provinces of Sham and Misr x>rith full administrative
authority, at the same time he nominated his son al-'Abbas
0
1. Tab., Ill, 1016; Muru;] t VII, 60-62..
2. Ibn Khayyat, II, 508 & 509; Yaqubi, llj.8-50; Azdi,
pp. 3^3 & 352.
3. Ibn Khayyat, II, 512.
9
I4.. Tab., Ill, 1032ff.; Tayfur, Kitab Baghdad, Cairo, 1368/
191/3, pp. 11-12, 101; Muru.j, VII, 63-6^; Aghani, XVIII,
1+3.
5. Tayfur, p. 11; Azdi, p. 352.
6. Muru.i, VII, 78.
55
T ~ ~ 1
as viceroy of Jazira, Thughur and al- Awasim.
In the matter of the succession, al-Masmun seems to
$
have recognized the error of his predecessors in nominating
4
more than one heir. Therefore, he kept himself aloof- from
this problem and enjoyed.to a certain extent the achievements
%
4
which his reign had brought to the people. When he fell
t
seriously ill in 218/833 during his campaign against Byzantium
a message was .sent to his son al-'Abbas, demanding his
4 4
immediate presence before the Caliph. There was some
%
4
speculation among army officers who were with the Caliph,
P
that he intended to nominate his son as his successor.




son al-'Abbas as an heir apparent before he went on this
V
expedition-* but such an assumption has no trace in other
early sources.^
4
In the early sources it is stated that al-Ma'mun
4
MB
nominated Ishaq b. al-Rashid as his successor. His policy
towards the succession was designed to strengthen the
*
9
Caliphate as the central institution of government for the
Islamic community, but it failed, due to the lack of support
4
from other parties involved. Indeed it made the position
of the Caliph even more precarious, because of the
antagonism which it provoked.
4
1. Yaqubi, III,- 158; Tab., Ill, HOOj Kamil, VI, 288.
Al-Ma'mun openly told Ibrahim b. al-Mahdi in the presence
of Ishaq and al-'Abbas that they incited him to kill
Ibrahim. Muru.11 VII, 67.





3. Dinawarl, p. 396.
4
4






The proclamation of al-Mu'tasim (2l8-227/833-8I|2) as
9
successor .created two antagonistic groups within the army,
one supporting al-Mu'tasim and the other al-'Abbas b. al-
9
4
Ma'mun. As the former was more powerful, and ultimately
9
victorious, al-'Abbas accused his supporters of being
4
disloyal to his uncle al-Mu'tasim and declared that he
acknowledged him as the legitimate Caliph.^" Although the
troops paid reluctant allegiance to the new Caliph, an
✓
active rivalry within the army continued behind the scenes,
fomented by the desire of al-'Abbas to be the Caliph instead .
4
K
of al-Mu'tasim. Once again the problem of succession itfas
to cause trouble and dissent ion in the Empire, and it was
the Caliph himself who bore the chief responsibility. The
opposition to al-Mu'tagim within the array became more
4
evident during the Caliph's campaign on the Byzantine
ft
p
frontier, in 223/837» when a group of army officers
9
attempted to assassinate him and to proclaim al- 'Abbas as ■
Caliph. When the plot was discovered, all its members






1. Yaqubi, III, 162-63; Tab., 116Ij.; cf. Muru.i, VII, 103.
2. Tab., Ill, 1256-65; Muru ,j, VII, 137. Yaqubi, III,
167, does not make any mention of the matter except for
the imprisonment of 'Ujoyjb. 'Anbasa who was considered by *7
. al-Tabarl and others to be the leader of the conspirators.
4
Al-Azdi reports that al- 'Abbas had proclaimed his right
to the Caliphate and the chief of al-Mu 'ta§im's guards
paid homage to him, and that when the Caliph discovered







This conspiracy allowed the Turks to secure their
• »
position throughout the Empire and thus become in one way
4
or another the real influence behind the throne. Once the
plot was put down, the remaining progeny of al-Masmun,
although completely innocent, were given to Itakh, the
famous Turkish general, who put them into jail-in the
» 4
basement of his own house where they all died shortly after-
1
wards. As the power of the Caliph grew less and less,
9
that of the army officers gradually increased, until it was
Q
they alone who mattered in the direction of affairs. It
<
was the dissention among the members of the royal family
which led to an increase in the influence of the army on
• •• • 4 «
the government affairs, and this reaction was clearly
9
4
noticed during the last period of al-Mu'ta§im's reign.
4
4
The 'Abbasid family was split into two factions,3 one group
ft
being supported by the Caliph, his courtiers and his power-
0
9
ful military elements, while the opposing group was
4
encouraged by the Arabs, who x^ere trying to maintain their
s
former power, which was. now being eroded by the recruitment




Unlike his predecessors, al-Mu'ta§im did not name his
t
successor, but gave the courtiers a free hand in electing
9
the Caliph and this became their main preoccupation in the
1. Azdi, p. i|28j Tab., Ill, 1267; TBN, fol. 91+b; C. Cahen,
"The Body Politic", Unity and variety in Muslim Civili¬
zation, ed. by G. Von Grunebaum, Chicago, 1967j P« 19JU--
P —
2. EI , s.v. 'Abbas ids.
3. Tab., Ill, 1256-65.; Muru.1, VII, I37.




period which will be treated in this thesis. Al-Mu 'tasim's
s
son Muljammad, (later al-Wathiq) xiras chosen as Caliph in
ft
s
227/892, and in his short reign the power of the influential
ft '
ft




of the Caliphs. Nor was. harmony restored within the dynasty
itself: al-Wathiq persecuted even his brother Ja'far (later
•
al-Mutawakkil) for personal reasons.1 Such an attitude / "
towards al-Mutawakkil might have arisen as a result of
« +













In consequence, this attitude of distrust among the 'Abbasids
ft




their ox«i freedom for the sake of their interest.
ft
Like his father, al-Wathiq did not nominate his
ft
successor, and al-Ya 'qubl reports that the Caliph refused
ft
to do so when it was suggested to him, claiming that God
»
ft ft




after his death. When al-Wathiq died, the army officers
ft
found another opportunity to demonstrate their power in
these matters, and after a short disagreement over al-Wathiq's
ft
ft
son, they approved the selection of al-Mutawakkil in 232/81j.7
. as Caliph.^ Prom this time on the 'Abbasids did not dare
« ♦
to oppose their courtiers, and the Caliphs were but the
1. Tab.,. Ill, 1371- It was stated that al-Mutawakkil was
detained in prison for a while. Ibn Kathir, IX, 311.
2. Yaqubi, III, 171.
3. Yaqubi, III, 172; Tab., Ill, 1368-69; Muru ,i, VII, 189;
Kamil. VII, 22-23; Ibn al-'Amid, Ta'rlkh, Lalahll




puppets of their generals, who were often able to appoint
ft
1





Departing from the practice of'his father and brother,
al-Mutawakkil made the same mistake as the Caliph Harun al-
ft
♦
Rashid by appointing in 235/850-his three sons, Muhammad
(later al-Muntasir), 'Abd Allah (later al-Mu'tazz) and
Ibrahim al-Mu'ayyad respectively as his successors. He
ft
<
imposed on them obligations similar to those which al-Rashld
ft
ft
had placed on his sons, and assigned to each a part of the
p
Empire. In 233/8L|.8 al-Mutawakkil appointed his son Muhammad
ft
. as Governor of Mecca, Medina, Ta'if and Yemen.^ It was




to accept the authority ("umra) of al-Munta§ir, and had his
ft
name mentioned in the Friday prayers.^* This attitude
indicates that al-Muntasir was highly favoured by his




and his son gradually became bitter enemies, and al-Mutawakkil
ft
ft
favoured his next son 'Abd Allah.
Al-Mutawakkil was praised for his policy towards the
ft
succession because it was assumed that he was seeking to
avoid uncertainty in respect to the future.^ But it seems
that this nomination was one of the causes which contributed
to his assassination, because in it lay the seeds of the
p
1. EI , s.v. 'Abbasids.
2. Yaqubi, III, 17I4.; Tab., Ill, 139i+-lJU-031 Muru.j, VII, 193.
3. Tab., III, 1379.
ft
Ij.. Yaqubi, III, 173.
5. M.S. Miah, The Reign of al-Mutawakkil, Ph.D. Thesis,
♦




conflict between al-Mutawakkil and his son al-Muntasir.
ft
9
Due to the pressure from the courtiers and the harems,
al-Mutawakkil came to favour his son al-Mu'tazz, as was
clearly shown when he sent him as his deputy to visit
ft
Ishaq b. Ibrahim, the governor of Baghdad, who was seriously
ill.^ In 2I4.O/85U- k*16 Caliph further honoured al-Mu'tazz by
ft
giving him charge of all the treasure-houses throughout the"
•
,
provinces, and ordering that coins should carry his narne.^
* ft
However, the coins of this reign x^hich have survived give
*
us an earlier date than does al-Tabari, showing that from
237/851-52 coins bearing al-Mu'tazz name began to appear.^"
.The Caliph seemed inclined more and more towards his son




and al-Muntasir. Therefore the conflict between the Caliph




their personal views especially as regards the Shi'a and
9
the Turkish mercenaries, x*ho thought it would serve their
c.
interests to encourage the son to stand against his father.
ft
ft
The divergence in attitude between the Caliph and his son
reached its climax in 2L|.7/86l and cost the Caliph his life,
ft
as will appear in the opening of the next section.
1. B.K. al-Tikriti, The Religious Policy of al-Mutawakkil,
MoA. Thesis, McGill University, 1969, p. 3.
2. Tab., Ill, ll;03.
3. Tab., Ill, 1395.
Ij.. M.S. Miah, pp. 56-7.
5. Kamil, VII, 36-7; Al-Arbili, Khulasat al-Dhahab al-Masbuk,
Baghdad, 1961)., p. 226j Diyarbakri, al-Khamls fl Ahwal










This brief survey of the internal disagreements of
9
the 'Abbasid line which arose at the very beginning of the
establishment of the dynasty shows clearly how this rivalry
*
among them had developed from individual interests and
t
ft ft




disunity that was to facilitate the virtual anarchy of the
4
ft
period under consideration in this work. The Caliphs were
the real source of this instability, and in their anxiety
to secure their own hold on the throne, they were prepared
to encourage rivalry among their putative successors and
4
their supporters, playing one off against the other. In
4
consequence of this, each new Caliph who came to the throne
...
was the tool of the parties which had brought him to power,
ft
and these were soon the real masters of the Empire. Al-
Rashid seemed to have mastered the situation, but he could
4




and antagonism between his sons.
By the time of al-Amin and al-Ma'mun, the conflict
4
%
among the members of the royal family came to be considered
4
as a struggle between two ethnic factions, the Arabs on
S
al-Amin's side and the Persians on al-Ma>mun's. However,-
9









Al-Ma'mun further complicated this perilous situation
ft
by introducing large numbers of foreign slave troops into













the reign of al-Mu'ta§im this recruitment of foreigners
♦ 9
became very pronounced, and they influenced the affairs of
%
the state. This led to a weakening of the position of the
4
*
'Abbasids and obliged the Caliphs to give some of their
9
*
privileges to the military leaders.
I
Al-Mu 'tasira's- death left a vacuum in the succession,
giving the courtiers an opportunity to nominate the person
f
of their choice,'thereby lessening the power of their
»
candidate, by the burden of obligation he was recognized
as having to them. Al-Wathiq made the same mistake as his
* 4
father in not nominating his successor. By the time of al
Mutawakkil the situation was beyond redemption, and it was
accepted that only a person enjoying the-support of the
4
4
most powerful generals could hope to become Caliph.
9
4
To sum' up, the disagreement among the 'Abbasids goes





gradually the Caliphs lost their power through this rivalry
%















THE 'ABBASID FAMILY AND ITS ROLE IN THE STATE
861-870)
«
The murder of al-Mutawakkil in 2i|.7/86l may be seen as
# ft
a direct consequence of dissension within the 'Abbasid
W
family, which allowed the personal prestige of its members
. to be manipulated for the realisation of the ambitions of
ft
*|
rival groups within the capital. Foremost amongst these
were the Shi'a who, since the time of al-Ma'mun, had
ft
benefited from the policy of the court and had established
ft
themselves as a separate movement in opposition to the
ft
9
'Abbasid family, and they saw the reactionary policies of
S>this Caliph as a threat to all they had gained. In
%
response to al-Mutawakkil's domination, they encouraged
ft
al-Muntasjir to oppose his father on such contrived issues
ft
as the veneration of 'All b. Abi Talib, making him reliant
on their support in the inevitable contest over the
succession. Al-Mu tazz, on the other hand, is presented,
ft
4
in one way or another, as sharing the views of his father
on such matters, and in'addition, his mother, Qablha, is
9
1. W.M. Watt, Islamic Political Thought, p. 89, takes the
view that al-Mutawakkil's attitude represents a
surrender to 'Ulama and the masses who were under their
influence. Prof. Watt's view* is also shared by von
ft
Gruenbaum, Classical Islam, tr. by K. Watson, London,
1970, p. 95.
ft
2. The discrimination shown by the Caliph against those
I
who had enjoyed the. favour and support of his pre¬
decessors. was described in B.K. al-Tikriti, The Religious





said/to have been one of his father's favourite wives.^
%
ft
Thus, he was favoured for the succession and became the
ft
centre of intrigue for the courtiers and retainers who
ft
wished to carry on the policy of the Caliph and to maintain
their supremacy. The political tensions created by this
polarization of the life of the capital was made the more
« •
dangerous by the fact that each of the parties sought,
also, to strengthen its position by suborning the Turkish






Al-Mutawakkil brought the situation to a critical point
when, on 28 Ramadan 2^7/5 December 861, probably acting
A
on the advice of 'Ubayd Allah b. Yahya and Path b. Khaqan,
ft
he appointed al-Mu'tazz to lead the Friday prayers, publicly
• ft
•4
depriving al-Muntasir of this mark of respect at the last
1. Ibn Nubata, al-Iktifa* min Ta'rikh al-Khulafa5, Ms. M.M.
ft
No. 57, Ta'rikh, Cairo, fol. 59a; Diyarbakri, II, 339,
says that al-Mutawakkil's hostility to al-Muntasir arose
from the latter's refusal to abdicate his right to the
succession in favour of al-Mu'tazz, and the same reason
is advanced by Ibn al-Duqmaq, al-Jawhar al-Thamin fx
Siyar al-Muluk wa al-Salatxn, Ms. Dar al-Kutub, No. 1522,
Ta'rxkh, Cairo, fol. J+lb.
2. In the Tanbih,' pp. 316-20, al-Mas 'udx mentions a body of
twelve thousand non-Turkish soldiers collected on the
orders of the Caliph al-Mutawakkil and put under the
leadership of 'Ubayd Allah b. Yahya, his secretary, and
ft





minute.'1' The rift between father and son was now out in
0
the open, and sides were seen to be taken by each of the
factions in the capital, most notably by the Turkish
« 9
general WasIf who, after having been deprived of his lands,
diya', cast his support in favour of al-Muntasir. Many




Atamish, recruiting support for al-Muntasir among the troops,
9
and presenting 'Ubayd Allah and Path; b. Khaqan as their
enemies.^ Al-Ya'qubl, refers to this very briefly,^ but
%
al-Mas'udl goes into detail to show that al-Munta^ir was
actually soliciting support from disaffected Turkish
military leaders.^- Rumours of plots by the Caliph and his
advisers to have al-Muntasir and his supporters assassinated
coincided with the latters® decision to murder them.-' It
0
% 9
was clear that the mystique of the 'Abbas ids had been eroded
e
to the point where they were considered as.merely political




1. Al-Munta§ir had already suffered many humiliations from
his father at the court. Cf. Tab., Ill, llj.57; Miskawayh,
VI, p. 555; al-QuqLa 'I, 'Uyun al-Ma'arif, Ms. Ahmad
Library, bo. 2898 Ta^rlkh, Istanbul, fol. 99a; Diyarbakri,
Hi 339. The incident of the Friday prayer is reported*
in Tab., Ill, lij.53 (Kamil, vii, 61), where there is an
account of al-Mutawakkil's confusion when Dawud b. Muhammad
I
b. Abl al-'Abbas praised the performance of al-Mu 'tazz at
the mosque, and declared that in all his long experience
he had never heard of anyone more eloquent or accomplished
than the prince al-Mu'tazz.
2. Muru.i, VII, 272.
3. Yaqubi, III, 178.
b- Muruj, VII, 272 & 273-
9











I The familiar account of the murder- of al-Mutawakkil
ft
and his vizier Path b. Khaqan on the night of 9 Shawwal 21+7/
"I
11 December 861, as given in the sources, dwells on the
r
insults and provocative behaviour of the Caliph towards al-
ft ft
Muntasir. who was present with him at a drinking party, but
ft
t
this must be seen as an attempt to provide an immediate
% ft
O
cause for an action which had already been decided upon.
There were, of course, attempts to exculpate al-Muntasir
in the matter of his father*s murder and present him as an
ft
unwilling puppet of the Turks.3 But the evidence given
by the primary- sources proves the opposite view.^- There is





certain fuqaha' to commit this murder because of the disgrace¬
ful behaviour of al-Mutawakkil in his private life.-' This
disregard for the security of the person of the Caliph,
even among members of his immediate, family, marked the
1. Tab., Ill, 11+65; Muru,i. VII, 267; Al-Tabari gives in
another account the date of his death as the 5 Shawwal
21+7. Tab., Ill, 1471.
2. Tab., Ill, 11+57, 11+62, Kamil, VII, 61+-65. The assassins
of the Caliph were the Turks Baghir and Baghlun, and they
|
are said to have been assisted by Musa b. Bugha and Hirun
b. Sawartakin. Gf. Yaqubi, III, 178-79; Muru ,j, VII,
268-271; Dhahabi, Tarikh, XIII, 82b; Sibt, IX, 250a;
Goldziher. Muslim Studies, tr. C.R. Barber and S.M. Stern,
London 1967, I, 11+0.
3. Von Gruenbaum, Classical Islam, p. 98; R. Levy, Social
Structure of Islam, Cambridge University Press, 1965,
p. i+l9; M.S. Miah, p. 103.
1+. Ibn al-'Ibri believes that al-Muntasir was the one whoI ft "
conspired secretly with certain slaves among the Turks and
murdered his father, Ibn al- 'Ibri, I, 11+5*











beginning of the decline of the office as a politico-
religious institution, and the fact that it survived at
4
all is to be explained by the-need for some visible centre
of authority which would symbolize the continuity of a
state which had lost most of its unity. Questions of-
4




it was the will of the strongest military power that would
henceforth determine who should occupy this office; and
thus, the very idea of dynastic succession was lost, as
will be discussed in the next chapter.
On the night of the Caliph's murder homage was paid
4
to the new Caliph al~Munta§irwho immediately appointed a
4
I
supreme committee under his own leadership. The committee
suggested sending Sa'Id al-Kabir to summon al-Mu'ayyad, and
Sa 'id al-§aghir to fetch al-Mu'tazz.^ Sa'Id al-Saghlr
*
related that after he had informed al-Mu'tazz's guard about
the murder of al-Mutawakkil and was brought into the
presence of the Prince, the latter asked him, "0 Sa'Id, what
>
news do you bring." Sa'Id repeated the story of al-
4
Mutawakkil's murder and asked al-Mu'tazz to return with him so-
A
1. It is said that, after the murder of the Caliph, Ja'far
b. Sulayman al-Hashiml came to al-Muntasir in order to
offer allegiance. Al-Muntasir, pretending to be unaware
of what had happened, asked, "How about my father, the
Commander of the Faithful, al-Mutawakkil 'ala Allah?"
The chief Ql^I replied that he had been murdered by Fatl?
b. Khaqan. Then al-Muntasir asked what had happened to
Fath, and was told that he had been murdered by Bugha.
4
Homage was then paid to al-Munta§ir by the chief QaqI, the
4
vizier and the retainers. Dhahabi, Tarikh, XIII, 82a.
9
2. Tab., Ill, H4.73J Ibn Nubata, II, 117b.
68
4 • *
that he might be the first to pay homage arid thus win
the heart of his brother. Al-Mu'tazz 3aid that he would
» '
go in the morning, but Sa'Id, assisted by the prince's
eunuch, continued trying to persuade him, until it was time
• , «
for morning prayers. Then, after performing the prayer, .
4




received by al-Muntasir, who drew his brother to his side,
#
embraced him, expressed his sympathy and received the oath
of allegiance from him. Shortly after, al-Mu'ayyad arrived
with Sa'Id al-Kabir and al-Muntasir did likexfise with him.^
9
9 4
There is an account which indicates that al-Mu'tazz was
9
reluctant to pay homage to his brother whom he considered
a usurper of his own rights, but Bugha a'l-Sha'rabi, another
Turkish general, told him, "Your brother has already killed
#
your father and I am afraid that he will murder you, too;
%
so it is better to pay him homage." At this al-Mu'tazz
changed his mind and paid homage to the newly appointed
Caliph.^
6 «
On the same night, the supporters of Prince al-Mu'tzzz,
f
collected together by the vizier 'Ubayd Allah b. Yahya b.
Khaqan,^ proposed to kill al-Muntasir and proclaim al-Mu'tazz
4
1. Tab., Ill, 114.73-751 Kamil, VII, 67-9; Ibn Nubata, II,
117b-ll8a; cf. Ibn Kathir, X, 350, who states that al-
Mu'tazz paid homage the morning after the murder, after
the new Caliph had received the oath of allegiance from
the dignitaries in the dar al- 'amma. Moreover, Ibn Kathir
mentions that al-Mu'tazz was the real successor to his




2. TDA, fol. 53b.
9
3» TBN, fol. 63a. Al-Tabarl mentions that 'Ubayd Allah
*
appeared the next morning to take the oath, and then
went ax-^ay. Tab., Ill, llj.71 -
<
Caliph instead. But when 'Ubayd Allah learned that al-
Mu 'tazz was already in the custody of al-Munta§ir 's
0
supporters, and had been forced to render the oath of
0
allegiance, he told his followers that it was no use their
r
fighting, since al-Mu'tazz had already surrendered to the
conspirators.^"
0
Despite the troubled state of the capital, on the
#
0
morning after the drama of al-Mutawakkil*s death the oath
«
P




. oath is preserved in al-T?abari, and it sheds light on the
j |
• »
relations between the two brothers, i.e. al-Munta§ir and al-
0
■Mu'tazz. There is no indication about whom the Caliphate
0




al-Mutawakkil's earlier disposition it would fall to al-
0
0
Mu't.azz and al-Mu^ayyad respectively, while the allegiance
• «
was made solely to the Caliph al-Muntagir. The document
begins by stressing the seriousness of the oath,^ demanding
A
P
from those who swore it that they obey, accept direction,
4
remain faithful, have no doubts about him nor deceive him,
0
0
neither turn aside from him nor be irresolute. Their duty
%
was to listen, to obey, to follow,to support, and to be
» «
ready to do all that al-Muntasir commanded. They were to be




both publicly and privately, at home and abroad. And they





1. Tab., Ill, II4.63.
*
2. Tab., Ill, lij.71-72.
3. Tab., Ill, 14,75-78.
70




Moreover, the oath asserts the importance of this
♦ ft
ft
commitment, and those who witnessed it must not mar it
through suspicion, treason, deception or by giving it a new








people, without violating the oath. It is made clear




also swore it before Allah. The hand of Allah was above
I
ft
their hands; whoever broke it, forfeited his own life,
4
ft





The Caliph, fearing that his brothers might act against




oath; no one who swore it should allow himself to be led
ft •
astray by envy or desire, nor should any temptation lure
ft
him from the right path. Life and effort must be
ft
concentrated on this commitment; Allah would accept nothing
ft ft
less than a total adherence to this oath. Violation of any
of its provisions would lead to the confiscation and
4





Feeling insecure in his new office, al-Muntasir was at
pains to emphasise the moral obligations incumbent on his
ft
ft
subjects to respect the dignity of the Caliphate, and this
ft
is the first instance met with in the historians of an
*
#







to religion were intended to impress on all people the
ft
*




was a witness to what was in their minds. What effect this
s
ft
was expected to have on the men at the centre of power, who
ft
had shown they would go to any extremes of violence or
ft
ft ♦
deceit to preserve their own interests, cannot be estimated.
$




standards as a final guarantee when all else had proved
ineffective.
Shortly after al-Mu'tazz and al-Mu'ayyad had taken the
ft









estimated at ten million dirharns."*" Al-Tabari speaks of
the harmony which marked the relations between the brothers
ft
during the early days of the Caliphate of ai-Munta§ir, who
respected them highly and, in particular, showed much
O
sympathy towards al-Mu'ayyad. The Caliph, however, feared
ft
his uncle 'All b. al-Mu'tasim and expelled him from Samarra
to Baghdad where he was kept under observation,^ indicating
ft
the suspicion and antagonism which persisted among the
members of the family no matter how critical the situation
%
the Caliphate was facing.^" The impression given by al-^abari
ft
9
1. Muntazam, XI, l[|.6bj Ibn Nubata, II, 117a; Dhahabi,
✓,
Tarikh, XIII, 82b.
2. Tab., Ill, II4.86j al-'Aynl, *Iqd al-Juman fi Tafrxkh Ahl
al-Zaman, Ms. Dar al-Kutub, No. 158I4. Ta'rikh, Cairo,
XVII, part II, 2lj.[|.a.
. 3. Tab., Ill, llj.79; Muntazam, XI, lltfa ; Ibn Kathir, X, 352.
ij.. There is one account which states that Abu Ahmad b. al-
Mutawakkil (later al-Muwaffaq) was detained for a while
by the Caliph's order because he killed Baghlun, one of
al-Mutawakkil's murderers. TDA, fol. 53b.
of family harmony should be judged in the light of the
ft
ft
continuous rivalry amongst its members which, more than
ft
any other factor, led to the'degradation of the Caliphate.
ft
Indeed, certain later sources state that al-Mu'tazz used
ft <
ft





father."'* On the other hand, the apparent friendship which
ft
ft
the Caliph showed towards his brothers might be interpreted
ft
as arising from a desire to avoid any possible disturbance
4
ft 9
from their side, by keeping them in close contact with his




. In 21^8/862, al-Mu'tazz and al-Mu'ayyad were forced to
A
renounce their right to the succession. The story of their
ft#
ft
abdication runs that when the brothers were summoned to
*
the jawsaq (the palace of the Caliph), al-Mu'tazz asked al-
9
Mu'ayyad, "Brother, why do you think he has asked us to come
here?" He replied, "To abdicate our claim to the throne, of
ft
course!" Al-Mu'tazz said, "I. cannot imagine that he would
do that to us."^ While they were speculating thus, a
messenger came in carrying the order of abdication from the
» '
Caliph. Al-Mu'ayyad immediately submit ted, but al-Mu'tazz
• •
refused to do so. He was then tortured by the guards until
he agreed.to comply. Al-Mu'ayyad scolded his brother for
A
ft ft
trying to hold out: "0 you child, you have seen what has
4
happened to your father at their hands, despite all his
1. Al-Arbili p. 226; Kaziruni, Mukhtagar al-Ta'rikh,
Ms. Jar Allah library, No. 1625# Istanbul, fol. 53b-,
2. Tab., Ill, II4.86; Kamil, VII, 73; Muntazam, XII, lb.
73
power| and you are trying to reject their demand I""*"
This incident shows that al-Mu'tazz was the more serious
of the two. Moreover, al-Munta§ir seemed to remain
9 *
aloof from what happened to his brothers, and it was




his vizier Aljmad b. al-Khasib, who had won over a number of
Turkish generals- to the support of al-Muntasir's son 'Abd
— P
al-Wahhab, as successor t.o the. Caliphate.-
9 9
9 9
The Caliph appeared to his brothers, powerless to
9
V •
initiate any activity, and all affairs were in the hands
ft
ft
of the courtiers, to whose wishes he had to yield in order













safety that he had forced them to renounce their right to
• *
the succession. His words x^ere: "Do you believe that I
have made you abdicate because I wanted to live long enough
ft
ft ft
to see my son of an age when he could be made to swear the
9
oath? By Allah, I have never for a moment wished such a
>
thing! I prefer that the sons of my father become Caliph
9
after me rather than some cousin or other. But these here
he pointed toward the mawali- who were standing or sitting
ft
there - "have tormented me over your abdication and I x«ras
ft
afraid that, if I did not do it, one of them might make an
ft
>
attempt upon your lives. What do you think? Could I do
9
s
such a thing? Kill the assassin? By Allah, all their
1.- Tab., Ill, 124.87s Kamil, VII, 73S Muntazam, XII, 2a
2. Tab., Ill, 11|.85~865 cf. Ibn al-'Ibrl, I, lij-5.
71+
blood is not worth the blood of one of you.' Therefore I
ft
have given in to their wishes; it is the lesser evil!"
ft
r




hands; he pressed them to him. Then they left the
e-e.1
In his concern for his brothers' safety the Caliph
seemed quite sincere, and it was important that he should
ft
9
convince them of this. The very fact that he should make
ft
his inability to control his courtiers an excuse for this
ft
•l
action shows to what extent the authority of the Caliphate
ft
ft




in command of affairs. Despite what the Caliph had pretended
»
#
P M ' ft ft




historians that al-Muntasir was actually the driving force
*
behind this abdication, and that he even threatened his
2
brothers with death if they refused to comply,, Further-
more, he. forced his brothers to sign their own abdication




'Abd al-Wahhab, whom the Turks, also, were tentatively
♦ »
considering as a successor to his father.-^
1. Tab., Ill, 124-88; Miskawayh, VI, p. 560.
4
2. Tab., Ill, 124.86.
3. Ibn al-'Amid, fol. 96b; al-Ktitubi, 'Uyun al-Tawarikh, Ms
. al-Maktaba al-Zahiriyya, No. 2j,7 Ta'rlkh, VI, Damascus,-
170b; Ibn Kathir, X, 353« But Ibn al-'Ibri believes
%
that the main object of al-Muntasir was to secure his
Caliphate by forcing his brothers to abdicate their
ft
right to succession. He threatened them with death
if they did not resign their claim so that he could'
nominate his son instead. Ibn al-'Ibrl, I, 11+5•
Despite the fact that al-Mu'tazz and al-Mu'ayyad had
abdicated their rights to succession, the Caliph still did
not feel secure and was encouraged by his companions to





again and advised to write down in their own hand that





been sworn to them, and released all who had taken it from
T"
its obligations. The document is preserved in al-Tabarl and
%










me with this office and had me swear the oath while I x-jas
ft
»
still a small child, without my desire or consent. However,
J
ft
having come to understand my situation, I realize that I
am not competent to hold the office with which he invested
me, and that I am not suitable for the Caliphate of the
Muslims. Whoever has taken the oath of allegiance to me is
permitted to break it: I have absolved you from it and
A
1
freed you from your oath.11 Al-Muntasir sent a message
i
to the governors of the provinces concerning the matter and
ft
publicized the statements of. abdication so that they should
be known to all his subjects. . .
1. Tab., Ill, IJ4.89; Anwar G. Cheyne, p. I30. The state-
ft
ments were read in front of the leaders of the people,
the Turks, the nobles, the officers, the QadI al-Qudat,
the Qadis, the generals, the Hashimites, the leaders of
the diwan, the body of attendants, the colonels of the
bodyguards. Also present were Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah
b. Tahir, Was if, Bugha al-Kablr, Bugha al-Saghxr and
all who were attending the dar al-'amma,.and the dar al-










I Even if al-Munta§ir had wished to favour his brothers,
his situation left him powerless to do anything about it."*"
4
9




seem to have been without substantial support in their
0
conflict with their brother, while al~Munta§ir appeared to
0
0
have had all the powerful dignitaries behind him. This is
significantly different from what had taken place in previous
%
reigns, when- the potential successor always appeared to have
* 0
most of the powerful elements on his side. It is probable
that these princes may have had Some following, but their
0
0
supporters were"not strong enough to declare themselves and
challenge the supremacy of the actual directors of the
Empire. The brothers' presence at the court, and the fact
that they were closely watched by the Caliph's sympathizers
4
would have prevented any outside supporters from contacting
C
0
them. Thus the Caliph shielded the court from any possible
disturbances which might have threatened his position.
The sudden death of the Caliph in 2Ij.8/862 offered an
0
opportunity for the dignitaries, and especially the Turks,
4
to choose the person whom they preferred for the Caliphate.
The Caliph and his family had no say in the nomination of
4
a • successor because all the power of the state was now
j
p




these powers behind the throne decided on Ahmad b. Muhammad
4
I
1. It has been suggested that al-Muntasir made a vain
attempt to secure the Caliphate for himself, by forcing
*















b. al-Mu'tasim, (later al-MuBta'in) as Caliph instead of
•I





surprising that the leading officers did not appoint 'Abd
♦
al-Wahhab whom they had favoured during the reign of his
4
4
father, and it can be assumed from the silence of the
9
sources on this point that there had. been some shift in the
9
p




that this resulted.in a compromise candidate being chosenj
I
9
the political alignments had become so fluid that
contemporary observers were afraid to commit themselves.
» •




of the royal family, noticeable since its early establishment,.
U
9
finally led to this unfortunate situation in the Caliphate
9
and later produced such tragic ends for the Caliphs them-
9
9
selves. All of which goes to confirm the assumption that
9




. in the history of the dynasty, because after his death the
♦
real power of the state fell into the hands of certain army
9
generals who were supported by a few self-seeking officers.
9
%
The Caliph, however, was used to fulfil the officers*
9
ambitions and the only thing that remained for him was the
(
religious function which the leading officers did not dare
• »
to usurp.
The new Caliph, al-Musta 'in, chosen on 10 RabI' 11 21j.8/
O




1. Tab., Ill, 1501-1503.













of action while he devoted himself to pleasure, paying no
%
attention to governmental affairs."*- The financial security
0
0
of al-Mu'tazz and al-Mu'ayyad was attacked, and on Jumada I
0
2i4-8/July 862, al-Musta'in forced them to sell to him all the
property they owned, except for a small portion on which
0 *
O




12 Ramadan 2l\.8/2 November 862, the Caliph again compulsorily
0
4
purchased all the buildings, houses, estates, palaces,
4
furniture, and such like, which they possessed to the value
of twenty thousand dinars. This deal was notarized and
signed by the witnesses, notaries, Qadis and others.^ It
was said that al-Musta'in went even further and forced them
to sell their village holdings, leaving al-Mu'tazz with a
0 '
0





al-Mu'ayyad an income of five hundred dinars. It was
I 0
estimated that the real value of the property purchased
*
from al-Mu'tazz was ten million dinars and ten standard
t
A
measures of pearls, and that of al-Mu'ayyad three million
I
dirhams and three measures of pearls.
0
In seeking to undermine the financial security of his
0
potential rivals within the royal family the Caliph intro-
0
duced a new phenomenon into the history of the dynasty.
0
Although al-Mutawakkil suffered from economic problems dur-
q
ing the reign of his brother al-Wathiq, the circumstances
0
1. Tab., Ill, 1508; al-Quda'i, fol. 106b.
2. Tab., Ill, 1507.
3. Tab., Ill, 1307. ■
Ij.. Tab., Ill, 1507.















were'entirely different. Al~Mutawakkil was only deprived





were forced to sell their own property. After buying their
»
considerable possessions, al-Musta'in confined al-Mu'tazz
%
0
and al-Mu'ayyad to a small room (hu.jra) of the .jawsaq, under
p
the supervision of their arch-enemy* Bugha al-Saghir.
At the very beginning of his reign his supporters were
said to be planning the murder of al-Mu'tazz and al-Mu*ayyad
because of a riot which took place in the capital, but the
•
.




princes were not behind the troubles. He recommended,
instead, that the two brothers be placed in prison. However,
it seems more probable that the two were placed in confine-
%
4




the expropriation of their property was subsequent to this.
4
Moreover, the Caliph decided on this plan in order to avoid
%
*
the anticipated disturbance from his family on the one hand,
and on the other hand to keep the leading officers to whom
9
0
he owed his Caliphate on his side. Thus the circumstances .
9
4
of the two brothers during this reign went from bad to worse.
4
In the following year, 2L|.9/863, al-Musta'In granted the
1
administration of.Mecca, Medina, Basra and Kufa to his son
1. Nuium. II, 327; Ibn Nubata, II, 121a.
2. Tab., Ill, 1502; Muntazam, XII, 3a; Miskawayh, VI, 5&k->
P - T
cf. EI , s.v. Bugha al-gaghir.
%
3« N. Abbott, "Arabic papyri of the reign of (3a'far al-
Mutawakkil" ZDMG-, XCII, 1938, p. 92.
8o
ft
al- 'Abbas, whom he, also, wished to have nominated as his
ft
• »
successor. However, we are informed by Sibt b. al-Jawzi
that the Caliph deferred acting on the latter issue,
apparently because of his son's youth. No doubt, there
ft
was a faction among the Caliph's supporters who wished to
have al-'Abbas assured of the succession, just as there were
I
those who favoured some other candidate; the Caliph's
fti
freedom of action in these matters could no longer be said
p




God has charged you to watch over his religion and
to keep his people from the slippery path where
others have perished
ft
Appoint your son 'Abbas as your successor - for he
is worthy of -it - ..
r
and issue letters to.spread this allegiance among
your subjects.
A
Although in years he is immature, he is mature in
intellect;
and as a guide he would lead as capably as an elder.
In earlier times, John was only a lad when he
received his Holy Wisdom,
and Jesus preached in his cradle.3
»
ft
Neither the Caliph nor his office retained any respect among
ft
*
his subjects. Naked power was the patent of authority, and
the 'Abbasid family was as much its victim as its benefactor
ft
In the year 251/865, a conspiracy amongst the Turks
against al-Musta'In and his supporters, Wasif and Bugha
ft
ft
1. Sibt, IX, 266a; where this event is included among
ft
those of the year 250; cf. Muru.i. VII, 314.6-14.7.
2. W.M. Watt, What Is Islam?, p. 122.
3. Muru,i, VII, 3k&~k7'
I4.. Ibn Dihya, al-Nibras f1 Ta'rlkh Khulafa* Bani al-'Abbas,
Baghdad, 1365/l965, p. 86.












the capital of the Empire without a responsible leader.
Later historians ascribe the source of this unrest to the
activity of al-Mu'tazz himself*"^" though in fact it is
f








respects this was a struggle between Baghdad and Samarra;
4
the former, anxious to retain its earlier pre-eminence in
»
.
the Empire, was seeking the presence of a Caliph as the
visible sign of capital status. Al-Musta'in took with him
to Baghdad his cousin Muhammad b. al-Wathiq* and al-Mas'udl
9
0
assumes from this that the Caliph was more concerned about
4 •
his. activities than those of al-Mu'tazz and al-Mu'ayyad who
♦
were left in prison in Samarra.^
When a1-Musta 'in, despite the insistent pleading of
9
the leading officers, refused to return to Samarra^" they
A
released al-Mu'tazz and his brother from prison and declared
the former Caliph, with al-Mu'ayyad designated as his




in the Empire, and this must be taken as symbolic of the
1. Muntazam s XII, 16a; Burhan al-Kamal wa Kamal al-Burhan,
(anonymous) Ms. Mo. 85 Ta'rlkh, M.M., Cairo, fol. 171b;
cf. Tab., Ill* 1523.
2. Tab., Ill* 151)2; Muru.i, VII, 365.
♦
3.* Muru.1, VII, 36I4.-65.
ij.. Tab.* Ill* 15h5>. Baghdad. II* 122; IbnalrKathir claims
that al-Mu'tazz was the one who released al-Mu*ayyad from
prison; Ibn Kathir*.XI, 7»





polarization of the disorganized elements of the society •
m
and of the 'Abbasid family itself. Abu Ahmad b. al-Rashid,
• •




allegiance to the new Caliph, because the latter had earlier
9
9
renounced his position of his own free will, saying that he
had not sought"the honour in the first place. Al-Mu'tazz
4
replied: "I was forced to do so under the threat of the
• »
0




that you had been forced into it, and x\re took the oath to
4














me in peace until the people have agreed among themselves,
4
I
otherwise - take this sword (and kill me)". Al-Mu'tazz
4
did not insist, and Abu Ahmad was allowed to leave without
taking the oath. ,
9
In the civil war that ensued',, the troops from Samarra
A
4
were placed under the command of Abu Ahmad (later, al-
9




against Baghdad. Each side sought to win over the
4
elements supporting the other: al-Musta'in wrote to the
0
0
Turks of Samarra, reminding them of the oath of allegiance
•
•
they had taken ,to him, while al-Mu'tazz wrote to the
S
military governor of Baghdad, Muhammad b. !£ahir, pointing
out that it was he who had been designated for the Caliphate
according to al-Mutawakkil's disposition. Each side, too,
4
1. Tab., III,. 151+9.









in Syria and other provinces of the Empire. A compromise,
ft
whereby al-Musta'in would remain Caliph with al-Mu'tazz as
I
I
his designated successor, was proposed, but it came to
»
nothing. Other secret negotiations took place between the
9
I*
two opposing groups, as a result of which al-Musta'in lost
the support of the leading dignitaries, including the
- P
influential Muhammad b. Tahir* and was forced to abdicate'.
%
ft
Under the terms of the settlement, in which al-Muwaffaq
*
acted as agent for al-Mu'tazz, al-Musta'in was obliged to
live with his family in Medina, with freedom of movement only •
ft




revenues of a certain unspecified area. Al-Musta'in, for
his part, refused to go to Samarra to take the oath of
ft




the contract agreed upon.-^
This distrust among the members of the 'Abbasid family
was also demonstrated when the mother and daughter of al-
Musta'in were searched by the soldiers of al-Mu'tazz before
being allowed to visit him in Baghdad.^" The agents of al~
ft
. Mu'tazz wanted to achieve the greatest publicity for al-
%
1. Tab., Ill, 1552-155^1 Kamil, VII, 91+; Ibn Kathir, XI, 7;
cf. Ibar, III, 287-90.
ft
2. Tab., Ill, 1632-31+; cf. Yaqubi, III, 180. The 'Abbasids in
ft
Baghdad bitterly criticized al-Musta 'in for the shortage
4
of food, and they accused Muhammad b. Tahir of deceit in
ft
his negotiations with Samarra. Tab., Ill, 1616; cf.
Ibar, III, 289.
3. Tab., Ill, 161+1-1+2; Muru j. VII, 366-67,° Kamil, VII,
108; cf. Yaqubi, III, 180.
I
ft
















Musta'In's renunciation of the Caliphate and his professions
* _
of loyalty to his cousin; therefore on I4.' Muharram 252/26
January 866 they brought him to the palace of Ibn Tahir for
4
the ceremony."'" The effect of these events on the prestige
« •
of the dynasty is shown in the following verses which were
current at the time:
.
The Caliph Agmad b. Muhammad (al-Musta'In) has been
deposed, and his successor will be either killed or
banished.
The authority of his family (banu abihl) will vanish,
and no-one will ever again be happy in the Caliphate.
0 Banu al-'Abbas, easy indeed was the path by which
you achieved domination over your slaves.
You fashioned your world in elegance, but (the
garment ofl life has been on you, never to be
repaired.
A
Having made public the announcement of his abdication,
al-Musta'in was not allowed to go to Mecca as agreed. He
4
4
stayed for a while in the house of gasan b. Salig near
9
4
Baghdad, while he was deciding where he would take up
• »
residence. At one point he expressed a wish to move to
Basra, and when asked why he chose such an unhealthy place, .
9
he replied,"Could Basra be any more distasteful than the
abdication of the Caliphate?"-^ Later, he was compelled to
move to Was it.
4
9
Al-Mu'tazz, on ascending the throne in 251/865*
9
rewarded his brothers al-Mu'ayyad and al-Muwaffaq, and
sought their support, during the critical situation in which
4
4
the Caliphate now found itself# In accordance with al-
1. Tab., Ill, 161|5; Muru ,j, 367; Damirx, gayat al-H.aywan,
Cairo, 1281*. A.H. , I, 108.
2. Tab., Ill, 16X4.85 Shadarat, II, 121^-125; Kamil, VII, 122.
3. Tab., Ill, I6X4.75 Ibn Kathir, XI, 10; cf. Ibn Digya, p. 86.
I4.. Tab., Ill, l6i|.7; Ibn al'-Sa'I, Kitab Mukhtasar Akhbar al-
• •




Mutawakkil's testament, he designated al-Mu5ayyad as his
ft
successor,"'" but the old suspicion and distrust among the
r
fl




worried by his brother's association with some of the
p
generals. In Rajab 252/June. 866, al-Mu'tazz removed al-
ft
ft
Mu^ayyad from the line of succession on the grounds that he
9 ft





revenues of the district of Arminiyya which he had been
ft |
*
promised. When the .pro-Mu'ayyad faction protested against
the Caliph's action, al-Mu'tazz responded by imprisoning
both him and his brother, al-Muwaffaq.^ On Friday, 7
.
Rajab 252/27 June 866, al-Mu'ayyad wrote a letter renouncing
• •
his claim to the throne, but even this was not sufficient to
allay the fears of al-Mu'tazz. Finally, on 21 Rajab/9 July
ft
9
he had him murdered in prison, on the pretext that there was
■ a plot being formed to rescue him. On the same day his body
ft
9
was displayed to reliable witnesses in order to show that it
ft
bore no marks of ill-treatment, the intention being to create
«
C
the impression that he died of natural causes•
1.'Tab., Ill, 151+5, a*id Baghdad, 11,122," both include
Ahmad al-Mu'tamid as second in line of succession, while
Ibn Kathir, XI, 7, does not give any indication that a
successor was designated.
ft
2. Al-Tabari indicates that there was some contact between
ft
s
al-Mu'ayyad and Wasif through Waslf's sister. Tab., Ill,
. 1659.
3. Tab., Ill, 1668-69; • Muruj, VII, 393; Kamil, VII, 115-16;
%
Baghdad, VI, 50.
i+. Tab., Ill, 1669; Muruj, VII, 393; Ibn Kathir, XI, 11;.
Ibar, III, 291; cf. Nujum, II, 335* TDA, fol. 60a *
5. Tab., Ill, 1669; Muru j, VII, 393-91+; Kamil, VII, 115-16;
Ibar, III, 291. Al-^Cabarl states that it was said that
al-Mu'ayyad had been smothered in furs, but another account
ft
holds that he was frozen to death on blocks of'ice.
86
*
Thus,, having succeeded in this, the supporters of al-
i
Mu'tazz turned their attention towards al-Musta'In, who was
a potential danger to the throne so long as he remained
1 -
alive. Orders were sent to Wasit where he was being
>
detained, that he be murdered and without the details of
the event being disclosed, al-Musta'In was eventually
*
>




Al-Muwaffaq was banished to Wasit in 253/867* and later
moved from there to Basra. Some time afterwards riots
broke out in the latter city so that he was brought back to
Baghdad, and settled in one of the palaces. In this same
year 'All b. al-Mu'tas im was sent to live in-Wasit, and




were not regarded as a threat to al-Mu'tazz, who may have
been intending to return to the policy of his father, al-
Mut awakk i1. But whatever his motives, his behaviour towards
>
1. Ibn Dihya, pp. 86-87; cf. Nu.ium, II, 335-36.
9
2. When the head of al-Musta'In was brought to the court, al-
Mu'tazz was playing chess and he did not bother to raise
his eyes to look at it. Tab., Ill, 1672; Shadharat, II,
126$ Ibar, III, 291.
3. Tab., Ill, 1693; cf. Ibn IJammad, Qilt al-Arwafr, As'ad
library, Ms. no. 7202. • Istanbul, fols. 71b-72a; Nu.ium,
II, 335> Yaqubi, III, 187* referring to the case of al-
Muhtadl, says that he was sent to Baghdad for his own
safety, but later historians are agreed that his presence
in Samarra was regarded a danger to the Caliphate and it
was for this reason that he was banished from the city.
Cf. Sibt, IX, 290a; al-Bayhaql, al-Mahasin wa al-Masawi',
Cairo, n.d., II, 3U.3-I4I;.. Al-Mas'udl, (Muru.i» VII, 398)
clearly states that al-Muhtadl was expelled to Baghdad
and put in prison. Cf. Muru,j, VIII, 3, where he is in
error when he mentions that al-Muhtadl was sent to al-Sham.
1).. D. Sourdel, "La Politique Religieuse des successeurs d'al-
Mutawakkil," £51, XIII, I960,p.12.
4
87




respect and devotion the family had previously commanded",
• 4
and the Caliph was seen to be as culpable as any of the
0
■1




867, al-Mu tazz actually sent all his kinsmen living in
0
Samarra, including the descendants of former Caliphs, to take
4
up residence in Baghdad, fearing that certain of his
P
officers might be tempted to use one of them to replace him
p
on the throne. And the financial condition of the state,
4
indeed, gave cause for worry, as there was no money
available to pay the soldiers.3 On 27 Rajab 255/H June
869, al-Mu'tazz was deposed by the Turkish officers, and
^ ♦
after five days of brutal treatment he died.^" The document
•
•
of abdication which he was forced to sign reads:
, P
"This is what the witnesses attestt and_it is in this
testament. They confirm that: Abu Allah, the son of
the_Commander of the Faithful, al-Mutawakkil 'ala
Allah, has made known to them and called them to
witness that, being of sound mind and in full
possession of his faculties, of his own free will and
without compulsion, he has considered the matter of
the Caliphate and the leadership in the affairs of the
Muslims, with which office he was invested, and he has
decided that he is unsuited to and incapable of
this responsibility. He renounces the burden of all
duties laid upon him and wishes to be freed from his
obligations; and he also releases everyone who was
bound to him by the oath of allegiance...He himself
calls witnesses to all' that is in? it ten in this state¬
ment; and he reveals to all these witnesses who are
mentioned below, and to each of these present after
the notification has been read out aloud to him word
for word, that he understands all that is written
herein and this is done freely and without coercion.
1. Yaqubi, III, 186-187.
2. Bayhaqi, II, 3l|4; Sibt, IX, 290a.
3. Tab., Ill, 1685; Kamil, VII, 132; Ibar, III, 796-97.
I4.. Yaqubi, III, 186-187; Tab., Ill, 1709; Sibt, IX,







I And it is written on Monday when 3 days were left
of Rajah in the year 255*
0
The brutality inflicted on al-Mu'tazz exceeded anything
that had gone before, and it should have been with deep mis-
p




accepting the oath of allegiance on the last day of Rajab
0
9
255/13 July 861|.^ Yet, al-Muhtadx seems to have been him-
4
self responsible in inspiring the coup, and even al-Mu'tazz
9
showed himself to be aware of his intrigues. It is reported
that the Caliph said to al-Muhtadi on the eve of his deposition^
"There is no welcome for those faces which have never
9
0
appeared in the light", meaning that al-Muhtadx was plotting
4
"in the dark" or behind the scenes against the Caliph al-
Mu'tazz. On the other'hand, al-Muhtadx showed his contempt
» |
%
for al-Mu'tazz by refusing to use his proper name, on several
occasions, referring to him insultingly as Ibn Qabxha.^
0
Al-Muhtadx's stratagem to surmount the anarcly and
chaos in the Capital was dependent on winning the support of
the religious dignitaries, as well as that of their followers,
0
and this he sought to do by emphasizing the sacred nature of
t
the Caliph and pretending a disdain of worldly affairs.
0'
1. Tab.,.Ill, 1712-1713.
2. Yaqubi, III, 1875 Tab., Ill, 1707.
0
3. Sibt, IX, 290a; al-'Aynx writes that al-Muhtadx was in
4
collusion with other elements of the army to kill his
cousin and assume the Caliphate, adding that he could have
saved his cousin's life but, out of worldly ambition, he
did not do so. The author denies the piety of the caliph
on the grounds of his misconduct with al-Mu'tazz. Al-'Ayni
XVII, part 2, fol. 335 a; cf. Bayhaqi, II, 3i|_0.











Von Kremer sees in this the beginning of a new concept
ft
of rule in the state, with a sharp division between the
secular arid religious institutions. At the same time,
ft
al-Muhtadi was careful to eliminate potential rivals to his
ft
4






misconduct, which some of the sources specify, he had Ahmad b.
ft
al-Mutawakkil (later al-Mu'tamid) thrown into prison.^
ft
Probably the reason for this action was Ahmad's popularity
ft
ft
with the army; and indeed it was he whom they selected as
the successor to al-Muhtadi the following year.^ Other
ft
senior members of the 'Abbasid family are said to have been




potentially dangerous members of the royal family were
accorded a totally different treatment; these al-Muhtadi
ft
4
sought to propitiate for the common purpose of restoring
the dignity and respect of the Caliphate.^ But the situation
1. A. Von Kremer, The Orient Under the Caliphs, tr. into
English by Khuda Bukhsh, Calcutta, 1920, p. 296.
2. Tab., Ill, 1788; cf. Muru.i, ■ VIII, 6; Kamil, VII, 11|9;
Ibn Kathir, XI, 21, where they do not mention the name of
Ahmad b. al-Mutawakkil. They clearly state that al-
Muhtadl was dealing with the tyrannical actions which had
ft
been practised before his ascent to power.
ft
3. Tab., Ill, 1818-19 & 1831; Kamil, VII, 162; Ibn Kathir,
xi, 23.
4
i|.. As soon as al-Muhtadi ascended the throne he banished
Qibiha, 'Abd Allah b. al-Mu'tazz, Isma'II b. al-Mutawakkil,
Talha b. al-Mutawakkil, and 'Abd al-Wahhab b. al-Muntasir
to Mecca. When al-Mu'tamid ascended the throne they were
allowed to return to Samarra. Muru.i, VIII, IpL. Ibn Sa'id
states that al-Mu'tamid had al-Muwaffaq brought from Mecca
where he had been exiled by 'al-Muhtadi. Ibn Sa 'id, al-
Mughrib, fl hula al-Maghrib, Cairo, 1953, 86.
5. Cf. his treatment of Salih b. Ya'qub b. Abu Ja'far al-
Mansur, and his own brother 'Abd Allah. Tab., Ill, 1739,




had gone too far to be restored so simply, and as soon as
ft
j
the army felt that they could no longer trust al-Muhtadi he
ft
ft
was deposed and murdered Wednesday 18 Rajab 256/21 June
870.1
ft
Although al-Mu'tamid appears in the pages of the
ft
I •
chronicles as a spiritless creature, wholly devoted to
4
pleasure, it is probable that his energetic brother al-Muwaffaq
» «
took upon himself so much of the authority that belonged to
p
the office that the Caliph himself existed as but his shadow.
ft
In any event, the Caliphate found a new stability and purpose
ft
during this reign and the anarchic situation which had
*
• ,
prevailed during the previous decade seems to have passed,




something of its former state.
In the nine years between the assassination of al-
ft
Mutawakkil in 2lj.7/86l and the accession of al-Mu'tamid
in 256/870, the anarchy which prevailed in the heart lands
ft
of Islam reduced the authority and respect of the Caliphate
to depths from which it seemed impossible for it ever to
ft
emerge.3. Basic to all the troubles which marked each year
*
of this period was the inability of the dynastic family to
1. Yaqubi, III, l89j Tab.,. Ill, 1818; cf. Ibn Kathir, XI,
ft «
23.
Fakhri, p. 186, writes that this reign was a very
surprising one because the Caliph and his brother al-
Muwaffaq seemed to have divided the affairs between them.
ft
Al-Mu'tamid only had his name mentioned in prayer and on
coins, while al-Muwaffaq received all other tributes.
ft
Al-Mu'tamid was involved in his social life and paid no
attention to governmental affairs which led his brother
to become the real director of the Empire.





remain united and resist the inducements of power and
9 *
|
prestige with' which self-interested parties tempted them.
ft
But how transient and dangerous power gained in this way
#




headlong descent into total chaos was halted in mid-career,
and the Caliphate entered upon a new phase in its history.
%
4
during which it was strong enough to survive even such
ft
disasters as the Buwayhid occupation in 335/9^5The
ft
period, therefore, can be regarded as having a positive
ft
aspect in that it impressed on the members of the family
ft
the necessity for co-operation among themselves if they were
ft
♦
1. "There is a x\rell known passage of Ibn al-Athir (viii,
339) in which he comments for his readers on a problem
that he supposes to have confronted the Buwaihid Mu'izz
ad-Dawla after his occupation of Baghdad in 9!j.6.
*
I have heard (balaghani) that Mu'zz ad-Dawla consulted
<>
several of his close associates on the question of
extruding the 'Abbasids from the Caliphate and giving
allegiance to al-Mu'zz li-Din Allah al- 'Alawl or some
other of the 'Alids. All of them advised him to do so
except one, who said., 'This is no sound opinion. Today
you have alongside you a Caliph whom neither you nor your
followers believe to be of the House of the Caliphate,
and if you were to command them to kill him they would do
so,... When you install one of the 'Alids as Caliph,,
there will be alongside you one whose Caliphate would be
held to be lawfully established by you and by your
followers, and if he were to order them to kill you they
♦
would do so. So give up this idea'." H.A.R. Gibb,
*
"Government and Islam under the- Early 'Abbasids,"
ft




to survive; and, probably most important, it showed that
9
4
. reliance on mercenary troops was no longer a feasible
4
« .
policy in what future held for them.. The respect of the
4
masses had to be regained, and this was done by stressing the
4
sacred nature of the Caliphate and presenting the incumbent
* •
of the office in a semi-priestly role as the physical
• 4
f I
expression of the xd.ll of God. The Caliph, henceforth,
4
must above all else be seen as a good man, the true
*
2
representative of the'ideal of Islam.
#
Probably one could trace the causes which led to this
, ♦
anarchy to the absence of any fixed dynastic principle
within the 'Abbasid family, which allowed the succession
4
*
to be subjected to the caprice of the power-hungry factions





further advanced than the Umayyads and, indeed, as they did
not have Arab tribal precedent to rely upon, their situation
9
was even more uncertain and confused. We, therefore, have
$
g
the absurd spectacle of the chief personage of a vast
4
9
Empire occupied only with intrigues and plots to maintain
• |
9
his own position in the face of potential rivals from within
4
1. A change for the better had taken place in the Capital.
Although the new Caliph al-Mu'tamid was absolutely
4
incompetent himself, very soon after his accession to
the throne he made his energetic brother al-Muwaffaq
4
the imperial vice-regent. 1314.
E.A. Belyaev, pp. 202-203; cf. Yaqubi, III,. 190-191;
Tab., Ill, 1839 ff.; Pakhri, p. 186.
2. Yaqubi, III, 187-88; Tab., Ill, 1795-96; Tanbih, p. 318;
bhe Arabs. London 196?, pp.cf. P. Hitti, History (
9
337; E.A. Belyaev, p. 202.
93
his family, while the Empire .itself was falling to pieces
around him. 1 While cannot be claimed that this period
helped towards the establishment of a dynastic principle of
9
0
succession,, at least it ensured that in the future there*
would be family consensus in such matters. 2
1. B. Spuler, The Muslim World* Leyden, I960, I, 6ls
Yaqubi, III, I8O-I83.
*




THE POSITION OP THE FOREIGN OFFICERS IN THE CAPITAL1
A. Their Attitudes towards the Caliphs
Although there has as yet been no comprehensive study
of the organisation of the 'Abbasid army, or of the
structure of command in its ranks, the functions of the
*
9
diwan al-jund can be seen to have undergone a marked change
p
after the death of al-Mutawakkil. The Turkish slave-troops
9
were permitted to enter the ranks of the jund (or standing
army), thereby seizing control of the official military
3 _
establishment in the realm. Henceforth, the.technical
_ 9
terms of rank in the army - 'Arif, Khalifa, Qi'id, etc.
cannot be taken in their former sense, and the general
ft
impression given by the sources is that the troops were
collected under the personal leadership of one or another
9
of the Caliph's officers.^ This absence of a military
1. The terra 'foreign officers' is used to refer mainly to
the Turkish generals. (
P
2. Cf. EI , s.v. Djund where the author suggests that in the.
'Abbasid period, the terra .jund continued to apply to the
Syrian administrative districts. But the diwan al-.jund,
which can be proved to have been still in existence after
al-Mutawakkil, also administered the non-Arab contingents.
3. Tab., Ill, 1799; cf. R. Levy, Social Structure of Islam,
p. ij.12.
ij.. There is abundant evidence that mamluks were introduced
into.the capital in great numbers during the reign of al-
Ma'mun, by both himself and al-Mu'tasira. Later these
mamluks reached the 'Abbasid capital through the co-oper¬
ation of Tahirid 'Abd Allah b. Tahir and the Saraanid Nuh
ft W •
b. Asa'd. Yaqubi Buidan, pp. 29-30; Tab., Ill, 1017; Ihn
Khurdadhbih, pp. 37, 39; Ibn al-Daya, p. ij.; . al-Kindl,
p. 188; cf. D. Ayalon "The Military Reforms of Caliph al-
Mu'tasim", XXVI Congress of Orientalists, New Delhi, 19614.,
p. 25; O.A. Ismail, "Mu'tagim and the Turks" BSOAS, XXIX,
1966, p. llj..
institution in the service of the state, regardless of the
9
9
individual in power, introduced a serious complication into
•
,
the affairs of the realm, for there was no reliable force
I
• 9
Upon which the Caliph could depend, and he was obliged to
9
9 '
come to terms with whichever military leader seemed to
command the greatest support among the soldiery. This
9
soldiery was, also, mainly of foreign or slave origin,^ with
no commitment to the lands they were supposed to protect.
9
It was apparent that whatever alliance the Caliph might be
V
9
brought to accept would be primarily in the interest of
those who commanded the respect of these troops, rather than
9
2
in his own interest or that of his state. The only means
9
the Caliph had to rid himself of- these embarrassments was to
appoint such generals to lead campaigns' at a distance from
9
the capital,3 and this was employed to the greatest extent
4
Muru,j, VII, 118, al-Mu'tasim introduced (i^tana 'a) men
from the tribes of Yaman and Qays in Egypt which he called
al-Maghariba; in addition, he brought in (ista'adda) men
9
from Khurasan and others from Farghana and Ushrusiyya.
2. Unlike the other military elements, the Turkish slave
9
troops were so contemptuous in their attitude towards the
9
Caliphs that they dared to stand against any ruler who
tried to ignore their demands. M.D. al-Rayls, al-Khara.j
fl al-Dawla al-Islamiyya, Cairo, 1957, p. lj-72; cf. EI^,
s.v. Djaysh.
3. This was previously to be seen in the cases of Abu Muslim
al-Khurasani who led the army against 'Abd Allah b. 'All
in Syria. Yaqubi, III, 85-6; Tab'., Ill, 92-98; Azdi,
4
9
p. 165. Also, 'Isa b. Musa, the potential successor
to al-Man§ur, was sent against Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya
in Mecca and then against his brother in Ba§ra. Yaqubi,









possible during the period under discussion, but without
*1
much benefit to the domestic situation. It would not
be a distortion of the facts to describe the Caliphate in
4





















1. Al-Muntasir, for instance, sent Wasif al-Turki to fight
I
the Byzantine army. Tab., Ill, llj.80. In 253/867
Musa b. .Bugha was sent to the region of Jibal with a
considerable number of Turkish troopsj Ibid., 1686.
97
•I. The Relations between the Caliphs and their Military
Leaders up to the Reign of al-^Muntasir
After the part that the array officers had played in
bringing Harun al-Rashld to the throne, the influential
m
leaders in the army became aware of the extent of the power
they wielded and began to interfere in the affairs of the
>
Empire*.^ By the time of al-Ma'mun their influence had
p
grown enormously, and it was the army who s< cur
Caliphate and gained victory over his rival brother al-Amin.
But the leading officers still retained their loyalty to
the Caliph rather than to their own interests, and the
• V
situation was to remain thus down to the Caliphate of al-
Mu'tasim. With the advent of the latter, however, the slave
troops had reached such numbers that they, too, began to
4
0
realize the possible extent of their influences but unlike
the earlier Arab primary
ment itfas to their own leaders who, with such support, felt
0
strong enough to challenge the authority of the throne.^
Henceforth, the army was no longer prepared to function
in its proper role in defending the state and maintaining
its peace and security,^- but became a political, instrument
1. Yaqubi, III, 115; Tab., Ill, 599-603; Azdi, p. 261.
2. It xtfas reported that Ashnas the Turk was at the head of
the Caliph's army when they departed from Egypt. Kindi,
p.
3. Cf. EI2, s.v. Djaysh.
D. Ayalon states, "Even under al-Mu'tasim his Mamluks never
fought the Turkish and other (mainly pagan) unbelievers
living beyond the Islamic frontiers in the areas which
stretched from the Black Sea to Afghanistan. They fought
*
heretics in the Caspian mountain areas who were active
within the borders of Islam." "The Military Reforms of






to be wielded by whichever military leader was capable of
•
,




this created in the capital spread to certain of the
*
ft
provinces, where military adventurers felt that they could
ft ♦ ♦
m
seize power with impunity, and the once-unified empire
ft
of the 'Abbasids was set upon a course of disintegration.-*-
ft «
ft
Upon al-Mu'tasim's accession, the army leaders split
*
ft





other opposing him. Al-Mu'tasim was encouraged to rely
ft
on the loyalty of those officers who favoured their.
ft
P
compatriots, the slave-troops and when, in 223/838, an
✓
unsuccessful plot by the non-Turkish officers to assassinate
him and his important generals was uncovered and suppressed,
ft
the dependence of the Caliph on these foreign mercenaries
ft
*
increased.^ This policy, which indeed threatened the
%
ft
1. D. Ayalon elaborates on this point stating, "The appear¬
ance of the Mamluks as a major military force under the
'Abbasids roughly coincided with the beginning of the
disintegration of their Caliphate, a fact which prevented
the Caliphs from making proper use of them. "The Military
Reforms of Caliph al-Mu'tasim", p. 26.
2. The Caliph al-Mu'tasim, who reinfonced his military
strength with Turkish soldiers, granted the Turkish
leader Ashnis an important iqta's in a district of his
• |
new capital. Yaqubi, Buidan, p. 32.
*
3. The plot was formed during the Caliph's campaign against
the Byzantines in this year, and these officers felt that
they were being discriminated against in the roles to
which they were assigned, the Turks being given all the
important positions. Tab., Ill, I236-38J Azdi, p. 1+26;
Muru.j, VII, I33,.
99
security of the Caliph and the lives of his generals had,
ft
in fact, hastened the advance of the powerful leaders to a
• *
position of strength and influence. However, the latter
i
*
did not yet feel strong enough to openly defy al-Mu'tasim,
, *
who still enjoyed some of the traditional respect of the
>
army; but behind the scenes they were active in pursuit of
p
their own interests, regardless of the welfare of the state.
ft
Al-Mu'tasim was not unaware of what was going on and it i3
I
recorded that he expressed regret for having advanced men,
ft




power and longed for such men as those who served his brother
ft
al-Ma'mun.^ Yet he made no effort to suppress or limit
%
their influence in the capital, and, in fact," went to such
• •
lengths to win their favour that he allowed itakh to murder
the innocent sons of al-Ma'mun. k
During his short reign, al-Wathiq proved no more
s
✓
capable than his father in dealing with this menace to the
4
9
state and himself. He put himself even more under the
ft
control of the military leaders.^ Thus, his favourite,
1. Ibn Badrun, Sharh Qasidat Ibn Abdun, ed. R.P.A. Dozy,
Leyden, 181+8, pp. 292-93.
2. It is stated that Afshin even encouraged the Caspian
rebel, Maziyar, in his plans to overthrow the Caliphate.
Yaqubi, III, 167; Tab., Ill, 1301+ff.
3. Al-Mu'tasim said this to Ishaq b. Ibrahim b. Mu§'ab who,
together with his brother Muhammad, his uncle Tahir b.
al-Bnsayn and the latterfs son 'Abd Allah, were recognised
as the four men most favoured by al-Ma'mun*, Tab., Ill,
1327-28.
1^. Moreover, the Caliph had already raised some other power¬
ful leaders to the position of provincial governor.
Tab., Ill, 1302-1303; Azdi, p. 1+16.
3. Cf. C. Brockelmann, p. 131.
100
♦
Ashnas, although already holding the governorship of Egypt,
*










230/8ij.5i Egypt, along with certain other provinces, was
ft




leave the capital to take up his appointment but sent an1
9
agent to act for him there.^ This privilege of allowing
%
ft
deputies to serve on behalf of the governors of the
« ft
provinces had previously been reserved for members of the
ft
ft




was extended to include the powerful Turkish generals,; whom
ft
the Caliph looked to for support and whose presence in the
••
capital he regarded as essential for his own security. In
%
this new order of authority we find the Caliph, for the first
time, excluding his own family from the centres of power
ft
ft
and fixing his hopes on men who had little stake in the
9




1. .Yaqubi, III, 169.
2. Yaqubi, III, 169; Tab., 111,1330.
3. Yaqubi, III, 169-70; during the reign of this Caliph
the Itakhiyya lands, which lay to the east of the capital
V
and were watered by the Ritul canal, a most important
ft
fruit-producing district, became an iota' granted by the
Caliph himself to Itakh. Yaqubi, Buldan, p. 39; cf. H.B.
El-Samarra'i, Agriculture Life in Iraq. Ph.D. Thesis,
London University, ,1970, p. 193.
I4.. Kindi, pp. 195» 196, 197.
5. H.A.R. Gibb sees this as the rise of a new bureaucratic
class deriving from the military arm of the state, and
endangering the former administrative organisation of the
Empire which was largely based on the 'Abbasid family.







Yet we find that during the reign of al-Mu'tasim and
al-Wathiq the leading officers showed themselves to be
loyal and devoted to the Caliph, quelling ant i-'Abbasid
0
revolts and participating in certain campaigns.^- The
0
4
false sense.of security which this created in the two
Caliphs was to allow the even further encroachments made on
their authority to go almost unnoticed. After al-Wathiq's
0
death it was the military personnel who were in a position
p
to say who should be his successor.
A
Al-Mutawakkil owed his accession to the throne to the





al-Sharibi (al-Saghir), and he began his r<
the Turks who had supported him^ and tried hard to keep them
*
9
satisfied. Thus, he put Itikh in command of the
and other regular army formations, giving him also the
office of ha.jib and the charge of running the palace.^- Prom
»
time to time, Bugha al-Saghir and Wasif, too, held the
5office of hajib in addition to their military commands.
0
By assigning the leading officers to high posts at the
court, the Caliph seemed to be inviting them to extend their
power, and it was inevitable that this would ultimately come
into conflict with his own authority. In 235/8L|.9-50> in
9
the course of a drinking party, al'-Mutawakkil became drunk
1. Yaqubi, III, 163-68, 169-72; Tab., Ill, 1170ff.
2. Yaqubi, III, 172j Tab., Ill, 1368-69.
3. Yaqubi, III, 172; Tab., Ill, I368-7O; Kamil, VII, 22-23
Tab., Ill, 1383; cf. Miskawayh,VI, 51^2; ' Kamil, VII, 29.









and insulted Itakh in the presence of the other guests, and
so angry did the Turk become that he was on the point of
4
murdering him. Appalled by his own recklessness, the
%
Caliph on the following morning expressed regret.for his
ft
behaviour'and begged Itakh's pardon. But he realized that
4
he could never feel secure as. long as the latter remained
4
i









he had him murdered. His two sons were detained in prison
4
until the accession of al-Munta§ir in 2l|.7/86l.
All the offices and dignities which Itakh had held were
"" P
bestowed on the equally powerful general, Wasif. Other
Turkish officers were promoted by the Caliph to important
military positions; in 237/851 Yazld al-Turkl was successful
4
in suppressing a revolt in upper Egypt;8 in 238/852, Bugha
4
al-Kablr was placed in command of an expedition to Arminiyya;^-
i
in 2lj.l/855 Salih b. 'Abbas al-Turki, the governor of Damascus,
• 4
c
played an effective role in suppressing a revolt in Hims.
1. Itakh was murdered in Baghdad on his return to Samarra
from Mecca. Yaqubi, III, 173» emphasises the role of
another Turk, Sa 'Id al-Hajib, in this murder, while
Tab., Ill, I38I4.-86, and other historians made Isftaq b.
«
Ibrahim, the governor of Baghdad responsible. Muntazam,
XI, 95a.
2. Tab., 1385-86; Miskawayh, VI, 5^2.
3. Kindi, pp. 200, 202; Khitat, II, 103.
• ij.. Tab., Ill, II4.II4.; cf. EI2 s.v. Bugha al-Kabir.
5. Tab., Ill, 1 i]22. Hims was an ancient and famous city
located between Damascus and Aleppo. It came under
Arab rule without fighting. Then the Arabs settled.in
the City which comprised mostly Yamanit tribes. Yaqut,






In 2L).2/855~856 Yazid al-Turki was appointed governor of










his early attitude to these Turks had allowed them.to
ft
appropriate virtually all the effective power in the state,
ft




for popular support, through showing favour to the old .
ft
o
orthodox element in the community. It may be that the
ft
appointment of powerful Turks to positions outside the
capital was merely a pretext to rid himself of their




this way; though, of course, they did prove useful in
ft
ft
maintaining his authority against rebels in the provinces.
S
The Caliph's negative attitude towards his leading
officers can be seen, also, in his policy towards the




successors in order of their ages, and divided the Empire
among them, instead of designating these provinces to the
army leader as his immediate predecessors had done. Thus
4 I
the Caliph was seen to be restoring the practice of the
period prior to al-Mu'tasim,' when provincial power, also,
ft
ft
was secured by members of the 'Abbasid family, and in this
ft
way some part at least of the influence of the leading
officers could be curtailed.-^ In the capital itself he
ft
ft
sought to limit their authority by elevating men such as
ft
ft
1. Kindi, pp. 202-203.
ft
2. Al-Tikriti, pp. 2, 32.




Fath-'b. Khaqan and 'Ubayd Allah b. Yahya to positions of
I
authority.^ The Caliph also sought to divide the power-
r *




distribution of favours and appointments.
4
The Caliph's eldest son, al-Muntasir, who was
ft
bitterly opposed to his father's policy encouraged and-
4
supported the powerful officers, who had suffered discrimin¬
ation, to take further action against his father.^ When
in 21*7/861, the Caliph confiscated the diva '. of Wasif and
assigned these lands to his vizier, Fath b. Khaqan,^ Wasif
*
and certain other discontented officers were encouraged by
al-Muntasir to take a decisive stand, and within two months
9
the Caliph was murdered. Thus ended the inviolability and
the freedom of action of the individual who occupied the
highest office in the Islamic state* and the .complicity
of his own son in the murder which brought this about is
indicative of a fundamental malaise within the dynasty
itself which was merely exploited by opportunists and
t
adventurers.
1. Yaqubi, III, 173, 175, 179* Tab., Ill, 1389, 11*1*1,
11*1*1*., 11*14.6-14.7, ll*52ff.
2. Thus, the Turk Bugha al-Sharabl was so influential that
even his son Firis was able to appoint a certain Sa'Id
b. Muhammad as governor of Adharbayjan and Armlniyya.
®!ab., Ill, II4.07. Bugha al-Kablr, too, i*as granted
special favours and it was his presence which stood in
the way of an assassination attempt against the Caliph
by a group of dissatisfied Turkish generals in Damascus
in 21*.'9/858. Their intrigues succeeded in having him
removed from the court, but the assassination plot was
never carried out. Muru,j, VII, 25l*--66; cf. Tab., Ill,
II4.36.
3. Yaqubi, III, 1785 Muru.j, VII, 273; Fakhri, p. 177-
li_. Tab., Ill, .11*52.
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leaders may have been, it. is certain that their support
9 4
6
was sought by elements which had the fixed purpose of
I
9
deposing the Arabs from the direction of the Empire which
they had brought into being
1 And for this reason, their
power was based on the loyalty of the troops
race rather than on the established array.
own
1. Mazyar is reported to have said, "Know that I, Afshln,
and ?aydar b. Ka*us and Babak, all four of us, have for
9 9
a long while covenanted and agreed to take the Empire
from the Arabs and restore.it to the Kisras of Persia."
9
Ibn Isfandiyar, p. 155•
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2. The Role of the Turkish Generals in the Period 2L7-256
/861-870.
4
Al-Mutawakkilfs murder was carried out by a group of
«
Turkish generals who had previously agreed among themselves
#
to take the oath of allegiance to al-Muntasir. It was on
their advice that the new Caliph sent Sa 'id al-Saghlr and
f
'
Sa'id al-Kabir to bring al~Mu'tazz and al-Mu'ayyad to the
court so that they, too, could profess their loyalty to him.
In as much as al-Muntasir gave these generals a free hand in
4
the direction of affairs and did not venture to interfere
9
I
in their activities, the relations between the two were at
O
first exceedingly harmonious. Of course, through his
behaviour in the struggle for power, al-Muntasir had alienated
all the other elements in the state to which he might have
looked for support. In order to win back some measure of
sympathy from these latter, he expressed his deep sorrow at
4
the fate that had befallen his father, and denied his part
#
in the conspiracy by openly accusing the Turkish generals
of conceiving and executing the plot.3 Later historians
were misled into accepting this as the true version of the
facts, and credited al-Muntasir with innocence in the affair.
1. Tab., Ill, 1V73-75.
2. Yaqubi, III, 179; Tab., Ill, llj.79ff.; Tanbih, p. 3II4.,
3. Muru.j, VII, 300; Muntazam, XII, 6b; Kutubi, II, 372.
L\.. Ibn Taghri Bardi, Mawrid al-Iatafa, Ms. no. 30 Ta5rikh, ..
Dar al-Kutub al-Zahiriyya, Damascus, fol. 76b. When-
9
ever al-Muntasir got drunk, he used to curse the generals
for murdering his father; to which they would reply,
"Qatala-hu man qatala-hu, wa-nahnu la-nalamu" meaning
al-Muntasir himself. TDA, fol. 39a.
«*
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When al-Mu'tazz refused to renounce h5.s rights to the
♦
♦
Caliphate, as had been stipulated in the testament of al-
Mutawakkil, it was these generals who were active in
♦
4
persecuting him, and they also put pressure on al-Muntasir,
0
9
so that he too should bring his brothers to agree to their
4
designs for having his son 'Abd al-Wahhab proclaimed his
successor.In this way, these leading officers sought
to ensure the continuity of their own power, and they were
4
4
vigilant, in suppressing any threat to it from other political
9





Al-Muntasir, despite his own complicity in the murder
of al-Mutawakkil and the guilt he shared with the Turkish
A
generals who had carried it out, was not able to maintain
amicable relations with them. They were eager to get rid
*
of him, but he was aware of their intentions, and was on
4 4
4
guard to frustrate them, hoping eventually to restore the
Caliphate to some of its former supremacy, in the capital,
O
at least. He failed to get any support however, while
4
4
the leading officers were growing more united in their
*
resolve to be rid of him before he could make any serious
s
encroachment on their power.^ According to al-Tabari, it
1. Tab., Ill, lij.86-88.
2. Certain later historians, for example, Dhahabi, Tarikhs
XII, 82aj SuyutI, Ta'rikh al-Khulafa», Cairo, 1383/1964*
4
p. 1435 Ibn Taghri. Bardi, fol. 76b., refer to this fact.
3. The leading officers discussed the matter, and reached
the conclusion that they could see no hope for their
9
future if al-Muntasir remained in power. Therefore







was the vizier Ahmad b. al-Khasib who encouraged them to
ft
ft
think about replacing al-Muntasir with some other member of
I >
t
the 'Abbasid family,but al-Dhahabl reports that Bugha al-
Saghir was the instigator of the conspiracy, and that he.
encouraged the other Turkish officers to look to him for a
ft
p
solution to the problem.
Before he had occupied the throne for six months, al-
ft
ft
Muntasir fell seriously ill, and the conspirators seized on
this as an opportunity to put their plans into effect. The




thousand dinars to see that he never recovered, and the
*
%
story goes that a poisoned scalpel was used in the performanc
*
3
of a venesection which resulted in death. Even if there
is some speculation regarding the historicity of such an
ft
ft
account, there are indications in our early source, al-Tabari
which explicitly refer to the death of this Caliph as being
4
caused by the poisoned scalpel which his doctor had used.^"
Al-Tabari might not have dared to state clearly that the




superior power at a time.
ft
1. Tab., Ill", II4.85-86'.
2. Dhahabi, Tarikh, XII, 82a.
3. Al-IshaqI, Akhbar al-uwal-f1 man Tasarafa fi Misr min
Arbab al- Duwal, Cairo, I3IIA.H., p. 92j Dhahabi,
Tarikh, XII, 82a; TDA, fol. 5^a» Another account speaks
of the Caliph's servant being bribed to poison the pears
of which he was so fond. Muntazam, XII, 6b.










Rabi ' II 2i|.8/6 August 862. The army leaders, including
Bugha al-Saghlr, Bugha al-Kabxr, and Atamish gathered to-
ft
ft
gether with their followers in the Haruni palace and had
ft
the officers of the Turks, the maghariba, and the ushrusniyya
ft
swear that they would approve and sanction everything that
Bughi al-Kablr and Bugha al-Saghir might decide. The
* <
meeting was directed by the vizier Ahmad b.' al-Khasib, the
participants agreeing among themselves that under no
ft
circumstances would they choose one of the progeny of al-
ft
ft
Mutawakkil as Caliph, for the army officers had played a
part in his assassination and consequently were afraid
ft




his father's death. Consequently the generals agreed not
*
►
to let the Caliphate pass out of the circle of the
V
*
descendants of their dead master al~Mu'tasim. There was
a divergence of opinion among the leading officers concerning
the kind of person they wished to be Caliph. Bugha al-Kablr
wanted someone of strong personality, highly respected by
his subjects as well as by the generals. Thus they them-
ft
ft
selves would stand in awe of him and be obedient to his
$
commands;, and under such circumstances they and their
followers would be able to maintain the unity which was
' their main strength. The rest of the Turkish generals,
0
however, disagreed with Bugha's view, and looked instead
1. Yaqubi, III, 180; Tab., Ill, llj.85-86, 1501.







for someone who would be subservient to their will and leave
them in control of the situation. In the end, they-
succeeded in persuading Bugha to accept the nomination of
ft







The factionalism which existed within the Turkish
military leadership was one of the main reasons why they
«
were never able to establish continuity of power in their
own hands, but when an immediate objective presented itself
t
ft
they could occasionally submerge their differences for their
common benefit and stand united against any opposition which
could threaten their position. During the short reign of
ft
al-Muntasir, the Turkish generals became the real masters of
the Empire, with Bugha al-Kabir, Bugha al-Saghir and Atamish
p
playing the role of king-makers.
On the other hand, they had to take into consideration
the respect which the Caliph still commanded amongst the
ft »
. pious Muslims, to whom he was above all the imam al-mu'minin
and the divinely ordained leader of the people. This was
ft
a force which they never felt able to challenge openly.^
4
4
The most convenient way of getting over this obstacle to
1. Tab., Ill, 1502-503; ef. Yaqubi, III, 180. Al-Ya'qubi,
however, mentions that a few generals rejected the
nomination of al-Musta'in to the Caliphate.
2. N. Abbott, "Arabic papyri of the reign of Ga'far al-
Mutawakkil", ZDMG, XCII, 1938, 91-92. '
3. Cf. R. Levy, A Baghdad Chronicle, p. 107. He points out
e
%
that any attempt to wield the Caliph's authority against
his consent would have roused the whole of the Empire,

















their ambitions was to ensure, that the person holding the
t
•*




then use this pious support for their .own purposes. Thus
♦ « »
they by-passed 'Abd al-Wahhab and elevated al-Musta'in instead.
It was now a political fact that the support of the leading
%
%
officers was the indispensable qualification for any 'Abbasid
4
p
who aspired to the Caliphate; but on the other hand these
officers had to confine their choice to members of the
'Abbasid family and at no time did they have the confidence
to attempt a dynastic change.^
4 «
4
As soon as al-Musta'in ascended the throne he rewarded
9
his powerful patrons by appointing Atamish as his vizier,
» '
to
with the governorship of Egypt and the Maghrib.^' At the
same time Bughi al-Saghlr received Hulwan, Mis.badhan,
4
Mihrjan and Qadhaq. Shahik al Khadim (the eunuch) was
to
given responsibility for the running of the palace, the
A
stables, the harem, the arsenal and the private business
ft
I
affairs of the Caliph. Moreover, Atamish and Shahik were
4
given priority over all other dignitaries and al-Must'In
allowed them a free hand in dealing with the buyut al-amwal.^
1. Tab., Ill, 1502-1503; «TDA, fol. 51+b; cf. Sibt, IX, 257a.
2. W.M. Watt, What is Islam?, p. 122.
3.. R. Levy, p. 107.
I4.. Tab., Ill, I5O3, 1501; Muntazam, XII, 3bJ cf. Nujum,
II, 330;' cf. also Muir, who states, "The new vizier,
.Atamish, held the entire patronage of office at his
pleasure, and so his fellows as a rule were presented
to provincial governments and commands." Muir, The Caliphate
Beirut, 1963, p. 535.









In Jumada, II, 2J.|.8/August 862, Bugha al-Kablr fell ill
9
and when he died shortly afterwards all his official ranks
were transferred to his son 'Musa, in addition to the posts
#
9






appointed chief administrator of the dlwin al-barld. the
9
1
ministry of the post. Such irresponsible disposal of
♦ w
*
preferments by the Caliph encouraged the military leaders
9
to think that there was nothing that would be denied thenr,
*
2
• and their demands increased beyond measure. However, the
*
•
scramble for offices and wealth created rivalries and
4
»
jealousies among the generals themselves, destroying the •




challenge that was eventually to be made to their position.
4
This rivalry and antagonism was particularly evident
among Turkish leaders who had taken the direction of the
9
affairs of the Empire into their own hands. Thus Wasif
4









isolated from the court. On Saturday 15 Rabi' I 2lj.9/9 June
0 I




that Atamish was with the Caliph in his palace, the .jawsaq,
4
when the troops who were searching for him seized, it. As
it was too late to flee he asked al-Musta'In for asylum. Not
only was this request refused, but no sooner had he been put




1. Tab., Ill, 1512-13; Miskawayh, VI, 566.
2. Tab., Ill, 1506; Muruj, VII, 360-6-1; Muntazam, XII, 2b;
Ibn Kathir, XI, 2.
3. Tab., Ill, 1513; Miskawayh, VI, 566; Kamil, VII 80-81;




cursing him for his "wrongdoings. . Moreover* the Caliph
*
rewarded WasIf by adding the governorship of Ahwaz to his
*
other posts, and Bugha received Palestine in addition to what
he already held. 2 After the death of Atamish, Bugha al~Saghir
became the most notable figure among the generals whose power
even the Caliph seemed to fear. At his behest, al-Musta'In
appointed as his vizier Muhammad b. . Fadl al-Jarjara'I after
the dismissal' of §Ili£ b. Yazdad. Bugha had conceived such






The jealousy and envy rife among the Turkish generals
was also to be seen when Bugha and Wasif, with the help of
the Turkish mercenaries, killed Baghir, one of the reputed
murderers of al-Mutawakkil. The conflict between them arose
over property which Baghir had received in the Sawad as
payment for his murderous deed. k Baghir had insinuated
himself into the service of the court, despite the hatred
of the Caliph. Al-Musta'In, of course, dared not show his
true feelings, so he pretended to favour the murderers of his
unc1 e 5 Nevertheless Baghir seems to have been aware of
the Caliph's discontent learned there was
a plot afoot to have him killed. He, therefore, made his
fellow officers swear an oath to stand by him, against all
1. Yaqubi, III, 181.
2. Tab., Ill, 1511].; Ibn Kathir, X, Ij..
3. T ab ., III, 1511+; cf. Pakhri, p. 180
[].. Tab., Ill, 1535; Sibt IX, 269a; Karnil, VII, 89;
Muir, p.- 537.
5. Tab., Ill, 1536; Kamil, VII, 90.
cf
threat's to his position.. They agreed among themselves that
4
0
they would murder al-Musta 'in, Wasif and Bugha and put on the
throne either 'All b. al-Mu'tasim .or the son of the Caliph al-
Wathiq.-1-
0
Their plot was discovered, and the Caliph, unaware of
the details, suspected that Bugha and Wasif might be. implicated
'
9
in it. He summoned them and said, "I did'not ask you to make
«<
0
me Caliph, but you and your people have elected me to this
position and now you want to kill me." They both swore their
o
innocence and said they knew nothing about the plot. The
%
two generals, thereupon, decided to imprison Baghir, and they
had him summoned to the house of Bugha. Baghir arrived with
0
an armed escort, but he was not allowed into the presence of
the generals. Instead, he was arrested and confined to the
*
bath, where he was finally murdered. When the news of
Baghir*s arrest reached his followers in Haruni, Karkh and Dur,
0
0
they marched on Bugha's house and forced an entry, but by this
0
ft
time their leader had already been slain. Alarmed by this
A
reaction, the Caliph and the two generals fled by boat down
0
the river to Wasif's palace; and, joined by Shahik the eunuch
| I





1. Tab., Ill, i-537; Sibt, IX, 269a; cf. TDA, fol. 56b. It is
also reported that the Caliph, Wasif and Bugha decided to have
Baghir murdered. Tab., Ill, 1538J Ibn Kathir, XI, 7.
2.. Tab., Ill, 1537-38. It was said that a divorced wife of
Baghir informed Bugha arid al-Musta 'In*s mother about this
► •
conspiracy.
3. Tab., Ill, 1538-39, l5l+2-l;3; of. TDA, fol. 56b; Ibn Taghrl
BardI, fol. 78a. In the two latter works there is no refer-
ence to the murder of Baghir; they consider the departure
of the Caliph and his companions from Samarra to be due to
the conflict between the Caliph and Baghir who remained in
the capital alive.
They, arrived in this city on the 1^. or 5 Muharram
« •
251/6-7 November 865* and Samarra was left to the mercies of
e
the army, plunging headlong into anarchy and chaos. It
9




the Caliph regarded their faction as being stronger than that
of any of the other groupings among the leaders in the unending




compromised himself in the eyes of the people; A popular
4
verse of the time leaves no doubt about how he was now regarded.
9
4
A Caliph (al-Musta 'in) is in a cage between Wasif and,




For the ruler to have abandoned his capital city to mob-rule
must have seemed the ultimate in irresponsibility, just as
his servile attitude to men who were probably regarded as
0
little more than barbarians would have deprived him of dignity-
and respect in the eyes of his subjects. With Baghir now
0
dead and the issue as to which faction among the Turks would
9
ft
eventually prove most powerful still not clear, al-Musta'in
ft
• f
gambled his own future on the prospects of Bugha and Wasif.
0
4
In having lost the presence of the Caliph, Samarra felt
9
9
that its own status as a city had been lowered, so a delegation
ft
was sent tp Baghdad to beg his forgiveness and plead with him
to return. When they entered his presence, they prostrated
themselves before him, placing their girdles on their necks
as a sign of obedience. The Caliph accused them of lack of
*
devotion, ingratitude and insubordination, saying, "Did you
9
not intercede with me for your sons, and have I not had about
0
0
I- Muruj, VII, 325; Dhahabi, Tarikh, XII, 12a; Suyuti, p.lijJ.
116
two thousand of them enrolled in the army because of your




your daughters entered in the register of those married
v
females who receive regular pensions. I have given so much
• • •
I
to your immature.youths and children that I have had gold and
silver melted down, and sacrificed my own pleasures and
desires for the sake of your happiness and satisfaction. But
you increased your brutalities, corrupt practices, intimidations
and tyrannical actions.""*" The members of the delegation
4
» •
admitted that they had made great mistakes in their attitude
4 1 H
*
towards the Caliph and his subjects and begged his forgiveness.
When this was granted, the chief of the delegation said to the
Caliph brusquely, "If you have really pardoned us, come and
ride with us to Samarra where the Turkish troops are awaiting
p
your arrival." His manner of address was regarded as dis-
respectful, and when he was reprimanded for it he took offence
and returned to Samarra .with his people.-^ Nevertheless, the
4




After their unsuccessful attempt to persuade al-Musta'in
4
1. Tab., Ill, 1544; Miskawayh, VI, 578-79; of. Ibn Taghri
Bardi, fol. 78a, makes no mention of a delegation sent to
Baghdad, but says that correspondence took place only
through messengers.
2. Tab., Ill, 1544; Kamil, VII, 92.
3. Muhammad b. fAbd Allah b. Tahir struck the leader of the
I I
delegation on the head and scolded him, "Does one say to
the Commander of the Faithful, 'Come and ride with us?'"
The Caliph laughed and said, "These are ignorant people
(qawm 'u.im) , they do not know the language." Tab., HI,
1544; Kamil, VII 92-93-





. k • -
4
• 1




decided to elevate al-Mu'tazz' to the Caliphate in his place.
They had him brought from his prison together with his brother
4
4
al-Mu5ayyad and placed him on the throne, recognizing that
•I
al-Mu5ayyad would be his successor. Al-Mu'tazz, it would
seem, was forced to accept the throne under the threat of
death if he refused, but the question remains as to why the
C
leading officers nominated one of al-Mutawakkil's sons, who
might be expected to seek revenge for his father's murder.
Although the sources provide no clear explanation for this, it
is possible that the generals felt more secure now than they
«
•
had at the death of al-Muntasir. Moreover, the sons of al-
• *
Mutawakkil, as well as being thoroughly intimidated, might now
prove more friendly towards the generals in Samarra, because
of Baghir's murder and the opposition they had shown to the
two main participants in the murder of al-Mutawakkil, i.e.
- - 2
Was if and Bugha. Yet these were the very men who had been
associated with Bighir in the plot to assassinate al-Musta'in
and replace him with either Ahmad b. al-Mu'tasim or the son
of al-Wathiq. That they now. brought al-Mu'tazz to the
4
9
Caliphate only after al-Musta'in refused to return to Samarra
shows that they regarded themselves strong enough to prevail,
4
no matter who held the office of Caliph.^
Thus, the Empire had two rival Caliphs at the same time,
further increasing the possibilities for intrigue and, in
1. Tab., Ill, 151^5; Baghdad, II, 122.
2. Among those who supported al-Mu'tazz was Sima al-Sharabl
p
who was favoured by the Caliph al-Mutawakkil. Tab., Ill,
1563.





effect, polarizing the anarchy between Samarra and Baghdad."*"
0
Certain leading officers who had received high office after
ft
ft
taking the oath to al-Mu'tazz, shortly afterwards were to be
ft
_ p




hand, the governor of Baghdad, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah b.
ft ft
Tihir stood firmly by al-Musta'in, and when he received the
news of the elevation of al-Mu'tazz, he commanded that the
ft
ft
supply of provisions (mlra) from Baghdad and Mawsil to
Samarra be cut off. He went even further and issued an order
to all tax-collectors of the provinces to send the khara.j
revenue to Baghdad instead of Samarra.3
t
The rift between Baghdad and Samarra continued to deepen
and the generals in each city made no move towards compromise.
The solution to the problem lay in their hands rather than in
ft
those of al-Musta'in or al-Mu'tazz, and most of the corresp-
ft
<ft
ondence concerned with the war between the two cities was in
their names.^ However, we also find al-Musta'in corresponding
with Slma al-Sharabi, who was the main military figure in .
Samarra, while al-Mu'tazz exchanged letters with Muhammad b.
'Abd Alllh b. Tahir.^ As a result of this latter correspondenc
1. It was al-Musta'In xtfho was responsible for this unstable
position of the Caliphate, owing to his ineffectual policy
towards his powerful leading officers. Ibn Dihya, p. 86.
2. Tab., Ill, 15^9; Kamil, VII, 93; for example, 'Attab b.
'Attib and Sulayman b. Yasar.
3. Tab., Ill, 155k~55; Kamil, VII, 91j..
![.. Tab., Ill, 1553 ffj of. al-Dhahabi, Duwal al-Islam, I, 118,
where he states that it was the powerful generals in Samarra
and not al-Mu'tazz who sent the army to Baghdad.
5. Tab., Ill, 155^» Both al-Mu'tazz and al-Musta'in were in
correspondence with Musa b. Bugha, each trying to win him
over to his own side. Later Musa joined al-Mu'tazz. See






/ and probably because Ibn Tahir felt that he could not defeat
ft
ft
Samarra, he, in union with Wasif'and Bugha, withdrew his








victory of Samarra over Baghdad, which also implied the
ft
4














preserved in al-Fakhri: when' al-Mu'tazz was enthroned, his
courtiers summoned the astrologers and asked them how long the
p
ft
Caliph would live and how long he would retain his Caliphate.
> * •
A wit who was present said: "I know better than the
*
•» •






The new Caliph seems to have made an effort to restore
*
some dignity and security to his office, but he was to be no
9
more successful in this than al-Muntasir. He tried first of
ft
al.l to eliminate the authority of Waslf and Bugha who were now
ft
ft
in Baghdad, and sent an order to the governor to remove their
_ o
names from the diwan and to prevent them from leaving the city.
His object in doing this was to prevent these two from regaining
contact with the Turkish soldiery, but he was frustrated in his
plans, because his brother al-Mu'ayyad and al-Muwaffaq interceded
%
1. Tab., Ill, 1625-26. Al-Mu'tazz in his letter to Ibn Tahir
%
after the war, reminded the latter of the promises between
them, and criticised him for supporting al-Musta'in.. Al-
mi
Mu'tazz, also, told Ibn Tahir he should have been the first
person to associate himself with his cause. Ibid., 1591j.-95'
9 ft
2. Fakhri, p. 181.






on the generals' behalf. Al-Mu tazz was compelled to
• ♦
4
reinstate them in all their offices with honour, after they .
4
P
came back to Samarra.
9
*
Certain discontented generals in the army of Samarra
4
4
attempted to organize a plot against the Caliph in favour of
4
1
his brother al-Mu'ayyad, but their plans were discovered and
9
the latter was killed and his- supporters severely punished.-^
4
The Caliph summoned Musa b. Bugha and asked him about the
matter. Musa conceded the real reasons behind the plot, and
4
said: "0 Commander of the Faithful, they want to rescue (from
• »
prison) Abu Ahmad (al-Muwaffaq) whom they love because he
*
served in the recent war; they do not love al-Mu'ayyad.
4
The attitude of al-Mu'tazz towards these generals can
be seen in the appeal for support he made to 'Ubayd Allan b.
4
'Abd Allah b. Tahir, the governor of Khurasan, in order to
suppress their influence in the capital. 'Ubayd Allah sent -
his uncle Sulayman at the head of a military force and it is
said that it actually reached Samarra. Wasif and Bugha
objected strongly to the coming of non-Turkish soldiers to
the capital, thinking that these troops would probably be used
to undermine their supremacy. Therefore they forced the
5
Caliph to order these troops to move to Baghdad.
✓
1. Tab., Ill, 1659-60; cf. Muru -.j, VII, 39k'> Sibt, IX, 275a,
where this intercession is attributed to the powerful
generals of Samarra.
|
2. Tab., Ill, 1660; Sibt, IX, 275a.
3. It was mentioned that Kanjur, al-Mu'ayyad's 5ajib, was
severely punished on the grounds- that he had organized
the plot. Tab., Ill, 1668-69.
[).. Tab., Ill, 1669; Sibt, IX, 276b; al-Quda'I, fol. 101b.












Was if had now become very powerful, and enjoyed a free
t
hand in government affairs, as may be observed from his
9
0
correspondence with the various provinces. This arrogation
of power provoked the resentment of the Caliph and certain
other generals, and in consequence they contrived to have
Waslf murdered on 27 Shawwal 253/30 October 869. The
♦ ^
Caliph now transferred all his powers and privileges to
Bugha al-Sharabi (al-Saghir), who had recently been honoured
— 2
with a croim (ta j) and two swords.




Caliph feared Bugha al-Saghxr and considered him his arch-
i
enemy.^ Bugha was aware of the Caliph's attitude and was
himself. planning to put an end to his reign and his life;^"
but he fell victim to his own over-confidence.^ The story
%
of his murder is not without interest: Bugha had been urging
%
the Caliph to go to Baghdad, probably so that he could remain
6
supreme in Samarra. Taking advantage of Bugha's pre¬
occupation with the arrangements for the wedding of his
daughter to Salih b. Waslf in Dhu al-Qi'da 253/^fovember 867*
al-Mu'tazz, accompanied by his vizier, Ahmad b. Isra'Il,
0
0
and numerous soldiers, one night rode to Karkh of Samarra
to visit Baykabak, another important Turkish general, who
was said to have been in hiding there because of his conflict
- 7
with Bugha.' On his return to the jawsaq he was accompanied
1. Tab., Ill, 1685.
2. Yaqubi, III, 185; Tab., Ill, 1688.
3. Tab., Ill, 1687.
i|. Tab., Ill, 1697$ Tanbih, p. 316.
5. Cf. Yaqubi, III, I85.
0
6.'Cf. Muir, p. 5if0.
7. Tab., Ill, 169jU-.
by Blykabak and the troops from Karkh and Dur who were under
V
—
his command. On learning of this visit, Bugha felt himself
4
threatened, so he left Samarra with five hundred men, taking
♦
with him a considerable amount of money from the treasury.
4
%
Apprehensive of his return, al-Mu'.tazz slept fully clothed
and armed, while his slave girls kept watch all night for
0
1
fear of a surprise attack. After a few days, the soldiers
*
of Bugha started complaining and grumbling about the
privations they were Suffering, for it was winter and they
had no tents. Afraid of mutiny and concerned for his own
safety, Bugha secretly left his camp by night and went by
boat down to Samarra, unarmed and with very little money,
< »• «
p
and accompanied by only two slaves. When the boat reached
the bridge of Samarra, the guards stationed there detailed
Bugha and informed the Caliph, who immediately ordered that
he be executed. This was done and the chief of the guards
*
was rewarded with 10,000 dinars and a robe of honour.^ The
story shows how the Caliph used his generals one against the
4
other in order to strengthen his own position. Moreover, it
* «
reveals the type of relationship which existed both between
4
.the generals themselves and between the Caliph and his
officers. The death of Bugha, however, seriously affected
the position of certain members of his family as well as his
1. Al~Mu'bazz is reported to have said to his courtiers that
he was afraid that Bugha would descend from the sky or
come out from the ground. Tab., Ill, 1691].; Muru,j,
VII, 396-97.
2.. Tab., Ill, 1695-96; Dhahabi, Tarikh, XII, 73a.





supporters. Two of his sons fled to Baghdad where they
ft
I I
took refuge with some trusted friends, but they were tracked
♦
down and imprisoned by the governor of the. city. In
I
addition, he imprisoned fifteen men from among Bugha's family
ft
and supporters in the qasr al-dhahab, and ten more in the
matbaq.




generals-, and was apparently in a position to exact revenge
for his father's murder.^ Tha.'alibx informs us that Qabxha
%
always encouraged her son to wreak his vengeance on these
Turks, and it was towards this end that Wasxf and Bugha were




at ion, the result of which could only have been propitious
s
for the future of the Caliphate. However, the followers of
ft
ft
these two leaders realized what al-Mu'tazz had in mind, and
ft





obstacle to his plan was Salih, the energetic son of Wasxf,
•
ft
who had stepped, into his father's place of power. Thus in
ft
• • . '
Rabx'.I 25l+/August 868, Salih was in a position to grant to
ft
ft
Daywadar the son of Afshxn, Dxyar Mudar, Qinnasrln and the
m
1. Tab., Ill, 1696-97; cf. Kamil, VII, 126.
2. EI^, s.v. Bugha al-S"aghxr; D. Sourdel, Le Vizirat
ft
ft
•'Abbas ide, Is 296'. He states that the Caliph took
these steps in order to ameliorate the disasters which
had befallen the Caliphate, and to gain revenge on the
leading officers who had formerly supported the. pretentions
of al-Muntasir and murdered his father.
0
3. Tha'alibi, Thimar al-Qulub, Cairo, 13814/1965? p. 86.
k. Muru.i, VII, 3I4.7-
12k
Aw'asim. At the same time Baykabak granted Misr to
- - 1
Ahmad b. Tulun. So seriously had the political capacities
4
of the Caliph been reduced, that even when he was able to
rid himself of an enemy, the place of the.iatter was immediately
filled by another equally dangerous. Salih did not even
bother to ask the Caliph for permission in appointing
governors to the above regions.
4
Salih b. Waslf went even further and decided to rid
himself of the Caliph's secretaries who were opposing his
numerous demands. He informed the Caliph, in the presence
of the vizier and the secretaries, that the army was receiving
no wages and that there was no money in the treasury because
v
Ibn Israeli and his followers had stolen everything. Ahmad
4
Ibn Isri'Il, who enjoyed the support of the Caliph, immediately
refuted this claim, telling Salih, "You are a rebel and a son
o
p
of a rebel." The argument continued between the two in the
presence of al-Mu'tazz and grew so heated that Salih fainted
with anger. His men who were waiting outside the gates
*
heard this and rushed towards the palace with their swords
drawn. They threatened al-Mu'tazz who escaped from them by
retiring to a private apartment.3 After a short while
Salih regained consciousness and ordered his supporters to
put the secretaries in chains and lead them away. Before
they left, however, the Caliph begged Silih to free Ahmad b.
Isra'Il, who was his private secretary and tutor, but the
stubborn leader refused this request.^- Although there may
1. Tab., Ill, 1697; cf. Yaqubi, III, 185.
2. Tab., Ill, 1706-707; Sibt, IX, 289a.
3. Tab., Ill, 1707.
I4.. Qabiha also attempted to intercede for Ahmad b. Isra'il and
• >
sent this message to Salih: "I would like you bo bring him











be doubts as to its historicity, this story shows vividly












placed the vizier and the secretaries in prison, Salih forced
al-Mu'tazz to appoint Ja 'far b. Muhammad al-Iskifi as vizier,ft
1
and this the Caliph reluctantly did.
*
• »
When Ahmad b. Israeli still refused to authorize the
«
4
release of money to pay the Turks, they positioned themselves
9
in front of the palace and sent in a message to the Caliph,
• •
asking him to come out and meet them. He replied, "I
4
9
took some medicine yesterday and I am now too weak to
#
* * »
discuss anything with you. If it is something really urgent,
P
a few of you should come and tell me. Then a group of
.
soldiers forced their way in and, dragging him to his feet,
, . «
brought him to the door of the room. It was believed that
4
4
they had cudgelled him, for when he came out his shirt was
9




The Caliph was deposed on 27 Rajab 255/H July 869 and,
✓
on the instructions of the generals, he was put to torture,
under which he died. . In order to legitimize their barbarity,
his persecutors compelled him to declare that he regarded him-
«
• »
self as too weak in character and too much involved in the
4
%
pleasures of social life to carry out the responsibilities
1. Tab., Ill, 1707J cf. Fakhri, p. 182.
2. Tab., Ill, 1710; Kamil, VII, 132. The Caliph, by so doing
showed that he did- not suspect treachery from their side.
3. Tab., Ill, 1710| Ibn Nubata, II, 125a; al~Safadi, II, 292
126
• •
of the Caliphate and that lie voluntarily abdicated the
%
I
office and absolved all those who had rendered the oath of
A
allegiance to him from their obligation. No previous
4
0
Caliph had ever been subjected to such physical abuse, and
I
later historians attempt to explain the contempt he was
*
4
shown as arising from defects in his own character which
n %
encouraged the Turkish officers to regard him as a non-
entity.^" Completely in control of affairs, Salih b. Wasif
4
designated the cousin of al-Mu'tazz, al-Muhtadi b. al-Wathiq,
as the new Caliph.
♦ 9
4
Al-Muhtadi ascended the throne at a time when the





officers had reached such a pitch that it could not be




suspicion by the very people to whom he owed his elevation,
4
and, aware of this, weak creatures such as al-Muhtadi were
prepared to go to any lengths to reassure their barbarous
patrons. Thus, al-Muhtadi allowed Salih b. Wasif full
authority to act in his name, and consented to a campaign of
•
•
persecution, which had begun in the reign of al-Mu'tazz
against the secretarial class, many members of which were
2





But the very lack of organization and discipline among
.the Turks Was to provide a more effective instrument for
curtailing their power than any initiative on the part of
4
1. Shatibi, Kitab al~Juman fi Mukhtasar Akhbar al~Zaman,
Ms. B.M. Or. 1555s fol. 26ij.a; Ibn Hammad, fol. 72b;
Suyuti, p. 36O.
2. Tab., Ill, 1720-23; Mur u ,i, VIII, 12; Kamil. VII, 136;






civil authorities. Any excessive increase in the wealth
ft ft
or privileges of one of their number was bound to excite
0
9
the envy of another, and this would often lead to outright
ft
hostility.^ Thus Musa b. Bugha and Muflih, the brothers of
0
Baykabak who were on campaign in Rayy, left the region and
ft
0
returned to Samarra against the express command of the Caliph
ft
himself.^ When the news of Musa's departure reached al-
Muhtadl» he described it as an act of defiance against the
• ft
will of God.^ Salil? b. Was if, who may have been aware of
ft
1
Musa's intentions, encouraged the Caliph to regard this
action as a sign of conspiracy and revolt, aimed at the
destruction of the Caliphate.^ Certainly Salih saw it 'as
♦ '
ft *
a threat to his own privileged position, and his reactions
were to cause another period of chaos and fear in the
ft
capital.
1. Muru.i, VIII, 3.
2. Tab.. Ill, 1739: Sibt, IX, 291a; Shadharat, II, 131-32;
Suyuti, p. llj.5; cf. Muir, p. 5lU|-«
3. The Caliph is said to have stretched out his hands to
Heaven and cried, "Praise be to God! Into Your hands I
commit myself because of what Musi b. Bugha has done,
leaving brothers in the lurch and surrendering to the
enemy. I am not guilty of the discord between him and
me. God, may You fight those whom the Muslims fight,
may You make the armies of the Muslims victorious•every¬
where. I am with the Muslims, .in thought and will;
wherever they suffer bring them help and defend them.
God, reward me for my good intentions, even if I should
fail after having received help from You." Tab., Ill,
1711-0; cf. Sibt, IX, 291b.
ft
!(.. Tab., Ill, 17i|.0j cf. Ibn ICathir, XI, 18, where it is
stated that al-Muhtadi actually called Musa to the capital'
to protect his own position against the powerful leaders,













bi-amr dar al-khilafa, and whose authority in certain matters
was equal to that of Silih, had recently handed over this
• 9
post to Satikln, who was supposedly loyal to him, believing
that he would in this way still retain his power over the
- - 1
palace and the Caliph when Musa arrived. As soon as the
4
■ latter's forces reached the capitai on ij. Muharram 256/13
— — P
December 869, Baykabak joined them.
Shortly after the arrival of Musa's soldiers in the
4
qatul, Salih went into hiding, fearing that he might be
4
' killed and this, indeed, seems to have been Musa's intention.^
4
He accused the Caliph of siding with Salih,but when al-Muhtadi .
4
reproached him for having committed a grave wrong against the
4
Caliph's dignity, he replied: "I only want your good. By the
holy grave of al-Mutawakkil; no evil shall befall you from
our hands."'' It was believed that if Musa had really sought
the security and safety of the Caliph, he would have sworn
either on the grave of al-Mu'tasim or al-Wathiq and not on
1. Tab., Ill, 1788.
2. Tab., III, 17142.
3. Tab., Ill, 1738.
4
_ 4
I4.. Musa's suspicions about the Caliph's sympathies began xirith
his arrival in Samarra, when the Caliph did not come out to
4
4
greet him from the court of law where he was presiding.
4
Both Musi and his troops remained for a while outside the
court, building waiting for the Caliph's permission to enter.
Finally, they entered without permission, took the Caliph
9
4
from his seat and led him outside, heading towards his
palace. Tab., Ill, 1788.
























participated. Nevertheless, he exacted from the Caliph .
ft
an oath that he would not join forces with Salih against
ft




Muharram 256/19 December 869.^
ft
ft
Characteristic of the arrogance of these Turkish
ft
ft
officers, who could conceive of no limits to their power,
#
ft
it was now mooted whether or not they should replace al~
Muhtadi with some other Caliph-figure. But some of them
9
seem to have had reservations about this proposal, and
s
♦ 9
Muflih is reported as saying, "You killed the son of al-
Mutawakkil (i.e. al-Mu 'tazz), who was handsome, generous,
and of excellent character, and now you want to kill this man
*
who is a Muslim, who fasts, drinks no wine and commits no sin.
ft
ft
• By God, if you kill him, I will go to Khurasan and make
known your deeds.When al-Muhtadi learned of this proposal,
he bravely confronted the plotters in the great reception-
ft
hall, and said: "I have heard what jou have in mind against me.
I am not like my predecessors al-Musta 'In or Ibn Qablha (al-
4
Mu'tazz). By God, before coming before you I put balsam,
mutahannoit, on my body and entrusted my sons to my brothers. \
^ . ft
Here is my sword! I shall need it as long as I can hold it
ft
in my hand! And if you so much as hurt one hair of my head,
most of you will perish. Verily you have neither sense of
religion, nor shame, nor humility! . How long (will you continue)
ft v
# *
1. Tab., Ill, li+60.
2. Tab., Ill, 1789.
3. Tab., Ill, 17931 Karail, VII, 150; cf. Yaqubi, III, 188|



















with those of Baykabak and his supporters, thus drawing
4
• 4
attention to the humiliating position which the 'Abbasids had
%
2
been reduced to during this period*
%
Al-Muhtadi openly accused Baykabak of complicity in the
affairs of Salih b. Waslf, and said: "Baykabak took part in
4
all that Salih did to the secretaries and in the appropriation
of the property of Ibn Qabiha, and if Salih took something
4
then Baykabak did likewise." This statement is said to have
4




Caliph, and disposed him to support any action aimed at
9
putting an end to his reign.^ When the officers who had
»
been Salih's rivals became suspicious of the Caliph's
✓
attitude and asked him to swear that he had no secret agree™
4
ment with Salih, he replied, "I will only swear in the
presence of the Hashimids, the Qadi, the legal writnesses and
m
the ashab al~maratib, after the Friday prayer."^
1. Tab., Ill, 1793-91+5 Kamil, VII, 150^51} Ibn Kathir, XI,21.
2. The Caliph told Baykabak, "Did you not know that some of
your supporters are living more prosperously than ray
brothers and sons? If you want to make sure of this
search their houses. You will find no furniture, slaves,
servants or singersj they do not even possess the diya'."
Tab,,- III, 1791|.J Kamil, VII, 151| Ibn Kathir, XI, 21.
3. Tab., Ill, 1795J of. Balawl, Sirat Ahmad- b. Tulun, Damascus,
135 8/1959s p. Lt-55 He states that al-Muhtadl had something
against Baykabak before he ascended the throne. And as
soon as he was elevated to the Caliphate, he decided to
put an end to this leader's life.








During this period of chaos and anarchy a few
. •
meetings took place between the Caliph^ representatives
and the factious Turkish troops, but they failed to reach
any settlement which might help to put an end to the lawless
V '




assassination of al-Mutawakkil, and which had badly affected
*
the economic and political life of the whole Empire. Mean-
*




which succeeded in separating their administration from the
central government. Musawir al-SharrPs revolt in the north
♦ •
of Iraq obliged the Caliph to call a meeting of his officers,
ft
I
and Musi, Muflih and Baykabak were ordered to lead a campaign
*
•« •
against the rebel. They apparently made their preparations
and mustered their troops on Wednesday 11 Safar 256/18 January
ft
ft
870. At the same time they were searching for Salih whom
they did not dare to leave behind in Samarra. After a
ft
thorough search in the city his hiding place was uncovered
A
1
and he was murdered on 23 Safar 256/30 January 870. A week
later, Musa b. Bugha, Baykabak and Muflih led their troops
✓
against Musawir al-Shari, accompanied by the Caliph himself
ft
O
as far as the outskirts of the capital.
The departure of Musa and Baykabak from the capital
ft
ft
offered a new opportunity to the Caliph to restore his power,
. «
but circumstances did not favour this design. He tried to
play off one general, against another, and in this showed how
little he was aware of the true situation among the leading
1. Tab., Ill, 1810; cf. Ibn Hammad, fol. 73a.
ft















officers; his ignorance was to cost him his life. Al¬
iiabari gives five different accounts of al-Muhtadl's murder,^
9
mm W
all of them putting the responsibility on Musa b. Bugha and
his followers. The most plausible one centres on his policy
towards the generals, the substance of. which is explained in
the following account.
After the departure of Musa, the Caliph sent orders to
s
Baykabak to take over command of-the troops and to continue
- 3
the campaign against Musawir al-Shari. He was, moreover,
m
9
either to have Musa and Muflih murdered and their heads sent
9
to Samarra, or to have them presented in chains before him.
9
9
Baykabak, however, realized the true purpose of the Caliph
and he informed Musa and Muflih of the orders he had received,
telling them, "If the Caliph challenges your supremacy today,
9
9
tomorrow he will do the same with me.The three generals,
*
Muflih, Musa and Baykabik, then decided to return to the
capital, and diverted the army from its real course, Baykabak
departing in advance to assure the Caliph of his support
•
-
against the other two leaders,, but at the same time telling




them. When the Caliph had been deluded into a sense of
9
t
security, the three of them would arrange to have him murdered
1. Muru.i, VIII, 8; Ibn Kathir, XI, 22.
2. Tab., Ill, 1813 ff.
3. Tab., Ill, 1813-15; Kamil, VII, 157; Ibn Kathir, XI, 22.
4
If.. Tab., Ill, l8lif.; Muru.i, VIII,'8-9; Sibt, X, 2b; cf.
Ibn 'Amid, fol. 102a.





When Baykabak arrived in the capital without having
fulfilled any of the Caliph's commands, the latter showed
* •
9
signs of displeasure and anger. Baykabak offered many
J
9
plausible excuses but he failed to convince al-Muhtadl who,
• •
9
acting on the advice of Silih b. Ya'qub b. Ja'far al-Mansur,
had Baykabak beheaded."^
The execution of Baykabak irritated the Turkish officers
%
O
in the capital and prompted them-to take action against the
♦
Caliph, which led to another period of civil war. The leading
•
.
officers produced a document signed by al-Muhtadl in which
he promised not to enter into any alliance against them, and
j
4
accepting that they would have the right to depose him should
O
he do so. The troops supporting the Caliph were soon
defeated, and he was placed in prison where, under brutal
9
4




then brought forward Abroad b. al-Mutawakkil, al-Mu'taraid, and
4
appointed him Caliph, public homage being paid to him on 13
0
4
Rajab 256/16 June 870. Al-Muhtadi's death was announced
only five days later.^
1. Salih told al-Muhtadl that not one of his predecessors had
had his courage. For instance, the Caliph Abu Ja 'far al-
Mansur had his most powerful general Abu Muslim al-Khurasani
4
murdered in order to maintain the unity of his empire and
he succeeded in doing this without antagonising Abu Muslim's
followersj and the latter was even more influential among
the inhabitants of Khurasan than Baykabak was with his
followers. If al-Muhtadl wanted to control the situation
he had to have Baykabak murdered. Tab., Ill, 1815J
Kamil, VII, 158.
2. Tab., Ill, 1822; Sibt, X, 8b.
3. Tab., Ill, 1822-23; Kamil, VII, 161; Wu.jum, III, 26;
cf. Ibn Kathir, XI, 22-23.
Realising that no confidence could be placed in any
ft
ft
compact made with the Turkish generals, al-Muhtadx had.
•
»
sought to win the support of the people by adopting a pious
ft
way of life and abandoning the social activities'of the court.
ft
This was not without some success, but the very growth of
*
his popularity among the masses only increased the suspicions
ft
O
of the generals, and provoked them to hostility. During
his short reign, al-Muhtadx failed to organise any riew
ft
forces powerful enough to counter those of the foreign




seen in the rivalry and antagonism among the members of the
ft
'Abbasid family, which allowed the generals to play them off
ft
one against the other. Similarly the Caliphs tried to set
ft
the generals against one another but were largely unsuccessful
<
Although the Caliph sought the co-operation of a few inactive
senior members of the family, these latter were unable to
bring about a new alliance in his support.
>
The detailed account of this period of anarchy which
appears in the sources has been briefly summarized here to
ft
reveal the degree to which the Turkish officers were able
to bend to their own will the politico-religious institution
ft »
of the Caliphate, and to become the true rulers of the realm.
The factors which explain how this came about, although never
explicitly stated by contemporary observers, are plain to
ft
the reader from the accumulation of incidents which appear
•
. ,
1. Yaqubi, 187-88; Muru.i, .VIII, 19-21; Fakhri, pp. 181-82;
ft
cf. C. Brockelmann, p. 133; Muir, p. 51+3*
2. Muru.j5 VIII, 2-3; Diyarbakrx, II, 3I4.2; Arbilx, p. 232;
Sibt,• X, 8a.
1 —in this account. Having, from the reign of al-Ma'mun,
ft




- who at first had no political commitment in the affairs of
*
ft
the state beyond this attachment to their master - each
» e
subsequent Caliph increased their numbers, and his dependence
ft
ft
on them, until the point was reached where they had become
ft
O
the indispensable condition for his survival.
ft
It was this selfish quest for survival at the expense
ft
of every other consideration that led the Caliphs to flatter
the men who rose to authority among these slaves by investing
ft
them with high rank and wealth. ^ It is not surprising that
9
ft
honours so easily acquired, and ultimately so hollow, came
to be looked upon with disdain, and their bestower with
contempt. In this situation, a united stand by the members
ft
of the 'Abbasid family might have provided a nucleus around'
9 ft




each one of them who had any possibility of acceeding to the
ft
Caliphate showed himself to be an active participant in the
ft
plots and intrigues with which the throne was surrounded, and
ft
insensible to any motives other than personal ambition. The
ft
1. Ibn al-Mu'tazz, pp. 82-83.
2. Cf. C.E. Bosworth 'Abu 'Abdallah al-Khwarazmi', JESHO.
XII, 1969, p. 117. Professor Bosworth suggests that the
'Abbasid diwan al-.laysh was one of the most highly-developed
and complex of government departments, thus reflecting the
paramount importance of the army in the Caliphate, as the
Turkish generals secured their ascendancy over the civil
power during the course of the 9th century.
3. Al-I§takhrl describes how the granting of iqta's was- used
by the 'Abbasid Caliphs on a large scale in their efforts




disorders of the period following the murder of al-Mutawakkil,
ft
t




















of the men who controlled this machine was a move as
disastrous to the weak Caliphs as to the good order of the-
state.
However, there is a positive aspect to this short period
of anarchy which should be stated: it permitted the dissolu-
ft
tion of.the artificial complex of provinces which had been
ft
ft
patched together in the name of an Islamic Empire since the
ft




vigorous states which had the validity.of regional, and,
in some cases, ethnic unity, as the reason for their existenc
ft
In Mesopotamia, too, the solution to the problem of. an
intractable army, in the reign of al-Mu'tamid, was .to lead
✓
to the formulation of an Iraqi national policy which, even
* «









given borders in pursuance of these fictive goals.
ft
Significant, too, throughout this brief interval of .
V
ft
anarchy, was the fact that there was no attempt made by the
1. D. Sourdel, "The 'Abbasid Caliphate", CHI, I, 129;
C.E. Bosworth, 'Abu 'Abd Allah al-Khwarazml, JESHO, XII,
1969, p. 116.
• •
•2. Tab., Ill, Muru.j,. VIII, • 67 ; Tanbih, p. . 318} Kamil,






all-powerful military despots to replace the 'Abbasids as
t
s
the legitimate sovereigns of the state, nor in any way to
J










the dynasty, the mystique of the family had become so im¬
planted in the political awareness of the people that no
m
9
physical force was able to dispel it, and this was to be
9
shown to a much greater degree later when even the.Shl'ite
Buwayhids were obliged to maintain an 'Abbasid as the visible
head of state. Certainly, much of this mystique was due to
the growing religious significance with which the Caliphate
*
was invested, and if a political theory can be said to have
0




position to the role of the Caliph as the source of divine
0
sanction for the secular activities of the state and, thereby,
s
provided the meaning of the state itself.
0
None of the generals.who rose to transitory power at this
9
time was ever in a position to defy the public opinion upon
0
which the real foundations of the Caliphate rested, and from the
perspective of history one can observe the short-sighted
tendencies of those 'Abbasids, who on certain occasions
regarded these officers as of more importance than the
people. If, instead of trying to exploit their mutual
jealousies in order to maintain himself at the centre of his
4
0
erratic balance, the Caliph had persisted in those occasional.
9
9
appeals to public, sent iment, it is difficult to see how
these generals could have remained in any position of menace
$
to him or any other minister of the state.
B. Their Attitudes towards the Viziers
ft
%
The status of the viziers had been insecure since the




mainly due to the recent institution of this office and .the
4
4




of such an officer. Therefore a continuous struggle for
ft





because each one of them wanted' to extend his authority at
the expense of the other. Whenever the Caliph noticed that
the balance of power or authority had changed in favour of
ft
ft
his vizier, the latter suffered in consequence of this
✓
ft
alteration. This can be seen in the murder of.Abu Salama al-
ft
- 1 P
Khalal, the extermination of the Baramika and the assassi-
9
V
nation of al-Fad.1 b. Sahl respectively.-^
ft
With the flourishing of the Turkish officers at the
ft
court, the caliphs and their military officers had adopted
new methods of suppressing the viziers, as well as the




that of the viziers, • This change of attitude towards the
ft
viziers can be considered a sign of encouragement to the




of the viziers and scribes. Before this reign the military
ft ft




their influence at the Court, and through the latter the army
1. Jahshiyari, pp. 90-91J Tanbih, p. 293; Fakhri, pp. 111-113
2. Yaqubi, III, 127-28; Jahshiyari,' pp. 23l^ ff.; Fakhri,
pp. 114-7 ff.




generals gained access to power. Al-Mu'tasim was the
first Caliph to confiscate the property of his vizier.
1
9
In addition to appropriating the secretaries' property, his
• ,
immediate successor, al-Wathiq, also imprisoned them 2 Al-
Wathiq 's intolerant attitude toward the civil servants had
4
*
encouraged the Turkish generals to exercise their own
authority to the full. But the Caliph seems to have ignored
the fact that the suppression of the vizier's power at this
time meant the diminution of his; own authority, because the
ft
Turkish officers intended to retain the power in their own
hands what the cost. The Caliph's attitude may have
been adopted as a result sur army
leaders to eliminate the influence of the civil servants.
*
The struggle for power was not the only contributing
ft




curtailment of-the secretaries' authority. However the
ft
conflict among the secretaries^ was the main reason which
1. Yaqubi, III, 163-61}.; Tab., Ill, 1181-83J Fakhri, p. 17^.
ft
2. Ahmad b. Isra'il paid eighty thousand dinar; Sulayman b.
Wahb paid four hundred thousand dinar; Hasan b. Wahb four¬
teen thousand dinar; Ahmad b. al-Khasib and his clerks a
million dinar; Ibrihim b. Rabafy and his scribes one hundred
thousand dinar; Najah b. Salama sixty thousand dinar and
Ibn al-Wazir one hundred and fifty thousand dinar. Yaqubi,
III, 170; cf. Tab • 9 III, I33O-3I.
♦
3. Ibn al-Abbar, (I'tab al-Kuttab, fol. 57b) speaks about
the conflict between Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Malik al-Zayyat
and al-Fa^l b. Marwan. Al-Tabarl (III, 1331) refers to
9
the antagonism between Ibn Abl Du'ad, the chief Qidi and
Ibn al-Zayyat, the vizier.
114-0
ft
* ft > »
A >
* «
encouraged al-Wathiq and his supporters, the Turkish
i
generals, for example, to behave in this way towards them.
I
These foreign officers, who were contriving to have the
ft
Caliph suppress the main obstacle which might prevent them
♦
s




doing, the Turkish officers probably found the. chance to
ft
obtain important posts and by attaining such significant
positions they could oppose any secretary whose power might
threaten the.ir supremacy. Therefore, by the end of this
ft
short reiga the Turkish officers were able.to play an
ft





• •• i • «
Shortly after al-Mutawakkil's accession to the throne,
%
the office of vizier was adversely affected by the imprison-
I
ment of the vizier Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Malik al-Zayyat and
by his subsequent murder. ^ The Caliph's action, hovrever,
ft
was an indirect encouragement to the Turkish officers to
1. This policy also came to be considered as a method which
ft
the Caliphs and their powerful Turkish leaders could use
to obtain money for the court from the viziers and their
scribes. M.D. al-Rayls, p. 82.
2. These were Wasif and Itakh. Yaqubi, III, 172. There is
also mention of Simi al-Sharabx as another Turkish dignitary
who played a part in putting al-Mutawakkil on the throne.
Tab., III, 1368.
3. Yaqubi, III, 172; Tab., Ill, 1370 ff. In addition to this
action the Caliph ordered the imprisonment, and then the
confiscation of the property, of the following secretaries;
'Umar b. al-Faraj a1 -R^khkh^j 1, Ibrahim b. al-Junayd al-
%
ft
Nasrani and Ibn al-WazIr and his brothers as well as his











enhance their power despite his successful attempt against
ft
the life of their powerful general Itakh. Al-Mutawakkil
k
ft
was unable to restore .the. vizier to his former position or
ft




sympathy he felt towards his later viziers. This was
-
•
possibly due to the conflict and mistrust among the
P
secretaries, which weakened their position. Their intrigues
to some extent encouraged the foreign officers themselves to




The murder, of al-Mutawakkil offered a new opportunity
ft •
ft




only at the expense of the Caliphs, but also of the viziers,
ft
ft '
who became tools in the implementation of the former's




Caliphs and their viziers which had dominated the 'Abbisid
ft
ft




period under consideration, we find that the Caliphs and their
ft
viziers stood side by side against their common rivals, the
• army generals„ This meant that the future and security
|
g
of the viziers was dependent to some extent upon the Caliph's
own position. Therefore the Turkish officers were the only
1. This applied only to his attitude towards al-Fath b. Khaqan
and 'Ubayd Allah b. Yahya but not the earlier vizier Muhammad
b. al-Fa<jll al-JUrjani. Fakhri, p. 177.
2. The available references are to the conflict between Najah
b. Sallama, the Caliph's secretary, and other secretaries •
such as al-^asan b. Makhlad and Musa b. 'Abd al-Malik,
Najah's jealousy.and envy of these latter led the Caliph
in 21+5/859 to confiscate the property of Najah and his




courtiers, who brought al-Muntasir to the throne. The new
Caliph, whose power was usurped by these dignitaries,
entrusted .his secretary Ahmad b. al-Khasxb with the
ft
-1 p
vizierate. Despite his stupidity and brutality, Ibn
al-Khasxb appears in the sources as the main policy-maker
during the short reign of al-Muntasir,^ which was possibly
ft




officers. In general this vizier seems to have been working
ft
ft
in the interest of the officers, and always proposed policies
»
which would be useful to them, so that they could further
ft
secure and strengthen their influence at the court. But
0
even with his sympathetic attitude towards the Turkish
• • •• «
officers, the vizier was not in a position to restore dignity
1. Tanjbih, p.' 311+; Fakhri, p. 178.
2. Muru.j, VII, 302j Sibt, IX, 262b-263a; al-Safadx, II,
289-90; Pakhri, pp. 178-79.
3. a. Ahmad b. al-Khasib was the one who declared the official
version of events, by announcing that al-Mutawakkil had
been assassinated by his favourite vizier al-Fatla b.
Khaqan, who was then immediately executed.
b. It was he who composed the oath and obliged the dig¬
nitaries to swear allegiance to the new Caliph.
c. This vizier was the dynamic power behind the removal,
of the two sons of al-Mutawakkil, al-Mu'tazz and al- ■
ft
Mu'ayyad, from their right to succession.
ft
d. Apparently his conflict with the Turkish leader Wasxf
led the Caliph to send the latter on a military campaign
against Byzantium.
e. This vizier was the one who took the initiative by
suggesting to the Turkish officers that they dispose








to either his office or the Caliph's which must have been
4 *
his main aim."*" Al-Muntasir, for his part, seems to have .
• »




capital and to have always adopted his proposals. But the
#
4 ♦




conspiring against his master in order to remain in office and
♦




their confidence. His policy, on the other hand, did not
« 4
benefit his position in the immediate future but rather
encouraged the military leaders to increase their influence
4
4
at the expense of both the Caliph and his. vizier, who were
9
still unable to challenge them. Thus, like his master, the
0
4
vizier became a mere puppet in the hands of a few powerful
9
army officers. The vizier's attitude towards them seemed
*
in one way or another to be an invitation to the foreign
4
generals to pursue their own tyrannical policy with the
intention of manipulating circumstances at the court to their
own ends. This therefore led directly to the degradation
I
4 9
of the status of the viziers in the eyes of these ambitious
officers.
Despite this decline in the vizier's power, he still
4
l 4
played an important role in certain affairs at the court.
0
9
For example Ahmad b. al-Khasib took part in the choice of
4 *






1. D. Sourdel believes that as soon. as'.Abroad b. al-Kha?ib was
in power he undertook to strengthen his position. Le Vizirat
'Abbaside, I, 288-89.
4








ascended the throne, Ibn al-Kha§Ib seems to have been demoted
from the vizierate, and according to al-Tabarl, the new
Caliph kept him as a secretary, and conferred the title of .
♦
vizier on a Turkish officer, Atamish.^ Shortly after, in.
♦ 9
c
Jummada I, 2lj.8/August 862, as a result of his conflict with
certain Turkish officers, Ahmad b. al-Khasib was dismissed
« »
and expelled to Crete, in addition to having his property
confiscated.^. Muslim historians seem to have proffered
various explanations of what led the Caliph to dismiss Ahmad;
al-Mas'udx, for instance, sees the Caliph's discontent as the
4
sole reason for his vizier's discharge,3 while Miskawayh
regards the conflict between the Mawali and .Ahmad b. al-Kha§Ib
as the main reason behind his dismissal.^- Ibn 'Abd Rabbih
• •
considers that Ahmad*s inability to carry out his responsi¬
bilities was the main pretext for the Caliph to replace him
*
with the Turkish officer Atamish.^ Ibn al-JawzI refers to
4
9
the conflict between the Caliph and his vizier and believes
4
that this was the sole reason behind the Caliph's action.
♦ t
1. Tab., Ill, 1502-1503J Miskawayh, VI, 562; Sibt, IX,
258a; cf. D. Sourdel, I, 289. But according to al--Ya'qubi
*
(III, 180) Ibn al-Khasib remained in office as vizier for
four months. Al-Masfudi shares this view and states that
Ibn al-Khasib remained in office for a short while and
later, due to the discontent of the Caliph, he was
dismissed. Tanbih, p. 315.
2. Yaqubi, III, 180; Tab., Ill, 1508. Al-Ya'qubl states that
shortly after his dismissal he was taken by sea to Crete
and then to Qayrawan.
3. Tanbih, p. 315-
Miskawayh, VI, 56^.
5» Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, al-'Iqd al-Parid, IV, 165.











But Sib't b. al-Jawzi emphasises the struggle for power
9 9
between the Caliph and his vizier, and considers this as
the main cause for the dismissal of Ahmad b. al-Khasib.
» u • o
o
m
Sib^ also does not ignore the competition for supremacy
9
0
between the powerful Turkish generals and the vizier, a disput
4




Ibn al-Khasib. Our later historians do not offer any
explanation which might help to solve these ambiguous circum-
4
. stances, although they make references to the relegation of
p
the vizier. A modern Egyptian scholar has suggested that
9
*
the reason al-Musta'In dismissed his vizier was the great
pressure placed on him by the powerful Turkish leaders who
4
0
requested the removal of Aftmad b. al-Khasib from his office
because of his strict financial measures.^ Since the Caliph
4
had no power to oppose the increasing influence of his army
✓




vizier and the Turkish genhrals was the main reason' which led
t
the Turks to gain possession of this important post.^"
The ousting of Ibn al-Khasib from his office and the
4
designation of Atamish in his place was of great importance
to the students of early 'Abbasid history, simply because it
shows the way that the Turks had gained influence at the
9
'Abbasid court. Thus the dismissal of Ahmad b. al-Khasib• •
0
can be considered a victory for the Turkish officers, and a
9
1. Sibt, IX, 258b.
9
2. • Arbili, p. 229j TEN, fol. 6i|h.
3. M.H. Ahmad, al-Khilafa wa al-Dawla fx al- 'Asr al-'AbbasI,
4






turning point in the decline of the office of vizier as
9
9
a position of civil authority, because it fell under the
9
9
control of a soldier who had no experience in the admini-
9
stration of such an institution. Hence, all the important
offices at the court came under the direct control of the
9
9
powerful army officers. But despite the transference of this
9
9
office to the hands of the Turkish generals, it did not help
*
to restore its dignity and subsequent events show how little
respect this office now commanded. Atamish did not remain
♦ 4
long in practising such undisputed authority at the court.''"
9
P




who were encouraged by the angry Turkish mercenaries, as
9
well as by the Caliph al~Musta'In who intended to strengthen
his own position and to eliminate the influence of such
9
P —
dignitaries. Thus, the murder of Atamish seems to have
adversely affected the status of this off ice, which then sank
in people's estimation even lower, than before. Although on
this particular occasion the struggle for power was part of
0
✓
the conflict between the Caliph and the Turkish generals,
the latter seem to have been aware of the situation. There-
9
9




of the avaricious military leaders, who were ready to






1. Cf. Pakhri, p. 180 where Ibn al-Taqtaqa does not mention




as Ahmad b. al-Khasib was discharged al-Musta'in appointed
Salih b. Yazdad to the vizierate.
9 •
2. Tab., Ill, 1512-13.
This decline in the vizier's authority could not be
attributed merely to the strength of the opposition, but also
to the jealousy and envy among the secretaries themselves.^
*
It must be remembered too that the court concentrated mainly
on obtaining money to pay the soldiers, and on the expenses
4
of the palace. The easiest way to do this, was to confiscate
the property of wealthy dignitaries, such as the viziers and
p
the secretaries. It is worth noting that the Turkish
officers did not continue to hold the vizierate despite its
significance in the retention of their supremacy. This can
%
be interpreted as an attempt by the generals to avoid any
possible dispute among themselves which might have led to
* '
their own downfall. They probably believed that if one of
«
their compatriots continued in this position he would provoke
the jealousy and hatred of the others and this would lead to
0
direct conflict.among them. Therefore, it was a much more
secure and a safer policy if they brought a person whom they






Sallh b. Yazdad, who succeeded Atamish, had failed in
r
his intention of restoring his office to its former dignity
P
by imposing certain financial measures on the Turkish officers
1. Atamish's secretary Shuja b. al-Qasim intended to
eliminate the former secretaries who had remained in office
4
9
as, for instance, Ahmad b. Isra'il at the land tax office
0
and al-Hasan b. Makhlad at the state properties office.
The latter was replaced by his substitute 'Isa b.
• Farkhanshah and was ordered to leave Samarra within thr
days. Tanukhl, Faraj, I, 135; cf. D.Sourdel, I, 290-91






when he tried to curtail.the expenditure of the officers
9
by controlling their payment.In adopting such a policy
4
the vizier provoked the anger of the powerful generals who
4
« i
decided to take a determined stand against him. Then, under
m
9
pressure from the opposition, in particular Bugha al-Sagh.Ir,
t
who was the main authority at that time, Ibn Yazdid fled to
Baghdad in Sha'bin 2l+9/0ctober 863.2 This indicates that
the vizier had no power to implement his intention of improving
the deteriorating situation in the capital, since whenever
this policy came into conflict with that of the Turks he was
exposed to various "forms of retribution from them. There-
9
fore, in order to secure his position and to maintain his
authority, the vizier was compelled to carry out and serve the
9
interests of the Turks. In complying with the officers, how¬
ever, the vizier sometimes acted against the will of the
secretaries,3 an act which only further encouraged the
Fakhri, p. 180.
2. Tab., III,. 1514? Ibar, III, 281+; Ibn al-Abbar (fol. 77b)
mentions that Ibn Yazdad fled to Baghdad because of his
*
insecure future among the Turks who bitterly hated him for
his tyrannical policies. Ibn al-Taqtaqa shares the same
view and emphasises that the threat on his life was the sole
9
reason which had led him to flee to.Baghdad. Moreover, the
latter considers that this threat came from umara* al-
9
dawla. Fakhri, pp. 180-81.
3. According to one anecdote, Ibn Yazdad persecuted a certain
4ft
Abu Ayyub who had been supported by the former vizier
<ft
'Ubayd Allah b. Yahya. Tanukhl, Fara.j, Ms. Paris Or. 31+83,
V
s
23a J cf. D. Sourdel, I, 292. On the other hand Ibn Yazdad
would have replaced al-Fa$l b. Marwan at the tax office by











generals to exercise their authority.
The successor of Ibn Yazdad seems to have been Muhammad
« *
- - 1
b. Fadl al-Jurjani, the former vizier of al-Mutawakkil,
\
who did not stay very long in office, as he died during the
year 250/861+.^ Ibn al-Taqtaqa clearly states that Muhammad
b. Fadl and his successor, Shuja' b. al-Qasim^,were appointed
as secretaries, kuttab, and nobody called himself by the name
9
'vizier'.^" This was probably due to the strong influence of
\
the Turkish officers which adversely affected the position of
0
the vizier. It must be remembered that the situation of
*
%
the vizierate was no better than that of the Caliphate
9 •
during this period, in comparison with the life and power
• •• •
9
of the army officers.
4
9
Ibn al-Abbar states that Ibn Yazdid returned to the
9 •
#
vizierate for a second time after Shuja' b. al-Qasim and
remained in office until the end of al-Musta 'In's reign,^
9








of Waslf, who became the director of affairs in Ramadan
*
250/October 861+, and had at his disposal the seal of the
9
Caliph and controlled the vizierate,^ one can easily under-
9
_ ^ _ . _ . 9
1. It was said that the successor was either Ahmad b. §alilj
b. Shirzad or Ahmad b. Isra'il. TBN, fol. 61+b.
2. Kamil, VII, 89.
4
3. But according to al-Tabari, (III, 1512-13) Shuja' b. al-
0
Qasim was murdered together with his master Atamish.-
1+. Fakhri, p. 180.
4
5. Ibn al-Abbar, fol. 77b.
*
6. Tanbih, p. 315.






stand how this personal secretary may have considered him-
*1
self a vizier. But this happened during the second
4
4







As many different individuals held the office of
. • *
ft
vizier during this reign, there remained no respect for him
ft
even in the eyes of the common people. The army generals
k •
4
on the other hand were pleased at these changes in office
#
because it helped them to maintain their supremacy.. It also
proved the futility of the institution as an aid to iraple-
ft
menting or adopting any policy intended to maintain peace and
• '
ft












nominated Ja 'far b. Mahmud al-Iskifx as his vizier. In order
i
to secure his position, the latter lavished many gifts on
*




vizier's generosity, however,•widened the rift among the
ft
A
Turks who separated into two distinct groups, one for, and
ft
/
one against, the vizier. Therefore, when the struggle for
ft
power between the two led to a riot, this offered the Caliph
<
ft
al-Mu'tazz the opportunity to dismiss his vizier whom he
s
ft
disliked. It is clearly stated that from the very beginning
the Caliph hated this vizier;^ but probably under pressure
ft
ft
from his Turkish officers, he had been obliged to designate
t »
1. D. Sourdel, I, 293-9i+.
m
2. ■ Fakhri, p. 181; D. Sourdel, I, 291^-95 •
•
«









The Turks succeeded in removing Ja'far b. Mahmud al-
ft ft
ft




who also remained in office only for a short time. Hence
ft
al-Mu'tazz appointed his favourite secretary Ahmad b. Isra'Il
ft
instead.^ The aim of al-Mu'tazz was indeed to rid himself
• • «
of both Waslf and BughS al-Saghir, but on meeting opposition




well as" the Turkish mercenaries the Caliph was unable to do .
ft
ft
this. He may have intended to strengthen the position of
the secretaries at court by gradually excluding Turkish
4
ft





Ibn Israeli to the vizierate but also in the extensive power
U




It is worth noting that the vizier noitf became completely
ft
ft
dependent on the Caliph himself. Their positions were
ft
4
1. It was reported that Sxma al-Sharabi was the real director
• - •
of affairs at the court. Sima was responsible for the
ft
ft
post office and for controlling the dlwan of the Turkish
ft
army, through his secretary Abu 'Umar. Tab., Ill, 1550;
cf. D. Sourdel, I, 295-
ft
2. The discharged vizier 'Isa had been badly treated by the
Turks. Tab., Ill, 1680-81.
ft
3. In 252/866 Ahmad b. Isra'il officially became vizier. Tab.,
Ill, 161+75 Kamil, VII, 122. Al-Tabari, (III, 161+0) states
ft
that Ahmad b.. Israeli received from al-Mu'tazz during the
vizierate of al-Iskafl control of the post office and
ft
obtained an assurance that he would be appointed vizier.
1}.. It is reported that immediately after the murder of Bugha
■
al-Saghir his son Musa received an extended favour from the
Caliph, and his secretary Sa'id b. Makhlad became aLmost as
powerful as a vizier. Nishwar, VIII, 1|.5-^8j cf. D. Sourdel
I, 297.
interdependent: whenever the vizier was in a strong
ft
• '
position so was the Caliph, and vice-versa. This indicates




their common enemy, the Turkish officers, who intended to
4
ft
usurp as much pox^er as possible. The position of the Caliph
ft
and his vizier seems to have been more favourable at the
beginning of the reign of al-Mu'tazz than during the previous
#
4
two reigns. But as a consequence of the struggle between
•
ft
the Caliph and his vizier, on one side, against the foreign
ft
army generals, on the other, the situation had completely
changed by the close of this reign.
ft
*
In Jumada. II, 255/June 869, Salih b. Waslf, th,e power-
* » •
ful Turkish leader, succeeded in having the three most
2
important assistants of the Caliph imprisoned against the
will of the Caliph and his family. This imprisonment
ft
represented a real victory for the Turkish officers and a
ft




secretaries had played its part in encouraging the army
leaders to. exercise their power not only against the vizier
and the scribes but also against the Caliph himself.-^ As
ft
4
1. Cf. D. Sourdel, I, 296 who believes that Ibn .Isra'il did
not play an important part either in the political life of
ft
the time or in the efforts made by the Caliph to take
J
revenge on the Turkish officers.
_ # |
2. They were Alpmad b. Isra'il, al-Hasan b. Makhlad and Abu Nuh
'Isi b. Ibrahim. Tab., Ill, 1706; Ka'mil, VII, 1L|.81 cf.
ft
Yaqubi, III, 18? where he'states that they were Ahmad b.
Isra'il, al-Hasan b. Makhlad, 'Isa b. Ibrahim and 'Ali b.
Nuh.
ft
3. Tab., (Ill, 172I4-) clearly states that 'Abd Allah- b.
ft «
Muhammad b. Yazdad was the one who encouraged Salih b.
ft
Waslf to punish the secretaries.
a consequence Salih be Wasif and his followers succeeded inX
t • t
♦ *
imposing their wills on the Caliph, forcing him to accept
4 4
4
Ja 'far b. Mahwud al-Iskafl as vizier, despit e al-Mu'tazz's
%
hatred of him. The Caliph, who had intended to nominate
#
h
§alih- b. Yazdad, submitted to their power and granted al-
Iskafi full authority as his vizier."'"
* »
The installation of Ja'far b. Mahmud to the vizierate
4
9
for a second time was of great importance, because it showed
how degraded the position "of the vizier was in the eyes of
9
4
the army leaders. The vizier became a mere tool in their




whom they wanted with this office. This meant that the
9
vizier was unable to exercise any authority, and if he wished
4
4
to retain his post he had to obey the army officers.^ More-
s
'over, al-Iskafi himself resigned from the vizierate because
9
of heavy pressure from the powerful leaders whom he was now
compelled to obey since he had been chosen by them. Salih
b. Wasif became the real power and master at the court and
even letter headings were written in his name.^
%
4
1. Tab., Ill, 17073 1709; of. Fakhri, p. 182 where he does not
refer to the attempt made by al-Mu'tazz to appoint Ibn
Yazdad, but simply states that al-Iskafl was nominated by
Salih b. Wasif and designated to the vizierate.
2. H.A. Mahmud, al-Islam wa al-Hadara al-'Arabiyya, Cairo,
1968, p. 59.
4
3. As a result of the vizier's humiliation-the-following
was a popular song.




Jj.. Tanbih, p. 317. . ^ ' -r -
! {J*-* •>








It seems that Ja'far b. Mahmud al-Iskafl continued in
0
0
his vizierate during the early period of al-Muhtadi?s reign.
•
»
Shortly after, he was succeeded by Sulayman b. ¥ahb and,
according to certain sources, the latter remained in office
P
until the end of the reign. But despite the designation




vizier was able to restore the former dignity of their own
offices, which had now been taken over by a few powerful
0
Turkish officers. Salih b. Waslf, and later Baykabak,
continued to dominate the affairs of the court. The vizier
on the other hand seems to have had no part in directing
0
A
affairs during the.short, reign of this Caliph but was
concerned only with fulfilling his masters' commands.
1. Fakhri, p. 183; al-Mas 'udl states that despite the brevity
of this Caliph's reign, several changes took place"among th
viziers who included Ja 'far b. Mahmud al-Iskafx, Ibn 'Ammar
and Sulaymin b. Wahb. Tanbih, p. 318. The author of TBN,
believes that 'Abd Allah b. Yazdad was the first viaier,
succeeded by Abu Salih b. 'Imad and Sulayman b. Wahb
respectively, fol. 65b, though Sibt b. al-Jawzi, (X, 9a)
mentions that Ibn Yazdad became a vizier during this reign
but only after Sulaymin b. Wahb and Ja'far b. Mahmud. The
role of Ibn Hazdad during the early rule of al-Muhtadl (Tab
III, 1816, 1822, I83O) led A.H. Herzfeld (Samarra, p. 255)
and later D. Sourdel, (I, 3OO) to infer that Ibn Yazdad
had been a vizier during this period.
2. Aghani, XX, 67.j Tanbih, p. 318; TBN, fol. 65b; Fakhri,
p. 186; cf. Muru,j, VIII, 2, where Sulayman who, according
to al-Tabari, was very close to the Caliph, during the
riots which were to bring about his deposition, was by then
0
playing the 'part of a vizier'. Tab., Ill, l62L|.-25« But
it has been suggested that the expression used to refer to
him shows that he did not actually hold this title.
s











to improve the status of the vizier at e, during his reign it
•
«
underwent a distinct decline. It was the Turkish officers
4





one can see on several occasions one of the officers having
4
4
invested himself as a regent of the Empire, eventually being
<
given the title of vizier, as was the case.with Atamish, and
. A




The secretaries who were linked with the military
officers on certain occasions, and through them afterwards
had access to the service of the Caliph, had only temporary
influence and very limited powers which were liable to dis-
1
appear as Boon as the power of their direct master dwindled.
During this short bewildering period of the struggle
for power, it seems that the Caliphate's and the vizierate's
4
situations were closely linked to each other and the decline
4
of one meant the collapse of the other. ' This was due mainly
4
to the vigorous policy of the Turkish officers, who intended,
in spite of their disunity, to suppress any power which could
p




immediately after this period, the struggle between the
*
Caliph and his vizier was renewed because of the suppression




1. D. Sourdel, I, 303-30]+.
2. Ibn al-Mu'tazz, pp. 82-83.
156
both the viziers and the Caliphs. With the decline of
t ♦
4






struggle for power between themselves as each tried to




1. It is reported that in 26I4./877 the Caliph al-Mu'tamid
confiscated the property of his vizier Sulayman b. Wahb
♦
and his family because of the increasing power of the
the Caliph'slatter. Tab.,.Ill, 1926-27. 265/878
brother al-Muwaffaq ordered the appropriation of the
> *
0











THE TURKISH SOLDIERY IN SAMARRA1
'i e
t
The Introduction of the Turks into the 'Abbasid Army.
There is definite evidence that Turkish soldiers had
been employed in the Caliph's bodyguard since the reign of
- 2
the Caliph al-Mansur, and this cannot be regarded as an
exceptional circumstance in a society which was composed of
various ethnic groups.^ At the outset of his conflict with
4
his brother al-Amin, al-Ma'mun intended to seek refuge with
*
4
the Khaqan of the Turks, but his adviser Faqll b. Sahl persuaded
him to remain in Khurasan.^" Many Turkish soldiers were used
0
against al-Amin during the civil war, and from this time their
1. The term 'Turkish soldiery' is used to denote the new
military recruits who were-brought into the Muslim army
about the end of the first century of the 'Abbisid dynasty,
most of whom were from the nomads of Central Asia. RI ,
s.v. Turks; cf. Osman S.A. Ismail, "Mu'tasim and the TurksJ'
pp. 114.-15, In this study these soldiers will be treated
as a separate body from their leaders who in certain cases
used them as means to fulfil their own ambitions.
2. Tha'alibi, Lata*if al-Ma'arif, p. 20: Ibn Badrun,' p. 292;
Ibn al-Faqih, Kitab al-Buldan, p. 282; Qalqashandl,
Ma'athir al-Inafa fi Ma'alim al-Khilafa, vol. Ill, Kuwait,
1961j., 3I4.7. Ibn Badrun and Tha 'alibi make clear that it
was al-Mansur who first introduced Turks into the service
e
of the 'Abbasid state. This possibly refers to the
position of Hammad al-Turki at the court of this Caliph.
3. W.M. Matt, Islam and the Integration of Society, London,
1966, p. III4.. Professor Watt sees this creation of an
♦
ethnic diversity as one of the outstanding achievements
of Islam.
Ij.. Tab., Ill, 802, 811|.; cf. Ibar., Ill, 232. If he lost
the battle with his brother, al-Ma*mun intended to take





numbers in the 'Abbasid army continued to increase steadily,
4
4
being estimated at three thousand during al-Mu'tasim's
expedition to Misr in 211j./829-30.2
4
9




ment which began under al-Ma'mun was motivated by the
4
4
desire to create a third force in the military establishment
O
which could hold the balance between-Arabs and Persians.^
• «
And it is even suggested that already at this time these
4
4
troops were made a part of the regular army, were enrolled"
4
in the diwan, and drew their salaries from the central
4
treasury.^" Although they may have been originally conceived
as such a third force, in the event, their recruitment was
0
to displace the Arab element in the military establishment;
<
4
and it might with equal force be suggested that this, in
0
♦
fact, was the true intention of al-Ma'mun, who felt he
• • * i
could no longer "trust those Arabs who had fought against his
(T






The Turkish soldiers, most of whom had been introduced
into the Caliph's army through the agency of 'Abd Allah b.
*
1. Tab., Ill, 891.
4
2. Yaqubi, Buidan, p. 30; Al-Kindx put their, number at fo.ur
thousand. Kindi, p. 188.
4 ,
9
3. C. Brockelmann stresses this point, stating that the
rivalry between the Arabs and the Persians to whom al-
Ma'mun in the first years of his reign had shown special
favour, had already compelled him to entrust his personal
4
security to a group of slaves, principally Turks, p.129;
Anwar G. Chejne, p. 118(seems to share this viex*.
I4.. Osman S.A. Ismail, p. 16, puts forward this suggestion,
but there is no explicit statement in any of the
authorities that the Turks were given such official status
at this period.
5. As soon as al-Mu'tasim ascended the throne he sent a0






Tahir and the Sarnanid Nuh b. Asad, had the status of slavest 0 *
« ft
and some of them were actually the currency in which the
e
1




the need for them increased, arrangements for their supply
%
were made with the local rulers of the regions, of Samarqand,






Although it is usual for modern historians to place
4
*
the blame for the infection of the body politic of Islam
ft •
ft
on this virus of an irresponsible slave soldiery on al-
Coritd. ]
of his election and ordering him to drop the names of
the Arabs from the diwan and to stop their pay. Kindi,
p. 11x3; Khitat, I, 311. 313. Al-Maqrizx, al-Niza'
%
wa al-Takhisum, Najaf, 1386 A.H., p. 63, states that al-
Mu'tasim ousted the Arabs, the Prophet's people, with
whom God established the Muslim religion, from the diwan,
and stopped their pay.
1. Before becoming Caliph, al-Mu'tasim used to send a certain
Ja'far .al-Khushshaki every year to Nuh b. Asad al-Samani
in Samarqand to buy the Turks. Yaqubi, Buidan, p. 2I4..
ft
2. D. Ayalon, "The Military Reforms of Caliph al-Mu'tasim",
p. 26 holds that the importance of the Samanids lay
v •
in the fact that they had been, since the days of al-
Ma'mun, the main channel through which Mamluks were
ft
brought into the Muslim world, a view already expressed
by ¥. Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol invasion,
London, 1968, pp. 209-211.
ft
160
Mu'tasim,'*' all that can actually be said against him is
that he continued the policy of his predecessors to the
lengths which he thought were desirable.^ The primary
duty of the slave troops was to act as palace guards ,3 an(j
4




that negroes and maghariba slaves were also employed for
this purpose in the early period.^" In regard to those
« •
elements which xirere brought from the Eastern' provinces, from
9
4 9 «
beyond Khurasan and Transoxania, there are sufficient
4
4
references to their lands or origin to show that the name
"Turk" was used indiscriminately.^ Thus it is beyond the
4
scope of the study-to go- into details of such, issues because




mercenaries in the Capital.
1. For example, M.K. 'Alii Khitat al-sham, Damascus, I, 131+3/
1925, 196,' A.A. al-Duri, al-'Asr al-'Abbasi al-Awal,'
Baghdad, 19l+5» P» 229; M. Canard, "Byzantium and the
Muslim World to the Middle of the ELEVENTH Century,"
CMH, IV, 1966, p. 701. They all draw the conclusion that
the fundamental cause for the decay of the 'Abbasid
Caliphate lay in the introduction of these Turkish Troops
during the reign of al-Mu'tasim.
4
2. Such large-scale importation of these'mercenaries was made
i
possible by the final subjugation and Islamisation of
Transoxania and its neighbouring areas, which took place
in the reign of al-Ma*mun and al-Mu'tasim. Baladhurl,
Futuh al-Buldan, Beirut, 1377/1958, p. 1+31; cf. D. Ayalon
p. 29; W. Barthold, p. 210.
*
3. Muru.j, VII, 118-119.
1+. Muru,j. VII, 118; Tanbih, p. 306; cf. Osman S.A. Ismail,
p. 11+. ■
5. Baladhuri, p. 606; Yaqubi, Buldan, pp. 29-33; Manaqib,
pp. 9-15; Muru.i, VII, 118; Kamil, VI, 319; Ibar. Ill,
357.
There were various factors which led al-Mu'tasim to
place his trust in the new troops more than the permanent
groups of the army. The cleavage in the military establish-
ment of the Empire which had resulted from the civil war
between al-Amln and al-Ma'mun had never been healed,' and the
antagonism between the old Arab faction and the new Muslims
9
%
in other spheres of social activity was reflected in the army.
Although al-Ma'mun had shown himself a partisan of the non-
Arab cause, his position as Caliph was made ambiguous by the
✓
m
dichotomy of the peoples over whom he ruled. It became
0
desirable, in these circumstances, to bring in an uncommitted
0
third element, the loyalty of which would not be influenced
.by these partisan feelings. This, like so many others of
al-Ma'mun's policies, was continued by al-Mu'tasim, and
the increasing intensity of the factional strivings in the
Empire led him to increase the numbers of slaves, and to seek
♦
V
his own personal security in the strength which they held in
comparison to that of the other troops.'
0
0
1. R. Levy, Social Structure of Islam, p. 14-17, quoting from
al-Tabari, III, H6I4, relates that on the accession of the
Caliph al-Mu'tasim in 218/833, the Persian Jund in Baghdad
rose in favour of his nephew al-Abbis, but the latter him¬
self acknowledged al-Mu'tasim and was thus able to quell
the disturbance. • Cf. Yaqubi, III, 163, where it is
mentioned that a few leaders refused to acknowledge al-
Mu'tasim as Caliph. The new Caliph, however, continued
to be distrustful of the indigenous army and by purchase
and other means recruited a large force of men originating
from the Turkish-speaking provinces of Eastern Persia and
Transoxania. Prom the 9th Century'onwards this enlarge¬
ment of the slave-army continued at an ever-increasing pace
C. Cahen, "The Turkish Invasion1' Setton and Baldwin,A
A History of the Crusades, I, 136.
162





the Mu'tazilite controversy which was destroying the social
»




inducement to al-Mu'tasim to look upon them as the only
0
quarter from which he.could expect undivided loyalty. It




building up this army to fight the Byzantines, or to
assist the propagation of Islam.^ Whenever they were used
0
outside the Capital it. was invariably to suppress opposition
to the Caliph's authority,^" and in later periods when they
0
s
were found fighting on the Byzantine frontiers it was always
0








.1. Nu'man Thabit, Al-Jundiyya fx al-Dawlat al-'Abbasiyya,
Baghdad, 1956, p. 207.
2. K.A.G. Creswell, A Short Account of Early Muslim
Architect tare, London, 1958* P« 259. He sees the war on
the Byzantine frontiers as the main reason for recruiting
*
these Turks. He states, "al-Ma'mun carried on campaigns
against the Byzantine Empire and for this purpose he
% •
imported several thousand Turks every year from central
Asia.;"
3. Osman S*A. Ismail notes that the Islam which these Turks
adopted was that which later came to be called SunnI
Islam in which the spirit of .1*ihad is assumed to have
suited their nature. "Mu'tasim and the Turks," p. 19.
i|.. Yaqubi, III, I6I4.-I66J Tab., Ill, II65 ff.; Tayfur,
p. 80; cf. Von Kremer, p. 3J4.O. In the most recent
0
work dealing with this subject, D. Ayalon emphasises the
position of the Turkish mercenaries as assuring the
protection of the Caliph. D. Ayalon, "The Military Reforms
of Caliph al-Mu'tasim", p. 26.
163
The family ties which linked al-Mu'tasim with the
• »
Turks through his mother, Marida, whom some believe to have
*
been a Turkish slave, may have had some effect on the
increasing recruitment of these troops in the army."*" More
9
over the Turks did have outstanding qualities of bravery
and manliness that.would have recommended them to anyone
such as the Caliph x^rho stood in need of a new military
2
force to preserve himself and his authority.
l.Yaqubi, III, 1614.5 Tab., Ill, 1329; Muru,j, VII, 10?;
Tanbih, p. 303; Kutubi, II, 333; Ibn Kathir, X, 297;
al-Durl, Dirasat fi al-'Usur al-'Abbasiyya al-Muta5akhkhira
Baghdad, 1951-1-> 228; cf. Osman S.A. Ismail "Mu'tasim
and the Turks", p. 19. The latter argues against Professor
*
al-Durl's inferences concerning the origin of the Caliph's
mother. Osman claims that she was not of a Turkish origin,
but he offers no argument for this.
2.Manaqib, p. 36 ff.; Tanbih, p. 303; Ibn Hawqal, Kitab al-
Masalik wa al-Mamalik, p. I4.I48; al-Istakhri, Kitab al-Masalik







A. The Attitudes of the Caliphs towards the Turkish soldiery
until the reign of al-Muntasir
ft
An assessment of the position of. the Turkish mercen-
ft
i •
aries in the Capital in the light.of the attitude of the
Caliphs towards them on the one hand and their co-operation
ft
with the 'Abbasids on the other should be preliminary to
ft
ft
any statement on the political life of the Caliphate in this
ft
period. Von Kremer states that to the three divisions of
ft
the south Arabian, the north Arabian and the Khurisanian
ft
✓
troops which formed the 'Abbasid army, a fourth was added
under al-Mu'tasim which very soon became the most dangerous.
ft
The special position accorded to these new troops was
•
»
indicated by the style in which al-Mu'tasim clothed them, in
ft
ft »
damask with golden girdles and various kinds of gold
9
ornaments. These were the troops he took with him as his
ft I
0
personal bodyguard when the Capital was transferred to




and seductions of Baghdad. The non-Turkish military
ft
ft
groups that came to Samarra with him were ordered to settle
ft
in their own special quarters of the city, each of which was
ft
made self-sufficient in such facilities as markets, mosques
ft
and baths.^ In this favoured position, the Turkish slave-
1. Von Kremer, p.. 314-0.
<
2.. Muruj, VII, 118; Suyuti, p. 3351 Nu,jurn, II, 233.
3. Yaqubi, Buldan, p. 33; cf. Von Grunebaum, Islam,
London, 1969, p. II4.75 E. Herzfeld, Geschichte der Stadt
Samarra, Hamburg,- 19l4-8,pp. 97-99. Both Von Grunebaum
>
ft
and Herzfeld state that the faraghina and the Turks lived
together in one district, but this was not in agreement
ft
with what al-Ya'qubl records.
165
*
troops began to regard themselves as an elite section of
ft
9
the community, and al-Mu'tasim encouraged them in this
9 »
belief by lavish praise of their leaders. To a certain
extent he did receive loyal and devoted service from them,







The number of these Turkish troops, in the reign of this
W
ft
Caliph, is not stated explicitly in any of the contemporary
ft
sources. Al-Mas'udi, however, puts their number at seventy
ft





and Shash, in addition to the Arab maghariba. Ibn Kathir,
ft
(X, 296), mentions-the improbably low figure of twenty
thousand, without, specifying their various origins, but this
ft
is wholly at odds with the statement of al-Ya'qubi (Buidan,
ft «




thirty thousand. How confused the available information is,
may be judged by the fact that al-Tabari records that in the
year 23ij./899 - only seven years after the death of al-Mu'tasim
ft
- two hundred thousand Turkish horsemen were sent to suppress
ft
_ p
the revolt of Muhammad b. al-Ba*'ith.
At his accession al-Mutawakkil granted 'ata'^ of eight
« • _
1.' Muru.j, VII,168.
2. Tab., Ill, 1381.
3. 'Ata', "gift", is the term most commonly used in the
early days of Islam to describe the pensions of the Muslims
P / -
later it designated the pay of troops. EI , s.v. Ata».
In the period under consideration, the term seems to have
only the meaning of an occasional gift to the soldiers.
166
months to pay to the .jund, and from the statement of al-
♦ •
9
Tabarl it would appear that this was in the form of rizq
The shakiriyya and the Hashiraites, also, received eight
9
months rizq, while the Turks received four and the
only three.The latter resented this discrimination and
refused to accept what they had been offered. The Caliph
instructed Ibn Abl DU*ad and Wasif to settle the matter,
proposing that those individuals in the group who were of




;iund, while those of slave-status should be put up for





prpblem and he persuaded the maghar iba to accept what had been
0
4
offered on this one occasion, on the understanding that in
O
the future they would receive equal treatment with the Turks.
It was al-Mutawakkil's intention to free himself and





Turkish slave troops which his predecessors had allowed to
4
4
develop, and in order to achieve this he had to run the risk
4
of incurring their.hostility, by showing favouritism to the
0
soldiers of the ,jund and the shakiriyya. This discrimination
ft
in favour of the non-Turks can be seen as an attempt to
4




pre-eminence in the state and thereby, to provide a stable
4
foundation for his own power.
Thus, the reigi of al-Mutawakkil saw the growth of the
0
4
irregular military formations being paralleled by an increase
1; Cf. EI , s.v. D,jund. D. Sourdel is in error in thinking
that the Turkish troops formed part of the ,jund at this time
2. Tab., Ill, 1369-70.
9 •
in the standing army of the state, al-Mutawakkil's
intention being to provide a counterbalance to the in-
equality in the military power which had mushroomed almost
n
unnoticed in the heart of the Empire. He ordered all the
slave troops to change their uniforms, and henceforth to
wear brown cloaks; they were also to carry their swords -
4
not according to the old Arabian custom, with a shoulder belt
o
but in the Persian fashion, buckled round the waist. The
<
diwan al-mawali wa al-ghilman-^ was created so that the Caliph
could keep himself informed of their numbers and status,
and control and manipulate them when they tended to become
troublesome. Al-Mas 'udi sees all this as a deliberate ■
attempt on the part of the Caliph to impress his authority
on the Turks, adding that he also expelled some from the
army and reduced the pay of others. A new corps of
y
soldiers consisting of Arabs and sa 'alik (vagabonds) was
formed to compensate for the envisaged reductions in the
Turkish contingents, and this was placed under the command of
1. Tab., Ill, II43I-32, 11+314.. The standing army, according to
al-Jahiz, comprised divisions of Arabs, Turks, mawali,
Khurasani and abna', Manaqib, I, 9. The historians
corroborate this: Tab., Ill, 1369-70* 1380-814, 1385-86,
II4OO, 12+31; Muru.i, VII, 258, 273-77; Ibar, III, 276.
They also include the ghilman, the shakiriyya, the
faraghina, the ushrusaniyya, the zawaqil and sa *all&.
»
2. Von Kremer, p. 3^5* quotes Ibar, III, 275«
s
3. Yaqubi, Buidan, p. 23. The diwan al-.jund came to be known
during this period as diwan al-.jund wa al-shakiriyya,
probably with the purpose of distinguishing those
registered therein from the Turkish mercenaries. Cf.




'Ubayd Allah b. Khaqan and the Prince al-Mu'tazz. In
• » »
- t
Samarra, the Caliph made grants of iqtafv only to slaves
s
0
from Parghana and Ushrusana, deliberately ignoring the
0
o
Turkish ghilman and mawall.
0
Al-Mutawakkil appears to have planned to stir up the
0
«
Shi 'a against the Turks and to play one off against the
other, his ultimate aim being to curb them both. Thus he
4 <
9
assigned almost all of his anti-Shi 'a measures to the Turkish
mercenaries.^ ■ For example, it was a band of Turkish
I
soldiers that was sent to fetch the^I'ma*1* 'All al-Naql from
his house and bring him before the Caliph.^" Yazld b.. 'Abd
Allah a1-TurkI, the governor of Egypt, under instructions
0
from Samarra, adopted a harsh policy against the 'Alids
*




of the Caliph's sons, who had shown sympathy towards the.
'Alids, was murdered by al-Mutawakkil's Turkish bodyguards.^1
1. Tanbih, p. 313.
2. Yaqubi, Buldan, p. 375 cf. Muru,i, VII, 273*
.3. N. Abbott, "Arabic papyri of the Reign of Ga'far al-
Mutawakkil", p. 90.
k- Muru,i, VII, 2-7.
5. Kindi, p. 203; Nu.jum, II, 309; B.K. al-Tikriti, p. 67.
Yazld b. 'Abd Allah is said to have pursued the extremists
among the Shi'a in Egypt, interrogating and punishing those
0
whom he caught. He executed their leaders and sent a
group of them to Iraq under terrible conditions. He then
turned his attention to the 'Alids in general .and inflicted













succeeded in suppressing the 'Alids he did not achieve
his second objective which was to restore 'Abbasid dignity
9
by eliminating the power of the Turkish slave army.
♦
*
Subsequently, the Caliph's policy towards the Turks
prompted him.to move his capital from Samarra to Damascus,
• A
intending thereby to seek the support of the Arabs in
Syria and the surrounding provinces as a counter-balance
to these insolent praetorians.^" If he had succeeded in
9
9
winning the Arabs over to his cause he would have reasserted
«•
?




plan, the Turkish soldiers of Samarra rose up in protest
0
against his transference of the seat of power, and Xtfhen al-
Mutawakkil learned of the troubles this had caused he
9
9
abandoned his plan and returned to Iraq on the pretext that
O
Damascus was not a healthy place in which to settle.
9
Although the Caliph surrendered to the demands of the Turkish
*
soldiers in this matter, he did not re-establish Samarra as
g
his Capital, but constructed another garrison to the north
of the city called Ja'fariyya or Mahuza, and made this his
residence.^
#
It is worth noting that al-Mutawakkil's religious
0
0
policy could be considered as one aspect of his anti-Turkish
9
policy.^" The Caliph found himself in a vexing situation.
« 9
1. S.P. Mahmud, A short History of Islam, Oxford, 1965, P«137»
2. Yaqubi, III, 177; Tab., Ill, 1^35, llj.36-37.
3. Yaqubi, III, 177; Yaqubi, Buidan, pp. L|.l - J4.2; Tab., Ill,
llj.38-39.




His immediate predecessors had been forced to call on the
Turks to protect them from subjects who resented their
ft
*1










of the Prophet as an official doctrine.of the state. There-
fore his religious policy obliged him, not from a theological
ft
ft




against the Turkish mercenaries so that he would be able to
P




• The behaviour of al-Mutawakkil can be seen as an attempt
ft
ft




its former position, with the Caliphate as the focus of its
ft
activities. But in this he was impeded not only by the
magnitude of such a reconstruction, but also by the intrigues
ft • 4
within his own family. His eldest son al-Muntasir exploited
ft
all the feelings of grievance which.his father's policies
O
had created among the Turks to further his own ambitions.J
4
Although the lack of solidarity among the Turks and their ft
ft
ft
mutual jealousies and rivalries should have facilitated
their elimination from a position of overwhelming power, the
|
disunity within the 'Abbasid family itself iwas equally as
great, and the one can be'seen as balancing out the other.
1. H. Bowen, The life and time of 'All b. 'Isa, Cambridge,.
1928, p. 3.
2. W.M. Matt, Islamic Political Thought, p. 89.
3. Mural, VII, 273-
171
1
B. The Position of the Turkish soldiers between 2.ii7-255/
861-869.
♦ «




increasing power of the Turkish mercenaries despite al-
1
Mutawakkil's intolerant attitude towards them. The murder
A
of al-Mutawakkil was, in effect, a triumph for the foreign




the real power in the lands of the Caliphate. The power of
the mercenaries'lay in the solidarity imposed upon them by
the fact of their being foreigners in Samarra; and, however
#
great may have been the forces operating to fragment their
*
unity, there was a basic awareness that their very survival
demanded that they should present a united front against
all those not of their race. Their loyalty to their leaders
arose from the feelings of insecurity they must have
experienced whenever they stepped outside the confines of the
barracks and the camp xtfhere they could feel at ease among men
of their own kind, and the commanding officer of each group
* *
was probably regarded as a providing and protecting father-.
. •
figure. It was when they had become more familiar with the
9
life surrounding them that they were susceptible to other
appeals; it was then that the power they had formerly
9 *
exercised dwindled ax-jay and was lost.
9 ♦
9
During his short reign, al-Muntasir was brought to the
*
realization of what an outrage, such as the murder of his
father, implied for the state and for himself, and, as al-
» •
Mas 'udi observes, he decided to eliminate this threat by re-







possible. The campaign led by Wasif against the Byzantines
4
in 21^.8/862 had no other motive than to rid the Capital of
them."*" Al-Tabarl, in his account of the origins of the
0
t
campaign, would appear to reduce the cause to the hostility
#
between the Caliph's vizier, Ahmad b. al-Khasib, and Wasif,
ft
but from the details which follow it emerges that it was not
0
4




as a whole, and he could see no other way of doing this
p
other than sending them to war on the frontiers. Later
4 4
0 *
historians agree with the interpretation of al-Mas'udi.^ Ibn
Kathir, however, makes no mention of any conflict between the
0
» • I
two, but simply states that al-Muntasir sent Wasif on an
• ••
m
expedition against the Byzantines.^- There are certain
9
0
accounts which refer to the fact that, at first, Wasif refused
0
4
to lead this campaign and leave the Capital, thinking that
it was a plot directed against the Turks. ■ But the Caliph
persuaded'him that the Byzantines were threatening the
C
Muslim frontiers and that either he himself or Wasif had to
0
0
lead this expedition. Wasif was finally convinced by the
Caliph's arguments and agreed to lead.the army against the
anticipated Byzantine assault.-' Moreover, the Caliph's
1. Muruj., VII, 300.
0
2. Tab., Ill, 11^80-81.
i
3* Although Ibn Khaldun mentions the conflict between the
vizier and Wasif, he briefly states that the Caliph ordered
Ahmad b. al-Khasib to launch the campaign as fast as
possible in order to rid the Capital of the menace imposed
by Wasif and his soldiers. Ibar. Ill, 282."
[|.. Ibn Kathir, X, 353*
4 »
5. Sibt, XI, 256a; Nu.jum, II, 326. The number of the
soldiers in this expedition was estimated at ten
thousand mawall (Turks).
ambition to rid himself of the Turkish influence can be
|
ft
seen from the message which he sent to Wasif shortly after
ft
|
the array had left Samarra. He ordered him to stay on the
♦
frontiers with his troops for four years and to fight the
ft
1
enemy of Islam only during the summer months. But even
♦
though the Caliph succeeded in removing Wasif and his Turks
>
ft





and the Turkish soldiers were still able to exert a pro-
ft
*
nounced influence on the life of the city.
9
Immediately after he ascended the throne, the Caliph
9
al-Musta'In rewarded the Hashimites, the quwad and the jund
)
— P
by alloting an additional allowance (arzaq) to them. . At
* ft
ft
first he sought to win the support of the Turks by offering
ft




throughout the Empire, but this merely resulted in exciting
ft
the jealousy of those who had not been so singled out for
*
favour.^ The only way the latter could obtain the wealth




their voices reach the'Caliph. The power of the Turkish
military slaves reached the point that their compatriots in
1. Tab., Ill, llj.85; Ibn Kathir, X, 3531 Nujum, II, 326.
2. Tab., Ill, 1505* Muntazam, XII, 2b, mentions that the
ft
Caliph gave an allowance of five months to the jund
alone, and this amount was estimated at two million dinars.
Sibt, IX, 258a, says that the Caliph paid 'ata* not arzaq to
his soldiers. Al.-'Aynl, XVII, part 2, 262a, shares this
view and- adds that the Caliph gave the 'ata * to everybody
who had paid homage to him.
ft
3. Al-Tabarl speaks about the jealousy which dominated the
Turkish soldiers especially during the supremacy of






Karkli and Dur succeeded in putting an end to Atamish whose
P •
9
position at the court provoked their envy and resentment.
%
The faraghina troops joined the Turks in overthrowing Atamish
s
n
and they also took part in the looting of his palace. The
4
4 > 9
Turks became increasingly importunate in demanding money, and
in order to appease them al-Musta'in was forced to reduce
4 «
I
the Arab element in the army. In 25O/86I4., he suspended all
» * ♦
the pay of Banu Umayya and the 'Uthmamiyya who had received
allowances from the dar al- 'amma. It is possible that the
money and property which the Caliph had obtained from
4 4




The Turks in Karkh and Dur caused more trouble in the
capital when they learned of the plot being hatched against
• *
Baghir. They raided the stables of the Royal family for
9
4
horses so that they could reach the jawsaq' as soon as possible
and save Baghir, but their efforts failed.-^ When they heard
that Baghir had been murdered, they plundered and set fire to
9
9
several houses in the Capital. Due to the fact that there
4
9
was no one capable of issuing orders which the Turks would
obey, the life of Samarra was reduced to a state of anarchy
•
,
1. Ibn Kathir, XI, 3j cf. Tab., Ill, 1513-
2. Tab., III, 1333.
3. It is said that the house of Dulayl b. Ya'qub, the
scribe of Bugha al-Saghir, and those of his close
neighbours were looted. Tab., Ill, 13^0- But Sibt, IX,






and chaos. Al-Tabari mentions that the troops deeply
>
regretted the departure of the Caliph from the Capital
following Baghir's murder, but he gives no reason for this
P
regret.'1 It may have been due to the fact that the Caliph
• ^
and his companions had escaped from their hands and thus
prevented them from taking revenge. Yaqut-^ dwells on this
Hi
point and states that al-Musta 'in fled to Baghdad when he
* •
heard about the tumult in his Capital which was caused by
ft
the rioting of the Turkish soldiers against himself. It
ft
ft
has been suggested.that the Caliph, unable to stand against
ft
the tyranny of his Turkish guards, fled to Baghdad, where he
k
expected the support of the Arab and Persian soldiers.^
ft
Henceforth, the Turkish mercenaries became the real
rulers of Samarra, xjielding absolute authority. They
imposed severe restrictions on the inhabitants: even boats
ft
ft
were not allowed to leave for Baghdad, heavy punishment
ft
ft
awaiting anyone whom they suspected of wanting to escape.
I
They thus prevented the Caliph's supporters from joining him.
Despite their supreme power, the Turkish soldiers did not
dare either to dismiss the Caliph or to appropriate the
1. The term used to denote these lawless group is mushaghghib
(Subvert ers). Tab., Ill, 1539.
ft
2. Tab., Ill, 1530, Miskawayh, VI, 577.
3. Yaqut, VI, I, Jj.08-lj.09.
ft
I4.. Ameer All, A Short History of the Saracens, London, 1961,
p. 291.
5. When the Turks learned that a boatman had made a deal with
certain people to carry them down to Baghdad, he was given
two hundred lashes and hung from the mast of the ship.
Tab., Ill, 15Jj-2. This savage punishment was intended ■






Caliphate for themselves. This may be interpreted as
arising from the religious significance with which the
ft *
'Abbasids had invested the office and their own persons.^
ft
.
On the other hand, the Turks did not appear to be interested
ft
ft • •




for immediate wealth and prestige. To the extent that it is









over the other elements in the army, and to enjoy such




Al-Mu'tazz, having been brought to the throne by the
ft '
Turkish troops in Samarra, at first sought their support in
ft
trying to remedy the critical situation in which the Empire
ft
found itself. On his accession, he prdered the payment of
ft
allowances for ten months in advance; but as a result of the
ft
ft
shortage of money in the bayt al-mal, allowances of only two
2




he also sought to impress upon them the sacred nature of the
Caliphate and the homage and obedience due to the person
ft
holding this dignified office.^ He was not above pursuing
the political objectives of his position, the first of which
1. H.A.R. Gibb, "Government and Islam under the Early 'Abbasids
pp. 120-121.
2. Tab., Ill, 15k5> Al-Musta'In in fact left five hundred
ft
thousand dinars in the treasury, (bayt al-mal), while his
mother left about a million dinars, and his son al- 'Abbas
six hundred thousand dinars.
t
3. Tab., 15k5~k9- Reference has already been made to the
>








/ v 1 '
was to rid himself of his rival a1-Musta'in,- and he was




his troops in their advance on Baghdad. This army was .
*





to two thousand maghariba, and it spread fear and consternation
*
among the inhabitants of the villages it routed by plunder
p
and destruction.- The villagers fled from-their homes and
. •
4
sought security in the cities, leaving the villages almost














were able to force the Caliph to reinstate his arch-enemies
in the posts which they had held during the reign of al-




their good favour was by bribery, al-Mu'tzzz employed this
. e
on an extravagant scale to further his own designs. When he
1. There are certain indications that during the civil war
al-Musta 'in increased the allowances of his soldiers,
especially the ushrusaniyya, in order to keep them
satisfied. When al-Husayn b. al-Afshin arrived in Baghdad
al-Musta'in increased the pay of his soldiers to sixteen
.thousand dirham a month. Moreover, al-Musta'in awarded
the 'ata * to everybody who had joined his army against
the Turks in Samarra. Tab., Ill, 1555> 1560.
2. Tab., Ill, 1555-56; cf. R. Levy, A Baghdad Chronicle,
p.109.
3. One may grasp some idea of what the state of the finances
were at this time by noticing that the allowances of the
Turks, the maghariba and the shakiriyya was estimated at
two hundred million dinars a year, arid that this was equal





I4.. Tab., Ill, 1660.
178
imprisoned his brother al-Mu'ayyad - whose influence was
4
9 m
great among the slave troops - he accompanied the act by
4
- - l
the exceptional issue of 'ata* to the Turks and maghariba.
The Caliph adopted this policy in order to fulfil his
0
%
objective of securing the Caliphate by ridding himself of
p
his rival.
In Muharram 252/January 866, a military expedition was
fc
sent to the town of Anbar^ to expel the Turkish and the
4
maghariba soldiers who were disturbing the area.^ This is
an instance of the negative attitude of this Caliph towards
0




Sensing the Caliph's hostility towards them they grew very
ft
9
resentful, causing further disturbances in Samarra on 27
0
Shawwal 253/30 October 867 when, along with the soldiers the
0
faraghina and the ushrusaniyya, they mutinied and demanded a
%
allowance of four months pay. It was in attempting to





1. Tab., Ill, 1668; Xbar, III, 297j Ibn Nubata, II, 125b.
2. It has been suggested that the loyalty of the standing
army was assiduously fostered, and great care was taken
by sovereigns who wished to assure the succession for
their own nominees, to win the allegiance of these troops
R. Levy, Social Structure of Islam, p. I4.I8.
3. Al-Anbar, a town on tte left bank of the Euphrates, lies
on the north western projection of the Sawad on a
• cultivable plain near the desert and near the first
navigable canal from the Euphrates to the Tigris (the
Nahr 'isa). The 'Abbasids used it as their Capital for
9
a few months before they established Baghdad. Le Strange
PP* 25j 31* 32; EI^, s.v. Al-Anbar.








situation, for the state could not really afford to pay the
-1
amounts that the rebels were claiming. The Caliph, in his
9
4
turn, had no money in the bayt al-mal to pay them, and when
0
9
he asked his mother to give him the amount needed to meet
4
these demands, she denied having any such sum. And so the
Turks, in league with troops of the faraghina and the
9
— P
maghariba, deposed the Caliph, and put him to death under
torture. One of the accounts has it that he was left
standing in the sun, in the palace courtyard at a time of day
when it was so hot that he had to keep lifting one foot and
then the other from the scorching' earth and that from time
. *
to time he received blows about the head.^
I
9
The Turkish troops, beyond the power of governmental
control, insubordinate to the Caliph and their own leaders
alike, were left as a law unto themselves. Al-Mu'tazz,
*
who had planned to counter their activities by using the
maghiriba against them,^ suffered the disappointment of
•
«
seeing the two actually working in alliance against him.
9




1. The amount demanded was fifty thousand dinars. Tab., Ill,
1718.
2. Tab., Ill, 1719. Bhahabi, Tarikh, XII, 53a, does not
mention any group other than the Turks. See also
Muntazam, XII, 29a.
3. Another account, also in al-Tabari, dealing with the
0
Caliph's death has it that he was put into a bath of
t
boiling water and left there until he died. Tab., Ill,
1710-11; Huru.1, VIII, I4.J Sibt, IX, 289b; cf. Bayhaqi,
11,
* »










/ 'The Turks start rebellions and thus destroy our
Empirej and our ruler is now nothing but a guest.
Thejr have taken the rule into their own hands and
the world must be silent and obey.
This is not the way to keep the Empire in order; no
enemy can be fought .thus and no unity preserved.'
And another one says: "
'The free men are gone, they have been
destroyed and lost; time has placed me amongst
barbarians.
It was said to me: "You remain too much at home;" and
I replied "There is no joy in going out."
Whom do I meet when-I look around?
riding on saddles.*
Apes
Another poet composed a poem shortly after the death of al-
Mu'tazz, in which he says:
army do not fear'They (the Turks) do not dread the
the sword.
Alas! he (al-Mu'tazz) is dead, this poor dethroned
Monarch.
Behold, Turks are the masters and the
world must listen and obey.
But you will see that one day God, who rules over all,
will punish them with a- terrible end
1. Tha'alibi, Yatimat al-Dahr, II, 8I|..
r
2. Muruj, VII, I4.OO; see also'Ibn al-Mu'tazz, pp. 82-81).
C. The Position of the Turkish troops during the reign of
ft
al-Muhtadi
The period starts with the departure in Rama^In 255/'
«
9
August 869, of Musa b. Bugha from Rayy for Samarra, which
led to a recurrence of trouble in the capital and to a
* 4
«
serious political crisis. Musa was stationed in Rayy with
ft
- **
the mawa11 (Turks) army, but his assistant, Muflil? (brother
ft
of Baykabak) moved into Tabaristan, after he had driven al-
*
Hasan b. Zayd and his followers into the area occupied by
the Daylamls. Musa had begun to collect the khara.i from
Rayy for the year 256/869-70, and 255/









of the region were dismayed and begged him to stay for the
ft




forced to leave the area at the insistence of his raawali who
had learned about the money which Salih b. Wasif had extorted
ft
1
from the secretaries and from al-Mu'tazz's mother.
As soon as the Caliph, al-Muhtadi, heard about Musa's
ft
activities he commanded him to remain where he.was. But
against the express wish of the Caliph, and contrary to
the request of the inhabitants of Rayy, Musa and his army
left the region, with the intention of entering the Capital
p
and sharing the wealth with the troops of Samarra.
9
1. Al-Mu'tazz's mother corresponded with Musa and asked him
m
✓
to leave the area so that.she could rescue her son as
ft
'










On Monday 11 Muharram 258/20 December 869* Musa and
his army entered Samarra, on the very day that al-Muhtadi
was holding a public hearing for the mazalim. The Caliph
had requested Musa and his followers to wait for a while
0
m
before giving them permission to enter the court; but
0
after they had been waiting for some, time, they began to
ft
suspect that the Caliph was plotting something against
them. Therefore they swept into the court, and removing the
0
0 •
Caliph from his seat, forced him to mount, one of the
shakiriyya horses. They took with them at the same time
*
all the mounts of the khasga in the .jawsaq, and rode off
towards the Karkh.^
This manoeuvre by the mawa1i was to complicate the
0
situation in the Capital. Shortly after the arrival of
%
Musa's troops, Salilc b. Wasxf went into hiding because they
had demanded from him, "the blood of the secretaries to-
0
gether with their property; the blood of the Caliph al-
Mu'tazz and his property also."^ His disappearance created
another crisis in the Capital, which was to lead to his
0
murder. The Turkish mercenaries in Samarra were too power-
ful for either the Caliph or any of their own leaders to




I4. Safar 256/I January 870, they appeared to have accepted
the Caliph's policy, and opposed their leaders. The Turkish
troops from Karkh and Dur gathered in the outskirts of the
0
1. Tab., Ill, 1787-89; Muru.i, VIII, 6; Kamil, VII, 139-l+Oi
cf. Ibn Kathir, XI, 20.
0






city/'and sent word to the Caliph, begging him to send one
ft
of his brothers to hear their plea.^" Al-Muhtadi despatched
ft
4
his eldest brother 'Abd Allah (Abu al-Qasim) with Muhammad b.
W
ft
Mubashir, better known as a1-Karkhl. The troops promised
ft
their obedience to the Caliph, saying that they were aware




to dismiss the Caliph. The mawa1i promised the delegation
ft
ft
that they would oppose this plot with their own blood but
ft
meanwhile, they complained of their own poor economic position.
'Abd Allah and Muhammad accepted their petition and immediately
ft
presented it to the Caliph who, in turn, sent them back with
4 *
a favourable reply. The mawali, who now numbered "one hundred
ft
and fifty horsemen and five hundred infantry, received the
*
delegation with great respect. Abu al-Qasim read aloud to









The mawall, thereupon, wrote a reply to the Caliph,
making the following points:
1. Cf. Von Kremer, p. 314.5, who writes, "Under MuhtadI, and
previously under Musta'In, these who called forth a serious
insurrection by rising against the Turkish soldiers and
their immense influence, were the Arab suidiers known as
shakariyyah." Makiyyah regards them as a group of Turks
from Karkh and Dur, stating that these are areas of
Baghdadj whereas they are in fact districts of Samarra,
ft
although in Baghdad there is an area called Karkh.
Makiyyah al- 'Ubaydi, Baghdad f1 al-Qarn al-Thilith al-
Hiiri, M.A. Thesis, Baghdad University, 1387/1967* p. 79.
2. Tab., Ill, 1796j Ibar, III, 299.
3. Tab., Ill, 1797-98.
18^
(a) The Caliph should be the sole authority in the Empire




(b) The old organization of the army, as it had been under











be included in the ziyadat (increments).
(d) The 'ata' should be paid every two months and the fiefs
ft
of their leaders should be abolished.^
ft
(e) The Commander of the Faithful should be the only one
with the authority to increase pensions.
*
In this same'message, the troops from K'arkh and Dur
ft
informed the Caliph that they themselves would follow their
ft ft
letter to his palace and camp outside until he met their
%
demands. Meanwhile, they threatened to put to death any-
ft
body who dared to oppose the Caliph's command.^" Abu
ft
1. The army organization during the reign of al-Musta'In was
as folbvjs: the 'arlf who held command over nine soldiers;
the khalifa, fifty soldiers, and the qa'id one hundred.
Tab., Ill, 1797.
ft
2. Ibar, III, 299; cf. Tab., Ill, 1797. This system of pay¬
ment was introduced during the reign of the Caliph al-
Mu 'tasim who intended to keep the Turks as a pure ethnic
group. Yaqubi, Buidan, p. 33.
3. Von Kremer translates the passage to mean' that the wages
of the soldiers should be paid every second month, and
landed property, which had been improperly transferred
to the Turkish officers, should be forfeited to the
treasury, p. 3k&', cf. Ibar, III, 283, 295»
Ij,. They promised the Caliph that if a single hair of his head
was harmed they would murder Musa, Baykabak, Muflih, Yajur
Bakalba and others in retaliation. Cf. Von Kremer p. 3^4-8
who fails to distinguish between this letter and the next




al-Qasim took their message to al-Muhtad'i, while the mawill
4







On Thursday 5 Safar 256/2 January 870, before Abu al-
ft
Qasim returned to confer with the mawili, he asked their'
ft
leaders, Musa, Baykabak and Muhammad b. Bugha to send their
%
own representatives to him to ask pardon for the false
ft *
ft
information they had propagated concerning the plot against
r ♦
the Caliph. The leaders agreed to this suggestion and each
«




strength of the mawali is said to have been in excess of a
thousand horsemen and three thousand foot.soldiers. Abu al-
4
■
Qasim took the Caliph's reply and went with the' leaders'
ft
representatives to meet the mawali. The message was read
*
» »
out to.them, and as soon as the reader had finished, Abu al-
ft ♦




messengers of your leaders who have come to beg your pardon
ft
I
for what you have heard about their deeds." In addition,
Abu al-Qaaim, on behalf of the leaders, said, "You are
■1
brothers, you are one of us and belong to us". Then each




The mawili now ,wrote the Caliph another letter similar
i




stressing that they would not be satisfied until he approved
9
0
the fpllowing five, conditions (tawqi 'at)
ft
1. Tab., Ill, 1800.
2. Tab., Ill, 1801.
186
9
(a) Increments to the officers should be reduced.
9
(b) The porters (bawwabin) from among the rnawall should not
A
4






(c) Their military organisation should be along the same
lines as during the time of al-Musta'in 0
(d) Fiefs (iqta'at) should be returned to the Caliph.
«
9
(e).He would withdraw the existing supervision of the fiefs
0
. ( ) so that they could place in power someone
whom they trusted and put under his command fifty
soldiers from Dur and another fifty from Samarra. All
#
these soldiers should be selected from the dawawin.
♦ %
i
In addition to these requests th.e mawali also demanded that:
(a) The jaysh should be under the command of one of the
Caliph's brothers who could mediate between the mawali
9
p
and the Caliph himself. Meanwhile they would not
9
recognize the authority of any person from among their
own ranks, i.e. it would not be permissible for a Turk
%
to be in charge of the .jaysh.
*
i
(b) §alih b. Wasif and Musa b. Bugha should be brought to the




(c) The mawSli would be satisfied with nothing less than the
9
immediate payment of their 'ata* and with regular pay for
their arzaq (allowances) every two months.
In this message the mawall threatened the Caliph by
disclosing that they had written to ahl-Samarra and maghariba
asking them to join the mawali. As soon as these people
joined up x^ith them they would march together to the
ft
i | ♦
Caliph's palace and demonstrate in front of it until their
ft
ft
demands were met. Meanwhile, the mawili sent letters to
I
their oxm leaders informing them of the content of their
i ♦
letter to al-Muhtadl. The mawall had full confidence in
ft
the Caliph and believed that he would not refuse their
ft
m
demands unless their own leaders interfered. If they
t
ft





any other proposal put to them and would threaten their
ft
*
leaders with death. Nothing would satisfy the mawali except
ft
the appearance of Salih b. Waslf so that they could reconcile
ft
his conflict with Musa b. Bugha. By so doing they hoped to
« ft
ft ♦
discover the place where the money was kept, because Salil?
1
had promised them six months pay before he went into hiding*
4
The mawali handed over their letter to the representative of
• »
Musa b. Bugha. Meanwhile, a few of them departed with Abu
ft
al-Qasim, the bearer of their message to the Caliph. This
ft
action would offer them ah opportunity of meeting the Caliph
I
and of hearing his reactions to their demands. When the
ft
ft
news that Abu al-Qasim had left the mawa 11 reached Musa he
ft
sent five hundred horsemen and ordered them to camp at bab ~
•
.
al-hayr • (a place situated between the j axis a q and Karkh).
>
Abu al-Qasim marched with the messengers of the Turkish
ft
%
soldiers and the representatives of their leaders to meet
P #
these people. Musa's messenger handed the mawali's letter
ft
to his master and the other leaders. Abu al-Qasim then
ft
informed them that he was carrying another message for the








Caliph; wherefore it was decided that they should go to-
• ♦
. '
gether to al-Muhtadi's residence. When they gained an
ft
audience with him, Abu al-Qasim gave the Caliph the mawali's
ft
reply which he read carefully and immediately ordered his
» • •
vizier to answer it, promising the following:
(a) The Caliph would accede to the mawalx's demands, and
- ♦
instructed them to appoint one of'the officers of the
dawawin whom they trusted to carry out their demands.
ft
(b) As to their request that one of his brothers be appointed
%
ft
to mediate between himself and them, the Caliph seemed
ft
to think that there was no need for such a mediator, for
O '




person.. The Caliph pointed out that he had in fact
ft
.
already unofficially appointed a person such as the
ft
ft
mawali wanted, i.e. Abu al-Qasim.
ft *
(c) The Caliph ordered the mawalx to list the immediate
ft
reforms necessary to improve their economic conditions,
ft
so that he could satisfy them without delay.^
Al-Tabarl (III, I8O3-I8OI4.) presents a text of Musa's
ft









(b) The mawali would receive better economic, treatment, in
accordance with the promises made in the Caliph's letter.
ft
ft
(c) As far as Salih b. Was if and the change of attitude of
1. Tab., Ill, I8O3.
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I the leaders towards him is concerned, the latteri >
wanted Salil? to give the' soldiers the amount of
money which he promised them. The leaders, however,
#
0
merely asked the Caliph about it.
0
0




respected, and obeyed by their leaders. Moreover,
•
•
the existence of any threat affecting the sovereignty
of the Caliphs was denied.
These two letters were read to the mawall by Abu al-Qasira on
0
Thursday late in the afternoon, and he was promised that
|
verdicts on both would be given the following morning, because
0
it was too late to form any concrete proposals that day.
On Pk'iday 6 Safar, 256/3 January 870, Musa b. Bugha
4
rode from the Caliph's palace with fifteen hundred soldiers
0
and camped between Karkh and the jawsaq. Meanwhile Abu al-
0
0
Qasira, after leaving the Caliph, marched to meet the mawall,
0
4
who numbered about fifteen hundred horsemen and three thousand
J
infantrymen. In order to remind the mawali of the Caliph's
reply, Abu al-Qasim stood up and read the letter once again
to the crowd. The mawall, thereupon split into three separate
0
factions,"*" the effect of lwhich was to prevent, them from
0 •
1. (a) The first group was fully in agreement with the Caliph
whom they hoped would augment their pensions because they
had been suffering from arrears in their pay.
(b) The second group promises to agree with the Caliph if
he would appoint his brothers as leaders of the mawall,
one in Karkh, the other in Dur and a third in Samarra.
Moreover, the mawali would never accept the leadership
of any of their compatriots.
4
0
(c) A smaller group wanted Salih b. Wasif to present him¬
self to them. Tab., Ill, 1805.
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reaching any sort of decision. Abu al-Qasim returned to
his brother with no reply. Musa departed immediately after
Abu al-Qasim and the angry mawali were left to themselves.
0





the part of the rnawall, and after the Friday prayer he made
0
a move against them by appointing Muhammad b. Bugha as
ft
commander of the jaysh, and ordered him" to march against them
0
in company with the Caliph's brother, Abu al-Qasim. When
these troops met with the mawali, Abu al-Qasim told them that
0
the Commander of the Faithful had approved all their demands
.
and if any were unfulfilled the Caliph would rectify the
*
situation as soon as possible. Then he read to them an
0
_ %
assurance of protection for Salih b. Wasif if he should" appear
In an attempt to reconcile the mawali's dispute with their
4
A
leaders, Abu al-Qasim proclaimed that this guarantee came as









all these favours had been granted by the.Caliph. Then
disturbances broke out among them and lasted for some time,
9
0
preventing Abu al-Qasim from forming a true assessment of
their situation; but finally, when he was on the point of
4




(a) Musa b. Bugha should hold the same position and enjoy the
am as Bugha al-Kablr during his life time
(b) Salih b. Wasif should have the same status,as Wasif (his
1. Tab., Ill, 1805-1806
2. Tab., Ill, 1806.
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father) had during the glorious days of Bugha.
(c) Baykabak should regain his previous position.




its present leader, i.e. Muhammad b. Bugha* until Salih
4
0
came out and paid their arzaq.
These points were, in fact, quite different from their
%
previous requests, nor did they remain in agreement even
t
on these conditions, but split into two divisions, one for
«
and the other against them. Their demands can be inter-
' *
preted as a' change of attitude towards the Caliph who had
4
already acted against the will of the mawali. ' Abu al-Qasim
%
had to leave without coming to any understanding with them.
i
*
In the early morning of Saturday 7 Safar 256/1^. January
9
870, Wasif's son rode out with a group of the mawali and
ihilman, and as soon as the inhabitants of the Capital'saw
4
them they clamoured for weapons."*" The reason for this move
within the Capital 'remains obscure, but the infantry who
were pro-Salih b. Wa§If, had plundered all the mounts of the
'amrna and camped in the valley of Ishaq b. Ibrahim, near the
mosque which had been built by Lujayn, one of al-Mutawakkil®s
wives. Thus an end
9
to the anarchy and to strengthen their own position so that
I
their master, Salih b. Wasif would be able to appear in
9
9
safety once again. On his way to the Caliph's palace, Abu
al-Qasim passed by the mawali who gathered around him begging
4
9
him to take their message to the Caliph. There was much
1. Tab., Ill, 1806.
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confusion regarding their requests, but in the end
Qasim realized that their main demands centred about the re¬
appearance of Salih b. WasIf. Abu al-Qasim informed the
Caliph and. Musa b. Bugha of this, and it was said by eye-
*
witnesses attending the Caliph's council that Musa b. Bugha
4
said, "They demand §alih b. Waslf from me as if I were the
one who were hiding him. .,1




mean that the mawall, .supported by the local inhabitants, had
decided on action against their leaders. The Caliph's
supporters rushed for their weapons, armed themselves and
:marched on the raawali. As soon as the news of their
departure reached the Turks and their supporters, they
4
became very alarmed, broke up their gatherings and scattered
to various districts. Musi b. Bugha was, therefore, seen
as having triumphed in the dispute and all the generals
»
*
joined him for further action against the Turkish mercenaries.
%
4
It must be remembered that a few quwad (generals) from Karkh
9
felt inclined to favour Salih's followers but were not able
to show their preference in face of the strength of the
oppos ition.
2
During the early morning of Monday 9 Safar 256/6 January
4
870 there spread through the Capital news of danger'
'
,
threatening the Empire caused by the sharl's revolt in the
4
northern provinces.^ This seems to have had a sobering
1. Tab., Ill, 1807
4
2. Tab., Ill,.1807
3. Tab., III, 1808
9
9
effect on the situation in Samarra, at .least for a short




had dominated the Capital since the beginning of this




by the angry Turkish soldiers and the Caliph appears to have
* '
had insufficient power to protest against it, though he
actually regretted the loss of his general."''
ft
*
On Wednesday 2 Rajab 256/29 January 870, the Turks in
Karkh and Dur caused more trouble, again on the pretext of
ft
demanding payment of their arzaq. The Caliph sent, his
brother, accompanied by a Turkish general, to speak to them,
but they refused to listen and demanded to meet the Caliph
9
ft
in person. Consequently a few of them were brought to' the
V
Caliph's palace that very day, and he spoke to them. Mean-
ft
while, he had sent orders to. stop the 'ata' from being paid
ft
to the soldiers that day or the following day. The Turkish
#
troops had postponed their decision until they learned what
course Musa had followed in regard to the 'ata' with his
9
soldiers, who had been despatched to fight against theS^arl.
Musa paid his soldiers the 'ata* for one month, thus providing
ft
a further reason for discontent in the Capital.
*
ft
Taking advantage.of the situation, al-Muhtadi attempted
ft
to play off the mawall one against the other by opening new
%
negotiations while Musa and his troops were away from the
ft
9
Capital. These new negotiations took place between himself
and the Turks in Karkh and Dur who were under the command of
ft
Muhammad b. Bugha. The disunity and restlessness amongst








the troops, however, prevented the negotiators from




murder reached his supporters amongst the Turks, they were
ft
9
provoked to further action and they demonstrated against
ft
ft
al-Muhtadi which led to an actual confrontation between the
ft
4
Caliph's army and the Turks on Saturday 13 Rajab 256/11
ft «
1
February 870. On the following day the Turkish troops
*
appeared to be in a strong position and were completely
ft
unified among themselves, having been joined by those who
*
« •
had formerly supported the .Caliph. In consequence, al-
1
Muhtadi was not in a posit ion. to achieve a victory over
ft
the rival troops, and he was taken captive while fleeing
ft ft
from*the scene of the battle. He was brutally treated and
ft
i
forced to abdicate his throne, and shortly afterwards, on
Thursday 18 Rajab 256/16 February 870, his death was announced
m




powerful political force iri the Capital during the reigp of




their own leaders, they had no clear objectives beyond the
\
ft
satisfaction of their immediate demands which were wholly
9
incidental to the power-structure of the state. In fact,
• 4
c




■and envious that it was rarely possible for them to unite on




position became so obvious that it could not be mistaken that
ft
they were able to submerge their own differences and present
• «
a united front to the challenge.
ft










THE POSITION OP THE TURKS IN THE CAPITAL
♦
t
A. The Divisions among the Turks
| I
9
It would be .x-jrong to seek the explanation for this
9
lack of unity among the Turkish slave-troops "in any
^ v
conflict of interest among themselvesj they were the tools
0
» *
of their leaders xtfho not infrequently used them to further
9
I




respect they, too, can be regarded as victims, as much as
*
those who experienced their violence.
%
9 9









•to one or another of the slave contingents in the Caliph s
0
0
army. Taken from their familiar environment and thrown
into the confusing complexity of metropolitan life, they
4
0
found their security in the artificial community of the
0
0 ♦
barracks, and in the guidance of the leader under whom they
✓
immediately served. Thus, at the time of their early
• ♦
introduction into the military organization of the Caliphate,
they were tractable and loyal; but this loyalty was to their
• •
own Commanders and it was the latter's relation with the
0
0
Caliph that determined their behaviour. In the fairly




relationship was normally of the best, and consequently we
0
0
hear little of Turkish disaffection or anarchy up until the
0





feelings and sentiments of the people among whom they lived,
0
0




and by the conditions in which they were obliged to live in
9
9
the Capital; In Baghdad their quarters were probably
scattered throughout various districts, but with the removal
9
ft








issues which seemed to affect their own interests. The








to marry outside their own race.
*
9
During the Caliphates of al-Mu'tasim and al-Wathiq -




seems to have been successful, and the Caliph was able to
ft
exercise control over his troops. However, with the
ft
9
accession of al-Mutawakkil, the tendencies implicit in this
4
situation came to a head: the various factions among the
9
^ ft
Turks, which had been united for a time after being trans-
ft
t









the others. Thus, when such leaders as al-Fath b. Khaqan,
ft
'Ubayd Allah b. Yahya and certain■others, were, seen to be
ft
p
enjoying the special respect and attention of al-Mutawakkil,
A
the resentment felt by some of the other Turks expressed
itself through indiscipline and disobedience among the troops
4
under their command.^ Attempts to. bring them under control
proved merely to aggravate their discontent, which, though
0 '
1. Yaqubi, Buldan, p. 33, reports that al-Mu'tasim bought
Turkish slaves girls whom he had married to his Turkish
troops.
9
2. Yaqubi, III, 179; Tab., Ill,' 1953 ff. ; Tanbih, p. 313.
ft







it frequently vented itself against the Caliph, was in
4
reality born of envy of men of their own class. It would
0
appear that the new leaders who had emerged from the ranks
were now capable of influencing the troops, and the rivalries
• ♦
9
which had formerly existed between the Turkish generals were




During the last phase .of al-Mutawakkil*s Caliphate
m 9
these divisions exploded into anarchy. The Turkish mal-
P
A
contents murdered al-Fath b. Khaqin along with al-Mutawakkil,
9
K
and although we are told that this happened because al-Fath
attempted to protect his master, there can be little doubt
<
4




Another Turkish dignitary Z'Qrafa, al-Hajib, having enjoyed




but al-Muntagir objected to this and they were finally
0
*
satisfied by having Zarafa pay homage to the Caliph they had
P -
put on the throne. Thus, ZQrafa was to play an important
• S
role in most.of the events which.took place during the period
under consideration.^
4
The divergence of attitudes amongst the Turkish mercen-
>
0
aries became apparent on the death of the Caliph al-Muntasir
* s
showing that jealousy and envy influenced all their actions,
|
with the satisfaction of personal ambition over-riding all
other considerations. However, despite this, the Turks were




1. EI , s.v. al-Fath b. Khaqan.
2. Tab., Ill, II4.6I- .
3. Tab., Ill, 11+79.
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compromise agreement on the nomination of al-Musta'in to the
Caliphate. As has. already been pointed out, this probably
arose from their feeling of insecurity and lack of self-
ft
confidence.
This apparent unity which the Turkish mercenaries had
9
shown at the beginning of al-Musta'in®s reign did not last




certain Turkish leaders. His favour enabled these men to
increase their influence at the court, provoking the
\
jealousy and resentment of the other Turks. The conflict
• ^
• 9 4
began to spread, and was encouraged by the Caliph himself
>
1
in order to secure his position. Such favours cost Atamish
and his scribe, S'huja' b. al-Qasim, their lives; but these
| »
assassinations merely made room for new Turkish leaders to
ft
claim the same prerogatives. The rank and file seem to
have been fully in sympathy with these murders, seeing the
ft
newly acquired wealth and prestige of their former leaders
own situation,^ and they lent
their support to new leaders who had risen up amongst them
in challenging the authority of these parvenuesA
The death of Atamish and the emergence of men such as
r
4
Bighir only served to widen the rift among the Turks. How
1. Al-Musta 'In was said to be behind the murder of Baghir as
• well as Atamish, and to have encouraged the other Turkish
leaders, especially Waslf and Bugha, to perform aggressive
acts against them. Tab., Ill, I6I4.2.
4
2. Tab., Ill, 1512-11).; Miskawayh, VI, 566.
3. Tab., Ill, 1510J Ibn 'Amid, fols. 97b - -98a.
•
v
I4.. Miskawayh, VI, 566; cf. Ibn Kathir, XI, 3.
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t
the antagonism between Baghir and other generals, for
4
example Wasif and Bugha, almost led to open confrontation
• %
♦
amongst the rival factions. It is evident that, the Turks
•
♦
were now divided into opposing groups, each trying to rid
itself of its rivals and take over their wealth and their
%
authority. In consequence, Wasif and Bugha, with the
encouragement of their followers, plotted against Baghir's
9
power and influence at the court, while he, meanwhile, was
bent on securing his position and was persuaded that the
best way.of doing so was by murdering the Caliph and these
two generals„ In this he had the support of his own
adherents, but the situation which his actions created in
% ••
m
the Qapital was ultimately to result in his own murder, which
. •
gave his supporters a pretext for plundering and setting
9
fire to several places within the city."*" Certain followers
of Wasif and Bugha, fearful and alarmed, fled in-secret to
V
Baghdad in order to join their leaders who had already
ft
arrived there with the Caliph al-Musta'in. These Turkish
e
soldiers, who were seeking to regain their former power,
I
, supported al-Musta'In against their compatriots in Samarra,
despite an obvious feeling of sympathy towards them.^
The impression that emerges most pronouncedly from an
4
examination of these events is of the simple Turkish soldiers
%
1. Tab., Ill, 1539. -
2. During the course of one battle between the armies of
Baghdad and Samarra, the minority of the Turkish soldiers
I 4
who were fighting beside the Baghdadis showed sympathy
t
towards their compatriots because of their heavy losses. .
Tab., III, 1627.
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being exploited by self-interested individuals who pretended
•
k
to espouse their cause while, in reality, using them to achieve
ft
their own personal ambitions. However, after their victory
ft
ft
over the troops of Baghdad, the Turks of Samarra became aware
« 4
of the power they held in their hands and even rose against
their own former leaders.
Thus, on*the 27 Shawwal 253/30 October 867 the Turks,
*
9
faraghina and ushrusana mutinied and demanded four months'
ft
wages. Bugha, Wasif and Sima al-Sharabi set off with a
ft ft
ft
hundred men from their bodyguard to negotiate with them. When
*




replied, "Take dust (for your wages).' What money have we?"
ft ft
Bugha, however, said, "Very well, we will ask the Commander of
the Faithful to hold a conference in the palace of Ashnas
(about your claim). However, the non-Turkish soldiers should
s
« »
be excluded." They accepted this proposal and marched to the
ft
-Caliph's residence. All the leaders went in with the
ft
exception of Wasif who remained outside with the angry crowd
. and our sources, as usual, keep silent as to why he stayed
out. Suddenly one of the mob threw himself upon Wasif and
ft
dealt him two blows with a sword while another attacked him
ft
y




Unlike previous murders of Turkish generals, this seems
ft
to have been a spontaneous act on the part of the troops and
ft
ft
not the result of intrigue or.plotting by rival contenders for
'
power. It was a signal to others who'might seek to use them
as instruments for provate ends that, henceforth, they could
%
ft
not count on unquestioning loyalty from this quarter. The








new emergent leaders sought their favour by totally relaxing
A
discipline and allowing the situation to degenerate into mind-
4
O
less anarchy. The Caliph and his suite thought it politic to
4
treat this as an internal matter among the Turks and to refrain
4
4
from openly interfering or taking sides. . ■
A




Turkish dignitaries and, whether he wished it or not, this be-
• V
*
came known and served to widen the rift of jealousy between them
4
4 ♦ •
In fact, the Caliph al-Mu'tazz employed his favour and patronage
in playing one off against the other in order to maintain his
•
•
own power. During the last crisis of his reign, when the
•
►
Turkish troops were causing trouble in the Capital, rebelling
4
*
against their leaders and demanding the payment, of their allow-
ances, they openly asked the- Caliph for fifty thousand dinars,
9
4
promising to murder their own leader, Salih b. Was if if he paid
V
P
them this sum. This shows that the Turkish soldiers were
•mainly seeking their own interests, not that of their' leaders.
%
But when al-Mu'tazz failed to collect the full amount, they un-
« • •
9
ited, and succeeded in bringing to an end his reign and his life
« «
The Turks appeared to be united at the time of the death





and his army, their position once again became very critical
4
and their power was in danger of collapsing. Since the very
beginning of al-Muhtadifs reign, the Turkish mercenaries had
been clearly divided into two major groups, the one led by
4
Salih b. Was if whom the Caliph seemed to favour, and the other
led by Musa b. Bugha. Nevertheless, the Turkish rank and file
1. This can be seen in the murder of Bugha al-Sharabi, Tab.,
Ill, 1691^-96.
2. Tab., Ill, 1718.
202
4
initially supported the Caliph against their own leaders, and
/
were prepared to resist them if they attempted to undermine
either al-Muhtadl's. or their own position. During the chaotic
4
4
reign of this Caliph, Salih b. Was If was murdered by the oppo-
sition group but his supporters appear to have remained .indiff-
♦ «
4
erent, content with the Caliph's promise to pay them their
I
allowances.
The struggle for Supremacy and power among the Turks
4
9
during the short reign of al-Muhtadi was to hasten the decline




encouraged the non-Turkish military elements to support one or
, • , «
another of the warring factions, while the Caliph himself was
4
striving to widen the rifts between them, hoping that he might
4
0 A
be able to restore some of the 'Abbasids' former dignity and
4
pride by discrediting the Turks and favouring the Arab and
9




.could use his loyal Turks to suppress those in rebellion against
0
him, but when the final confrontation came the former went over
J
4
. to the enemy and he was left with no support from that quarter.J
The last real success that the Turks may be seen to have
9
gained in the brief period of their involvement in the affairs
of the state was the dethronement of al-Muhtadi and the ele-
► 4
vation of al-Mu 'tamid to the throne. But this was to prove
0
how insubstantial had been their hold on power all along, for
|
once a military emergency occurred in the regions, requiring
0 4
their presence, the capital returned to its former normality
4
and an 'Abbasid could again be seen directing the course of
event s.
1. Kamil, VII, 8lj cf. Makiyya al-'Ubaydi, p. 79.
2. Yaqubi, III, 188, states that al-Muhtadx changed his
• 0
attitude towards the Turks by favouring the abna'.
0
Yaqubi, III, 188-89; Tab., Ill, 1827-31.
ft






Although the Arabs were the main group who suffered
A
from the introduction of Turkish slaves into the army,
there were other elements, also, which were to feel its
ft
effects.^ These at times united to oppose the growing
ft
might of the newcomers.
The first open protest against the insolent
ft
appropriation of power by the Turks was voiced immediately •
after the murder of al-Mutawakkil, when the contingent
*
•
which had been formed by this Caliph under the command of
s
'Ubayd Allah b. Yahya gathered round their leader begging
him to take decisive action against the conspirators and
*
ft
their leader, the Caliph's son al-Muntasir. But 'Ubayd
ft
Allah, on.learning that al-Mu'tazz had been summoned into





1.. The term "The other military groups" implied non-Turkish
soldiers, whether or not they were Arabs.
2. E.G. Browne sees the reign of al-Mutawakkil as
characterised by the ascendancy of the Turkish party,
accompanied by repression of the Arabs and, to a lesser
extent, of the Persians, A Literary History of Persia,
I, 31+1-2.
3. It was reported that the elements involved in this
action were a group of abna', 'a.jam, arman, zawaqil
of a 'rab origin and others. Their number was estimated
at ten thousand. Tab., Ill, 11+.63J Miskawayh, VI,
557; TBN, fol. 63b.
20k
4
In consequence, on the morning of the day on Ttfhich al-
•i
Muntasir received the homage of the people, when the news
• •
of the Caliph's murder spread to al-Mahuza (the murdered
0
Caliph's residence in Samarra), the .jund and the shakiriyya,
ghawgha 'amrna and others gathered
together at the bab al- amma of ,ja 'fari. The angry
crowd grew even larger and there was- much argument among
0
0
them about the oath of allegiance with which they appear








with al-Muntasir and delivered the Caliph's message to
♦ •
them.
1 It was met with strong resistance from the angry
gathering. Taken aback by the abuse which was showered
*
upon him, he returned to inform his master of their
. feelings On hearing this, al-Muntasir became' very angry
% •
and came out in person, surrounded by the maghariba. troops.
*
As the Caliph approached the gathering he shouted to his
2
soldiers, "Dogs, get them."
(
The maghariba immediately
attacked the crowd, forcing them to retreat and, finally to
1. It was also stated that Zurafa al-Hajib was the one who
delivered this message.
2. It will be shown below
Tab., Ill, li|_79.
the ghariba, who came to
be considered as one of the Arab elements in the army






This protest against the new Caliph can be considered
as an expression of the feeling of the non-Turkish elements
0
about the superiority which was being accorded to these
parvenues, whom they feared would ultimately displace them
entirely in the army and in the running of the State. They




of leadership amongst them that this could not be put to
9




Muntasir they seem to have quietly acquiesced to the new
state of affairs.
As soon as al-Musta in ascended the throne a riot
0
spread through the capital in protest against the Turk's
p
decision' to make him Caliph, instead of al-Mu'tazz. There
0




the groups who organised the riot: Al-Tabarl takes the view
0
that they were the shakiriyya, who supported Muhammad b. fAbd
9
Allah b. Tahir, the tabariyya cavalry,3 and a thousand soldiers
from the fammaIbn al-JawzI refers to them as mainlyk
1. The maghariba attacked the crowd and drove them towards the
three gates of the city. The crowd, however, got out of
control and scattered in various directions, a fex\r of them
dying as a result of this confusion. Tab.,. Ill, llj-79.
2. R. Levy sees the uprising as a protest against the Turks'
disregard for al-Mu'tazz's superior entitlement to the
throne. The people of Samarra, out of loyalty to the
Prophet's family, gathered in force to oppose the
candidate of the Turks and to enforce the claim of al-Mu'taz
A Baghdad Chronicle, p. 107-
0
3. Tabariyya seems to be a group of horsemen who were possibly
brought from the district of Tabaristan.





coming from the 'amma, with some other unspecified soldiers,
• while Ibn Kathir holds the view that they were a band of
0
discontented Turks.^ Ibn Miskawayh,^ Ibn Nubata^- and Ibn
Khaldun^ repeat al-Tabarl's view with minor variations but
0
all of them seem to agree that the instigators of the riot
were mainly soldiers of non-Turkish Origin..
The anti-Turkish crowd took advantage of the ceremonial
0
0
celebrations of the new Caliph to attack the ushrusaniyya who
- f
were arranged in two rows to. protect al-Musta'In. The
ushrusaniyya, however, broke ranks and gathered together in
- • 7
groups, supported by the maghariba. A battle ensued in
which the insurgents fought bravely, both sides suffering
heavy casualties. The next day the 'amma attacked the Turks,
%
inflicting casualties and capturing weapons. But in the- end
4
the supporters of the new Caliph won the day, and continued
to enjoy a privileged position in the circle of the court.
4
4
1. Munt az am, XII, 2b.
2. Ibn Kathir, XI, 2.
4
3. He states that they were the soldiers of Muhammad b. 'Abd
•
•
Allah b. Tahir supported by the tabariyya and various other
groups of people. Miskawayh, VI, 562-63.
l±. Ibn Nubata, II, 120b, considers them as the shakiriyya
forces plus elements of the jund.
5. Ibn Khaldun sees them as coming from the jund and the
lower classes and he regards them as supporters of Ibn
Tahir. They were later augmented by the shakiriyya and
the mubayyida, Ibar, III, 283.
6. Their cry was, " V Jr »
0
0
"0 Mu'tazz, the protected." Tab., Ill, 1503.
7. They joined them after the mubayyaga had associated them-
selves, with the shakiriyya. Tab., Ill', I5OJ4..
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Although the s and the jund had lost the battle,
they did not remain wholly submissive; in 2)4.9/863 they
supported the 'amma in Baghdad against the government in




proclaimed that the main purpose of joining this riot was
to force the government to pay their allowances. This may
ft
ft
have been used as a means to show their anger against the
Turkish supremacy which they hoped to diminish in order to
r •
regain a certain amount of power and thus suppress the
ft
Turkish influence at the court.
There are many indications that most of the non-Turkish
elements united with a'l-Musta 'in in Baghdad against the army
of Samarra.
2
The majority of the soldiers who were sent to
ft »
9
fight against Baghdad were Turkish slaves. 3 During the war,
certain regular groups in the army, mainly the shakiriyya,
ft




of the army in Baghdad. Thus on Wednesday, 12 §afar 251/
ft
ft
16 March 865, 'Abd Allah b. Sulaymin b. Tahir arrived in
Baghdad with about three hundred men from the shakiriyya.
1. Tab., Ill, 1510; Kamil, VII, 80.
2. Only six Turkish and maghariba military leaders were said,
to be fighting with the army of Baghdad. Tab., Ill, 1595
It should be remembered that these leaders were not
fighting for the benefit of al-Musta. In himself, but
ft
rather with the aim of regaining their previous positions
of power.
ft
3. The army which.was sent from Samarra against. Baghdad con¬
sisted of five thousand Turks and and two thousand
Only one week after the beginning of the
ft
fighting al-Mu'tazz strengthened his troops by sending
another force of Turks, the maghariba and the faraghina






On the same day the shakiriyya who had been in Samarra under
9
the command of various leaders arrived in Baghdad with the
intention of strengthening the army of al-Musta 'in. and of
ft
fighting the Turkish mercenaries.^ On Monday, 2I4. Safar
251/28 March 865» the shakiriyya who were with the army of
t
Musa b. Bugha in Syria refused their leader's request to
ft
ft
march on Baghdad to support al-Mu'tazz against al-Musta'In.
On the other hand, the Turkish element in this army responded
gladly to the request and encouraged their leader to hasten
• •
.
their despatch to Baghdad.^ Moreover, on the 5 RabI' II
%
251/10 April 865 thirteen hundred soldiers from the shakiriyya,
under the leadership of Habshun b. Bugha al-Kabir, arrived in
i
Baghdad and immediately joined the forces of al-Musta 'in.




received a message from al-Mu'tazz in Kufa, where he had been
sent by al-Musta'in to suppress a revolt, ordering him to
(
t
bring his troops to Baghdad and join the forces attacking the
ft
9
city. Meanwhile, al-Mu'tazz promised him and his soldiers
■ great rewards if they joined him. When Muzahim read the
+
Caliph's letter to his soldiers, the Turks; the faraghina
and the maghar iba were pleased at the opportunity being given
to them to join forces with their own people and strengthen
their position against the common enemy, i.e. al-Musta 'in's
1. The number of the shakiriyya who arrived in Baghdad was
estimated at only forty individuals. Muhammad b. 'Abd
Allah b. Tahir rewarded them as well as the shakiriyya
ft
who had already arrived with Sulayman b. Tahir. Tab.,
Ill, 1559-60.
2. Tab., Ill, 1582;. cf. Kamil, VII, 98, where he mentions
ft ft
that Musa b. Bugha was intending to join al-Musta'In
✓
but his Turkish soldiers refused his request.
ft






army/ On the other hand the shakiriyya, who were with
«
»
Muzahim, strongly objected to al-Mu'tazz's demand and
decided to remain loyal to al-Musta'in. Therefore, they
V 1




while Muzahim arid his sympathizers joined the troops of
1 ' ' •
Samarra.
• •
During the reign of al-Mu'tazz, the maghariba, who had
0
*
never departed from their loyalty to the Caliph and had
, 0
»
hitherto always appeared to associate themselves with the
W
» 0
Turks, seem to have become disquietened at the position of
0 ♦ •
0
superiority which was-being gained by the Turkish mercenaries
0




deposing and murdering both. Caliphs and ministers." The
0
e '
enmity grew until finally oh 1 Rajab 252/27 July 866, there
* —
# I
was a direct confrontation between the Turks and the
0
• • ,
maghiriba, as a result of which the former were forced to
0
leave the 'jawsaq where they were camped. The maghariba
0 0




which had been set aside exclusively for the use of the Turks.
4
The latter reacted to this defeat by calling in support from




support of these new contingents, they were unable to defeat
J
the maghariba, who were now supported by elements from the
0
shakir iyya and the ghawgha■*, A truce between the two sides
was arranged by Ja'far b. 'Abd al-Wahid,^ under the terms of
s
1. Tab., Ill, 1619.
2. Tab;, III, 1681.
3. He was possibly Ja'far b. Mahmud al-Iskafx, the secretary
of the Caliph. Cf. Tab., Ill, 1681.
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which each would retain its present position, until a
final agreement could be reached. To the Turks such a
ft
ft
stalemate was intolerable, and, characteristically, they
*
resolved it by murdering the two prominent leaders of the
4
4
maghariba, Muhammad b. Rashid and Nasr b. Sa'id. At the
%
9
same time they strengthened their own position by uniting
ft
themselves under the single leadership of Baykabak. In
*
this way they contrived to regain the domination of the
life of the Capital which they had formerly exercised.
ft
Al-Mu'tazz seems to have favoured the maghariba in
ft
<
their anti-Turkish manoeuvres, hoping that they would




into his hands once again the direction of affairs. It is
A ♦
related that al-Mu'tazz, upon hearing the news- of the murder
4
ft
of the two maghariba leaders, became very angry and resolved
9
to take revenge on the person who was responsible for this
P
deed. But he soon discovered that he did not have the
power to . challenge the Turks openly, so he had to be
ft
-satisfied with having Muhammad b. 'Azzun banished to Baghdad.
Al-Mu'tazz did not seem to have the same confidence in
» A
ft
the shakiriyya as he had in the maghariba. The shakiriyya
1. Tab., Ill, 1681.
*
2. Muhammad b. Rashid and Nasr b. Sa'Id had had a meeting in
the early morning of the day on which the Turks had
decided to attack them. As they were returning to their
ft
homes, they heard that Baykabak was marching towards Ibn
Rahhid's house. They therefore took refuge in the house
of Muhammad b. 'Azzun; but the latter betrayed them to
Baykabik who came and slew them. Tab., Ill, 1681.







of Baghdad protested to Muhammad b. ^ahir* against the privi-
« •
leged position of the Turks when they were demanding the pay-
4
ment of their allowances. When Ibn Tahir informed the Caliph
4
%
of the situation, he received the answer: "If you have organ-
s
4
ized these soldiers for your own benefit, you yourself must
pay them their allowances (from your own pocket). But if you
have enlisted them for our benefit, we are not in need of them.
The Caliph's reply provoked the anger of the troops, in Baghdad




After one day of disturbances Ibn Tahir distributed two
4
,
thousand dinars among them and this kept them quiet for a while
%
The Caliph's attitude towards the shakiriyya shows once again
4






■ • In the final crisis when al-Mu'tazz was obliged to
4
9
abdicate the throne, the maghariba and the faraghina are found
4 ♦
%
acting in unison with the Turks, presumably because they had
learned by experience that greater rewards would come from co-
*
operation than from resistance. The shakiriyya were not in
Samarra at that time, and therefore played no part in these
%
events. While in Baghdad the shakiriyya remained restless
Q
• •
and continually expressed their discontent against the sup-
4
remacy of the Turks. Therefore, on 13 Ramadan 255/27 August
4
869, they and the na'iba associated themselves with the 'amma
*
in the latter®s revolt against Muhammad b. Aws, the deputy
military governor of Baghdad. The shakiriyya took advantage
4
of the occasion to show their hatred of the Turks and to
demand the payment of their wages.^
1. Tab., Ill, 1661-62.
2. Tab., Ill, 1?02.
»
3. Al-Tabarl says that the main cause for this trouble was the
lack of money to pay the soldiers. Tab., Ill, 1726-28.
C. The Struggle between the 'amma and the Turks.^
% »
Since the very first introduction of the Turks into
0




presence, as may be seen from the terms which they used in
»
speaking of them: 'ulu,i "savages" and 'ajam "foreigners".2
I
The tradition . "Leave the Turks alone as long as they leave
you alone" became current and was used as a formula for
discrimination against the Turks.3 The attitude and the
m
arrogant behaviour of the Turkish troops incurred the hatred
e
of the citizens, and from time to time provoked reprisals
against them.^" This hostility between the troops and the
|
1. The term 'amma, which has already been mentioned on
several occasions is used here to refer to all classes
4
of society at the time, except the khassa, i.e. the
intimate officers of the Caliph. It mainly refers to
the native inhabitants of the Capital as well as Baghdad,
i.e. excluding the 'amma of the Turks. B.M. Fahad,
Al- 'Amma fl Baghdad, Baghdad, 1967, pp. 2-3. According
to the Shi'a scholars the term 'amma was used to refer
to the Sunnites. See al-TusI, Muhammad b. al-Hasan b.
ft * I ft
'All (d. I).60/1067)» Fihrist Kutub al-Shi 'a wa u^ulihim,
ed. by A. Sprenger and others, Calcutta, I85I4., 281 f.
But it is difficult to apply this term to our period of
study since 'amma was used by non-Shi'ite scholars and
appeared in historical rather than theological or
philosophical works.
2. Tab., Ill, 1180-81.
3. I. Goldziher, Muslim Studies, I, 2l|.5.
1|. The people of Baghdad, in particular the youths, old men,
0
and women received severe, treatment from the Turks,
<
0
which led the inhabitants to react every now and then
• against such behaviour.. Tab., Ill, 1180; Muru,j, VII,
118-9; Tanbih, p. 308; cf« Azdi, p. lj.16.
< 0
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inhabitants came to a climax when a man stopped before the
Caliph, al-Mu'tasim, and openly abused him for introducing
♦
the barbarous Turks: "0 Abu Ishaq (meaning al-Mu'tasim), may
4
s
God punish you for this jiwar (i.e. introducing Turks into
9
0




and have caused the deaths of our men by settling these 'ulu.j
m
9




are unable to overcome."^ The Caliph was well aware of the
insecure position of his recruits and feared the consequences




from the 'amma, the Caliph and his troops were forced to find
O
another place to be the capital and a garrison. Moreover,
0
the Caliph himself must have felt insecure in Baghdad
because of his anti-Sunnite policy and the support which the
9
imim Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 2I4.I/855) had amongst the 'amma,3 who
0
had already been seen to be antagonistic towards his new
1. Tab., Ill, 181; TDA, fols. I)_6a-b.
2. Yaqubi, Buldan, p. 30; Miskawayh, VI, lj.28-29;
TBN, fol. 9lj.a.
I
3. On the Caliph's growing fear of the supporters of Ibn
Hanbal, Patton translates from al-MaqrlzI, "After the
scourging of (Ibn Hanbal), al-Mu'tasim brought out Ishak
Ibn Hanbal (Ahmad's•uncle) to the people, and asked them
to. witness that he would testify that he (the Khalife)
gave over to them their Imam without hurt or damage to
his body. It is said that if the Khalif had not caused
this deception to be practised, the people would have
risen in insurrection." W.M. Patton, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal
and the Milina, Leyden, 1897; cf. al-Maqrxzi, p. 8.
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bodyguards. Their support could have finally been expressed
ft
T
in open attack on himself and his praetorians. Even in the
ft
ft
construction of the new garrison town, the Caliph allotted
4♦ '
a special district to each ethnic group, in order to avoid
ft








Jamma had participated in several anti-Turkish movements.
f
But in the month of Safar 2i|.9/March 863, they themselves
♦
provoked a riot in Baghdad in protest against the favoured
ft
position of the Turkish troops.^ The occasion for this
ft




Byzantine frontier, and the murder of two Muslim-leaders,
'Umar b. 'Ubayd Allah al-Aqta ' and 'All b. Yahya al-ArmanlA
ft
These two leaders were considered the most efficient fighters




in the eyes of .the 'amma, who suspected the Turks of
ft
ft




such as the abna', the shakiriyya and the Jund, toOk advantage
of this situation and joined the 'amma with the additional
n
intention of demanding their allowances.^ In order to gain
1. Y.I. al-Samarra * I, Ta'rlkh madinat Samarra', I, Baghdad,
1968, 17; D. Sourdel, "The 'Abbasid Caliphate", CHI, I,
125; Pellat, The Life and Works of Jahiz, London,
1969, pp.- 11-12.
• • 6
2. Yaqubi, Buldan. pp. 30 ff., Muru ,j, VII, 122.,
3. Cf. TBN, fol. 100a where the author uses the term -'Muslimun
(Muslims) to refer to the rioters.
W
!(.. Tab., Ill, 1510; ' Kamil, VII, 79-80, cf. Ibn Kathir, XI, 3





more/supporters for their cause, the 'amma marched on the












Baghdad, which later was to spread to Samarra itself. The
angry crowd marched towards the two bridges in the city,
9
destroyed one of them and set fire to the other. The diwan
1
qisas of the two prisons was plundered, the records were
0
torn to pieces and thrown into the river. The 'amma also
plundered the houses of Bashir and Ibrahim, the sons of Harun
*
al-Nasranl, who were the scribes of Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah b.
Tahir.3
0
This riot, intended merely to express the anger felt by
the 'amma towards the Turkish mercenaries, expanded until
0
the participants declared Holy war (.jihad) against the
Byzantines. They were encouraged in this by the wealthy
people of both Baghdad and Samarra, who offered a considerable
0
0
amount of money in support of anyone who was ready and willing
0
to go on campaign. ' When the news of these gifts reached the
»
i ■
other provinces many people among the 'amma rushed to Baghdad,
♦
0 ♦
declaring themselves willing to fight the enemies of Islam.




Turkish mercenaries, remained aloof and showed no sign of
interest nor gave any encouragement to the fighters.^-
1. Diwan qisas al-raafcbaso^n is the term used for the registers '
1
of these two prisons. It probably contained the names of
the prisoners and the period of their sentences.
2. Tab., Ill, 1510-11; Ibar, III, 281;.
0
3. Tab., Ill, 1511.









I According to al-Tabarl, on Friday 21 Rabi' I 2ij.9/l9
A
<
April 863» a group of unidentified soldiers in Samarra
rushed towards the prison, opening its door and releasing
4
all the prisoners."*" Zttrafa al-Hajib, with a group of his
♦
ft
mawali, was despatched to suppress them, but the 'amma
9
resisted and fighting broke out between the two sides. .
• 4
0
Zurafa and his troops suffered heavy casualties and were
forced to retreat. ' In response to this insurgency, Atamish,
Wasif, Bugha and their fellow Turkish soldiers rode out to
meet the 'amma and, in the fighting which followed, the latter
were defeated. This riot by the 'amma in Samarra is
ft
#
indicative of the anger felt against the Turkish soldiers
. •





Although these attempts by the 'amma were to some extent
t
4
intended to reduce the influence of the Turkish mercenaries,
• »
they fell short of this objective; and the reason for this
4
failure was the lack of leadership and organization, in both
ft
of which the Turks had the advantage. Their failure, however,
ft
1. Tab., Ill, 1511. Ibn Kathir XI, 3, identifies them as the
'amma. See also Miskawayh, VI, 565J Ibar, III, 281]..
2. Tab., Ill, 1511-12; Kamil, VII, 80; Ibn Kathir, XI, 3.
The account runs that a cooking pot was thrown at Wagiif,
who immediately ordered his men to set fire to the whole
area, which included several shops as well as houses.
Then the maghariba, who were on his side, exploited the
*
situation and plundered certain hpuses belonging to the
'amma. Al-Tabari adds that he saw the devastated area
with his own eyes.
217
should not be taken as implying a surrender to the
• »
foreignersj indeed, subsequently they were to be found
« « «




During the civil war between Baghdad and Samarra, the
4
*












group among the 'amma known as the 'ayyarun^" were given a
4
special status so that•they could participate more fully in
•
-
P t — —
this war. The ayyarun proved their bravery during the
t ^ •
4




on- Thursday 13 Safar 251/16 March 865 'ammat ahl Baghdad
4
• •





the face of the enemy. 3 On the same day the ghawgha *, too,
%
fought gallantly, forcing the enemy to retreat from certain











army of Baghdad and, due to their courage, it suffered fewer
•
• ,








and another military group named the mubayyada, played a
significant role in defeating the Turkish troops.^ The
p . _ „
1. EI , s.v. Ayyarun.
2. Muhammad.b. 'Abd Allah b. Tahir sent his orderly to select
a certain number of soldiers from among the 'ayyarun.
9
t
These he placed under the command of an 'arif (sergeant).
Special shields and slings were made for them. Tab., Ill,
; Miskawayh, VI, 581*
3. Tab., Ill, I56O.
j
Ij.. Tab., Ill, 1561 j Kamil, VII, 96.
*







'ayyarun even wished to give pursuit and harry their rear,
4
but Muhammad b. Tahir refused permission.1 When the
• 4
* > *




inferred that the position of al-Mu'tazz must be in decline
✓
and they took advantage of this to raid the suq ashab ai-fy.ull
(jewellers * market) and plunder it.^
• ,
The fighting spirit which the *ayyarun had shown in
*




to improve the weapons with which they were provided. They
9
%
were re-organized and placed under the leadership of commanders
chosen from their own ranks.They were then stationed at
the various gates of the city, where, during their first
4 «
4
confrontation with the Turks, they killed about fifty of
the enemy, losing only ten of their own number. During the
c
following days the 'ayyarun took up their position at the
4
♦
qatarbil gate and taunted the Turkish troops. When they
passed beyond the gate a few of the Turkish soldiers crossed
4
the river by boat with arrows at the ready and fought them.
4
♦




stood firm against the attackers and massacred them. The
chief of the 'ayyarun. however, was called to the presence
of the governor of Baghdad and was advised not to go out to
*
face the enemy, except when ordered to do soA
1. Tab., Ill, 1565..
2. Tab., Ill, I565.
4
3. Their leaders were Yantawayh> Duwnal, Damhal, Abu Namla,
and Abu 'Asara. Tab., Ill, 1587.• The 'ayyarun were
armed with kifir kubat, in addition to their other weapons.
Tab., Ill, 1586-87, 15891 Kamil, VII, 99.





On Sunday 15 Rabi ' 1 251/865, the 'ayyarun participated
it
with the BaghdadI army in a brave fight against the soldiers
4
*
of Samarra. The latter lost several ships, in addition to
0








field and ordered one of his generals, Muhammad b. 'Awn, to
4
let the 'amma depart. The general was very rude to them,
♦ »
o
abusing the 'amma and even killing one of their men. His
4




him, but he managed to escape. The army of Samarra took
4









of Samarra and marched to plunder his house; but they were





had to content themselves with raising their voices in
protest against him. Later Muhammad b. Tahir. sent a
4
message informing the 'amma that he had dismissed Ibn 'Awn
« ♦
4
from all his military posts and had appointed his own brother
4
'Ubayd Alllh b. 'Abd Allah b. Tahir in his place. They
« *
4 *
seemed to be content with this action and remained faithful
4
. 4
to the army of Baghdad in the struggle against the Turkish
.
4
'mercenaries.^ It is evident that the 'amma in general and




in the army of Baghdad in their attempt to suppress the
0
<4
Turkish influence in the capital and restore law and order.
4
1. Tab., Ill, 1586-7; cf. Ibar, III, 289.
2. Tab., Ill, 1590.
4
4














initiative and suffered heavy casualties. They were forced
» 4
to retreat from the strategic positions which they held and
— 1
were pursued by the 'amma who plundered all their goods.
4
0
Muhammad b. Tahir encouraged the 'amma in their savage drive
against the Turkish troops by rewarding each man who brought
0
2
the head of a Turkish soldier to him.
%
4
Throughout this long period of war between Baghdad and
9
0
Saraarra, the 'amma and the merchants suffered greatly from
0
9
the shortage of food and rising prices. They went together
to Muhammad b. Tahir and complained to him of the economic
hardships they were suffering, and he promised them some
s




gravity of the situation which his troops were facing, sent
0
• * •
a secret message to al-Mu'tazz in Samarra, asking him to put
0
an end to the x*ar. When the people of Baghdad learned of
0
0
this correspondence between Ibn Tahir and al-Mu'tazz, they
0
0
were dismayed. On 23 Dhu al-Qi'da 251/27 December 865» a
0
0
group. compos ed of the ,iund. the infantry, and the 'amma
41
gathered together in protest against .what was seen as Ibn
J






their, salaries, and the amma expressed dissatisfaction.
0
0 0 *
with the deteriorating ■ economic situation. They told Ibn
9
0
Tahir that iirhether or not he fought alongside them they would
0










1. Tab., Ill, 1626-27.
2. Tab., Ill, 1626-27; Kamil, VII, IOI4..
0
3. Tab., Ill, 1639; cf. R. Levy; A Baghdad Chronicle, p.112.
/ When Itan Tahir succeeded in restoring peace with
♦
Samarra, the 'amma thought that the treaty had been arranged
in the name of their own Caliph al-Musta in.and that al-.
* 4





kept quiet x\rhen the food-ships arrived ft»ora Samarra. But
*
*
on Wednesday 10 Dhu al-Hijja 251/12 January 866, the Turkish
i
envoy arrived in Baghdad and announced that the Commander of:
♦ 4
the Faithful (al-Mu'tazz) and his brother Abu Ahmad were
4
|
dictating the terms of peace, and that- they would show favour
9
to all who showed obedience and respect their commands. The
'amma reacted strongly, to his proclamation, and abused the
9
I




Ibn Tahir's negotiations were not what they had imagined,
A
4




Then the arnroa advanced on Ibn Tahir's palace where
4 9
0
fighting broke out between them and. his guards, which-did








abusing Ibn Tahir for deceiving the Caliph al-Musta 'in.




morning they ctemanded that he be shown to them to prove that
he was still alive and unharmed. Al-Musta 'in came out
with Ibn Tahir and several other courtiers, reassuring them
2
that he was being well treated and had received no injury.
1. Tab., Ill, I63O-3IJ cf. R. Levy, A Baghdad Chronicle,
P-' 113.
2. Tab., Ill, 1632-3^; Muruj,. VII, 366; cf. Ibn Kathir, XI,
The conclusion to be drawn is that the 'amma seem to
have adopted a very anti-Turkish attitude during the civil
9
war and that they participated in almost all the fighting.
%
9
They were displeased by the secret negotiations which took
place between the representatives of al-Mu'tazz and the
Governor of Baghdad, whom they came to regard as a traitor;
ft
but most probably their determined resistance was a reaction
to the chaos which the Turkish soldiers had brought ,to the
0
0
social and economic life of the region,and can be seen as an
4
4
assertion of local patriotism.
0
In Ramadin 252/August-September 866, the 'amma again
✓
associated themselves with the revolt of the troops in
•
•








as Caliph. They failed in their efforts to prevent his
ft
recognition in Baghdad, only succeeding in creating further
0
disorders and strife in the city, which were soon put down
4
4
and normality was eventually restored.
* *
On Thursday, 30 Rajab 255/114- July 869, when the news
4
4
of the removal of al-Mu'tazz and his.replacement by Muhammad
b. al-Wathiq al-Muhtadi, reached Baghdad,^ the 'amma and the
)jund noisily beseig'ed the palace of Sulayman b* 'Abd Allah b.
• j
0
Tahir, the Governor of the city. On being informed that the
♦
governor knew nothing about the situation in Samarra, they
0
dispersed. The Governor told them that he still had no
,
definite news from Samarra and that prayers would still be
i
1. Tab., Ill, 1658-6*8; Kamil, VII,- 1-114.-115.
2. Tab., Ill, 171i4.; Ibn Kathir, XI, 17- Both of them state
that the 'amma did not know that al-Muhtadi had ascended
the throne and as soon as they learned about it they
stopped their resistance. Cf. Sibt, IX, 290b.
/ 1
offered in the name of al-Mu tazz in the mosques of Baghdad.
On Saturday 2 Sha 'ban 255/17 July 869, the 'amma




b. al-Mutawakkil who was in exile in Baghdad at the time and
called on the citizens of the city to pay homage to him as




they went away, probably because they were certain that
9
Sulayman would protect Abu Ahmad from any possible threat to
his life.3 The new Caliph, al-Muhtadi, sent his represen¬
tative to Baghdad to quell the trouble by bribing the ,jund
in the city, distributing thirty thousand dinars among them
as an 'ata*. The messenger was unable to enter the city
because of the riots. He informed his master in Samarra
#
of the situation, who responded by sending a further sum of
money to the people of Baghdad, xtfhich he hoped he would
satisfy thern.^" Invthis he was successful, and on Thursday
7 Sha'ban 255/22 July 869, homage was paid to .him in Baghdad.^
%
%
The 'amma, on the whole, seem to have been content with
J
this Caliph, in spite of the troubles which they caused at
the very beginning of his reign. When al-Muhtadx'became
9
«
involved with the restless Turkish troops, the 'amma took
his side and it was reported that the 'amma in' Samarra
0
protested against the Turks' plan to. kill the Caliph. On
A
1. Tab., III,171H-
2. Tab., Ill, 171H-15; Sibt, IX, 291a; Ibn Junghul, III, 287a.
3. Tab., Ill, 1715; Ibn Kathir, XI, 17; Ibn Junghul, III,
287a.
1^. Tab., Ill, 1715.
5. Tab., Ill, .1715; Kamil, VII, I3I4.; Sibt, IX, 291a; cf.









Saturday 30 Muharram 256/8 January 870, they.distributed
4




city, inviting the inhabitants to standty their Caliph
against the barbarous Turks.^ Yet subsequent events show
4
0









the Caliph found himself. Shortly after, the sources make
reference to certain 'amma who accompanied Silih b. Waslf
P
from his hiding place to the „jawsaq, but it is not clear
9
whether they were supporting this Turkish leader or not.
During the course of the battle between the Caliph
1
al-Muhtadi and his Turkish soldiers, the 'amma.appear to






continuing the struggle even after his army was defeated
• "•
•
and he himself had fled. The victorious Turks went
9




Prom the above presentation of the position of the Turks
t
in the Capital it is evident that, despite their supremacy,
9
they felt insecure and had no confidence in their own power.
This was mainly due to the obvious divisions among them and
the opposition to their settlement in the Capital which
9
came not only from the other military groups who considered
1. Tab., Ill, 1795-96.j Kamil, VII, 1-36-37.
2. Tab., Ill, 1810; Ibn Kathir, XI, 22; Ibar, III, 297-98.
m
3:. Tab., Ill, 1818. But in two of his several accounts
4
concerning the death of this Caliph, al-Tabarx makes
reference to the role of the 'amma in this matter, saying




the Turks as usurpers of their power but also from the 'amma
The latter initiated as well as participated in every anti-
Turkish manoeuvre in order to eliminate their power.
9
due to the lack, of leadership and an organized body to
But,
9




suppress all the attempts which were made on their position
CHAPTER VII
THE REVOLTS IN THE PROVINCES
The 'Abbasids were unable to retain direct control'





Spain, for example, never came under their domination and
ft
ft
indeed, in 139/757 the Umayyad refugee Abd al-Rahman
9
ft
succeeded in establishing an amirate there. Since the very
ft
beginning, most of North Africa had been lost to them, the
Idrlsids (172-31i|/789-926) holding the area further West,
and the Rustamids (160-296/777-909) controlling the central
ft
4
Atlas. Only Ifrlqiyya "(modern Tunisia) was governed by an
9 ft
officer of the new dynasty, but this too was granted virtual
I
ft
independence in the period of Harun al-Rashld when Ibrahim b
ft
al-Aghlab (I8I4./8OO) was granted full sovereignty in the
ft




ij.0,000 dinars. It appears that he merely wanted, to
ft ft
i
establish a friendly buffer state between %ypt and any
thr and this











of the 'Abbasid-Empire were Egypt and Syria, and Hijaz in
ft
the west, Bahrayn and Ba?ra in the south, and the various
1. Kamil, VI, H3.
regions of the east; these the Caliphs from earliest, times




Hoxtfever with the passage of time it became apparent
that such far-flung possessions could not all be held with
security. Beginning with Harun al-Rashid and continuing
under al-Ma'mun and his successors one can notice a concen-
tration of attention on those regions which were felt to be
a <
9
essential to the survival of the Caliphate, and a relaxation
*
of the grip on certain others.
Thus, al-Mansur was unsparing in his efforts to suppress
the revolts which broke out in Khurasan and other eastern
regions after the murder of Abu Muslim. He adopted the
same measures.against the uprisings in Medina and in
#
Basra. His son and successor-, al-Mahdi was equally
a 1
m
















relationship with the governors of Baghdad came into being.
4
ft
In 237/851 Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah b. Tahir received the
ft
ft
prefecture of the city in addition to his authority over
%
several other' regions in the Sawed,"*" which implies that the
I
fahirids had'even-begun to exert their power over the most
strategic province in the Empire. But this appointment may
ft
4
also have had among its purposes the suppression of Turkish
ft
ft
influence in Samarra, as well as strengthening the loyalty
of the Tahir.ids.?
Al-Munt.a§ir appears to have been very eager to maintain
*
ft
a good relationship with Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah, who was
to become the mainstay of the Caliphate and to enjoy the
4 ,
ft ft
Caliph's confidence while still wielding his own authority.
♦
ft




Byzantine frontiers, he sent a letter to Muhammad informing
ft
ft
him of the situation and ordering him to deliver copies of
the letter to the various, provinces, encouraging the
-
inhabitants to join the array and to wage war against the
infidels.3 Shortly.after, when he had'dismissed his potential
successors, al-Muntasir sent another long letter to Muhammad
« "
telling him about the situation within Samarra, and copies
1. Tab., Ill, lip.1.
2. C., Brockelmann, p. 133.
3. Tab., Ill, llj.81, ILi.85.
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/ 1




The reply made to th'ese letters is not known, nor do we know
ft
what attitude was taken by Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah with
ft
regard to the Caliph's dealing with his two potential
successors.
%
This correspondence is evidence of the .good relations
%
between the Caliph and his vice-regent, and, indeed, it was
in the interest of both parties to maintain such friendships.
ft
ft
On the Tahirid side, there was an obvious advantage to them
in maintaining in power the Caliph from.whom they had already
ft
received such marks of favour and whose precarious position
was an assurance of their own pre-eminence. To what extent,
if at all, the Caliph endeavoured to use the influence of the
I
<
prefecture of Baghdad against the increasing power of his
I
ft
Turkish officers is not known, nor is there any information
about the attitude of Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah towards the
ft
|
intensification of Turkish power at the court. Clearly he
could not be content with the influence exerted by the Turkish
officers on the Caliph, and his uneasiness on this matter
ft
ft
explains the attitude of his followers immediately after the
ft
ft
nomination of ai-Musta'in to the Caliphate.^ Al-Ya^qubi
mentions that the supporters of al-Musta 'In were very much
# ft
ft
afraid of the governor of Khurasin, Tahir b. 'Abd Allah and





But, again, there is no clear evidence that either this
1. Tab., Ill, 1^89-95.
2. Tab., Ill, 1503-1505.













death, immediately appointed the latter's son Mutiammad
ft
ft #
governor of Khurasan, and the two Holy cities were added to
his brother Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah's governorship over
ft
i •
Baghdad and ma 'awin al-Sawad.1 Al-Ya'qubl considers this
nomination to be the result of a conspiracy amongst the
ft
ft ♦




to expel from Baghdad.^ Al-Tabarx does not refer to this
#
account and gives the impression that the Caliph was content
-
\






in. Khurasan and that the offer of this power to Banu Tahirft
i
was meant as a sign of respect and honour.^ If it was the
ft
intention of the Turks to remove Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah b.
*4
Tahir from Baghdad, as they eventually succeeded in doing,
9 *
the question arises why did they not themselves take over
✓
ft I I
the rulership of Baghdad which was of such great importance
*
to them? It may be.true that they were displeased at his
r
stay in Baghdad but the Caliph, on the other hand, did not
#
dare object to the Turks' demands to remove him from Khurasan
ft
in spite of the mutual respect which existed between the
ft
Caliph and the governor. Thus, under pressure from the
ft
A
1. Tab., Ill, 1506; Kamil,'VII," 77.
2. Yaqubi, III, 180. Al-Ya'qubi clearly states that
✓
ft




this honour because his brother Tahir had already nominated
his son Muhammad to the governorship of Khurasan.
• ♦
3. Tab., Illi 1506.
231
Turks, al-Musta 'in was forced to follow this policy towards
the Tahirids.•
» 9
It is noteworthy that Muhammad b. Tahir did not
• •
interfere with the 'amma riot in Baghdad in 2l|9/863» even
♦
though the houses of two of his scribes were plundered
This does not necessarily imply that he was sympathetic
towards them or that he supported their actions against
*
either the Caliph or the Turkish mercenaries; he was
ft
\ v
probably merely awaiting orders from Samarra before committing
0
himself to action. It may.be that since this revolt was
ft
directed against the. Turkish supremacy and not against
9
himself, he felt he could remain aloof from.it. But in so
«
|
doing he would put at risk his reputation amongst the
inhabitants of the city. The best interpretation that can
P
ft
be placed on his attitude is that he wanted to present
himself as a mere agent of the Caliph who would only act on
ft ^
» ft




in the Tahirids' military actions in Khurasan, which will be
£
9





in the Sawad region.
9
This type of co-operation between the Caliphs and the
governors of Baghdad was to the advantage of both the Caliphs
and their representatives. The Caliph wanted Baghdad to
V
remain peaceful in order to secure his position in Samarra
because any uprising or riot in the one would soon threaten
0
ft
his own position in the other. As for the Tahirids, loyalty
1. Tab., Ill, 1511; Kamil, VII, 79-80.
0
2. Yaqubi, III, 182; Tab., Ill, 1516, 1523."
232
/
to Samarra meant the continuation of their power not only





b. Tahir in supporting the Caliph al-Musta 'In against al-
Mu 'tazz. Muhammad took over the direction of affairs in
|




correspondence carried his name or was addressed to him
t
f
personally instead of to the Caliph al-Musta'In. One must
bear in mind that at the beginning of the war between Baghdad
and Samarra, Ibn Tahir actively supported al-Musta in against
9




betrayed his master by making a secret agreement with al-Mu'tazz
4
aimed at the dismissal of al-Musta'In from the Caliphate. Ibn
Tahir was probably anxious to bring about an end to the siege
because he had begun to recognize that his forces were not
in a position to win the war against Saraarra. Al-.Tabarl




position by distributing his forces over too wide an area,
9
thereby offering the enemy a choice of weak points to attack.
9
Ibn Tlhir was advised by one of his generals, Abu al-Saj, that
4
% I
in order to win the battle he should not let his'officers
*
become scattered over a wide area; but he refused to accept
-
this advice and pointedly told the.leader, "I have my own
plan. ..1
%
There certainly must have been some deterioration in
9
■ the position of al-Musta'in which persuaded Ibn Tahir to









course, was to retain his power in Baghdad, and in order to
« •
do this he surrendered on the terms laid, down by Samarra.
9
There is a curious explanation offered by fabari, who has
♦ *
it that under the influence of his Persian advisers, Ibn




soldiers. When the troops of al-Raqqa were defeated by the
O
Turks,'he is reported to have said, "What use are the Arabs
now, without the Prophet and divine aid?"^ Although this
9
9




it gives the impression that this ieader had no confidence
✓
A




forward terms for a peaceful settlement with the authorities
of Samarra in order to gain favour with them.3
*




have favoured, his brother 'Ubayd Allah b. 'Abd Allah b. Tahir
9
9








too, was himself very anxious to fill this office.^- Even
9
9
if some suspicion concerning the authenticity of this
9





1. Al-Raqqa, one of the chief cities of upper Mesopotamia
commanding the Syrian frontier, is located on the bank
of-the Euphrates. Le Strange, pp. 101-103.
2..Tab., Ill, 1578; Kamil, VII, 57.
•
»
3. Shortly after the end Of the war the Caliph al-Mu 'tazz
4 •
%
bestowed his favour on this governor and extended his
9 •
9
authority over the other parts of the Sawad. Tab., Ill,
. 1656.
9






of Baghdad was considered of greater importance than that
0
9




extend his influence over the other regions as well. The
| %
Caliph had also sought support from the Tahirids in Khurasan
*
4
in suppressing the power of the Turkish officers. Troops
I
. were sent by the governor of Khurasan to the capital, but,
•
.
unable to enter Samarra, they had been diverted to Baghdad.^
The leader of this military band, Sulaymin b. 'Abd Allah b.
4
Ifahir became the commander of the garrison of Baghdad sahib
-2 - -
al-shurta fi Baghdad. 'Ubayd Allah and Sulayman expressed
their loyalty to the 'Abbasids by quelling all disturbances
4
both within Baghdad and throughout the Sawad.
4
As soon as al-Muhtadl was elevated to the throne, a riot•
4
3
broke out in Baghdad and Abu Ahmad b. al-Mutawakkil, who was
4
in exile in the city, was detained in the house of
Sulayman b. Tihir,^ though it is not clear from the sources
why this was done. It may be that he intended to nominate
0
9
him as successor to his brother, al-Mu'tazz; but against
9
this must be weighed the fact that no proclamation of his
right of accession was made eiren to the people of Baghdad
r
9
who strongly supported him. It is equally probable that
Sulayman may have received a secret message from the nexir
v
Caliph asking him to keep under observation this senior
•
•
'Abbasid dignitary who could be considered as the most
1. Yaqubi, III, 185.
2.. Tab., Ill, 1706.
3. Tab., Ill, I7H4.-I5.




remained loyal to al-Muhtadi and enjoyed his confidence,
«
%








favour,- the Caliph sent him more robes of honour than had
been sent to 'Ubayd Allah b. 'Abd Allah b. Tahir.^ Apart
ft
from this incident we have no information concerning the
9
attitude of the prefect of Baghdad during the short reign of
a
this Caliph, nor was this to become clear even during the
4
ft
Caliph's final confrontation with the Turks.
It is permissible to infer that both the Caliphs and
the governors of Baghdad seem to have been content with
ft
41
their mutual relationship. The Caliphs did not intend.
9
ft
to deprive them of their privileges and they, in turn, had
no desire to enlarge their powers at their masters' expense.
The authority of the governors of Baghdad continued to be
ft
derived from the Caliph, except during the second siege of
ft
« ft
the city. It was valuable to maintain the Tahirids in Baghdad
s
ft
where they could use their influence on certain elements of
s
the 'Abblsid troops stationed there who regarded them as a
s
4
source of stability in the oonfused circumstances of the times.
|
ft
The Tahirids saw the advantage of remaining aloof from the
r
struggles going on in Samarra, and the benefits of this policy
9
J
may be seen in the fact that the Turks did not take control
of Baghdad even when they were presented with the opportunity
« r
ft
to do so during the riot which the supporters of the Tahirids
ft




1. Tab., Ill, 1715, I725-3I4-.




2. Al-Anbar and al-Mada'in.
These two towns were within the jurisdiction of
♦ ft
✓
Baghdad, administered either directly by the governor of
0
the latter or by his agent. Attempts were made to have
• • •
• •









eventually they were returned to their former position.'
•l
Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah had sent Najubat b. Qays, one
ft *
of his military leaders, with contingents of the A'rab to
ft
fight the revolt in al-Anbar, ordering him to remain stationed
ft
in the area after quelling the riot. Meanwhile, he also
ft
dispatched Abu al-Saj to al-Mada'in to suppress the revolt
ft
p
there and win this city over to the side of Baghdad. The
ft
4
authorities in Samarra T\rere observing the situation in these
ft
ft
two cities very carefully, being anxious not to lose their
ft
former influence, especially over al-Anbar because of its
0








life of Baghdad; for the main imports of the city from the
ft
western provinces and the north had to pass through this area.
By controlling al-Anbar, Samarra would feel a sense
ft
of.security and mastery over the situation, enabling her to
impose her own terms on Baghdad. Therefore, al-Mu'tazz
ft
ft
1. Al-Mada'in, a medieval town or rather a group of towns in
Iraq (Babylonia) about twenty miles south east of Baghdad
ft
lying on either side of the Tigris in two almost equal
portions. EI-*-, s.v. Al-Mada'in; Le Strange, pp. 33~35,
67, 190,-22lj..
ft






took/advantage of the circumstances in the city and sent a
military expedition to take charge. . When Najubat heard
ft %
0
about these manoeuvres, he broke the dikes of the Euphrates
ft
ft
allowing the water to flow into the ditch around the city
• • •




plain. At the same time he sent a message to Muhammad b.
ft
ft
Tahir asking him to send reinforcements. The army of
Samarra, which was marching towards the area, clashed with
ft
ft
these troops which were coming from Baghdad to reinforce
Najubat*s position in Anbar, and defeated them."'" As soon
ft
ft ft
as Najubat learned of this, he destroyed the bridge leading
into the most exposed part of the city so as to prevent it
from being entered by the Saraarran troops. But despite
these apparent preparations for resistance, he did not risk
ft
ft
an encounter with the enemy; instead, he abandoned the city
ft
to the Samarrans and returned to Baghdad. When al-Anbar
2
entered on 23 Jumada I 251/8 June 865, the inhabitants were
given an assurance of protection and ordered to open'their
shops and continue with their daily business once again.^
ft »
ft
This event was advantageous for both the citizens as well
as the Samarrans, because two days later.a number of ships
arrived in the city from al-Raqqa carrying flour, oil and
0
ft
other necessary materials which were of great importance in
alleviating the critical economic situation.^",
»
0
1. Tab., Ill, 1601; Kamil, VII, 101; Ibar, III, 288.
ft
2. Tab., Ill, 1601-2; Kamil. VII, IOI-3.
3. Tab., Ill, 1601).; Kamil, VII, 102; Ibar, III, 288-9.
ft
ij.. Tab., Ill, 160^-5; Kamil, VII, 102.
238
Al-Anbar then became the strategic point from which
*
could be launched activities against other towns which lay
4
%
on the route of advance towards Baghdad. . When Abu Nasr b.
%
Bugha, the military commander of the troops of Samarra,
*
took over the administration of al-Anbar he coerced the




Ramadan 25l/0ct his troops defeated the
forces of Abu al-Saj who had been dispatched from Mada'in
ft
to stop the advance of the Samarran troops, and forced them
• *
to retreat back to the city. Muhammad b. Takir sent another
ft
contingent to reinforce Abu al Saj, hoping to save Mada'in
ft




The Turkish troops defeated these new forces too., and,
finally, entered the city itself.
1
%
The loss to Baghdad of these two cities was not to last
very long. As soon as the peace settlement between Baghdad





restore his power over them; he again appointed Abu al-Saj
as his agent in the ma
t - Furit. and this time the






and taking the administration into his own hands.
2
1. Tab., VI, 162Ii.-5; Kamil, VII, 101].






Located on the fringe of the desert, Kufa was
A »
important because of the role it played in the,early history
6
%
of the expansions and the prestige this attached to it as one
4 4
of the first capital cities of the Muslims.^ The city had
remained quiet during the short reign of al-Muntasir and the
•
c
first two years of his successor, al-Musta'in, but in 250/86!^
the .'Alid Abu al-Husayn Yahyi b. 'Umar b. al-Husayn b. ZayV'd
b. 'All b. al-Husayn b. 'All b. Abl Talib led a revolt against
*
the 'Abbasid dynasty, proclaiming his own right to the
Caliphate. Economic factors seem to have been the main
' »
9
reasons behind the move,3 and because he failed to get the
money he needed, he moved from Samarra to Kufa^- where he
probably expected to find greater support for his cause. He
1. Yaqut, Buldan, IV ,. 322-7.
2. Cf. Mu.ru,j, VII, 33O, where al-Mas 'udl states that the first
appearance of Yahya b. 'All was in 2i|.8/862.
3. Yahya had been in economic difficulties during the reign of
al-Mutawakkil, and when he went to Samarra to inform 'Umar
I
b. Faraj, the official responsible for the affairs of the
Talibids, instead of receiving help he was put in prison
where he remained until the first year of al-Musta'In's
reign. He was then released on the intercession of his
family.' He moved to Baghdad, then returned to Samarra
where he approached Waslf and informed him of his poverty
and the oppression which he had suffered, only to receive
abuse, and dismissal with the words "What sort of things
can be given to a man like you?" (meaning to a disloyal man
Tab., Ill, 1516; Miskawayh, VI, 567; TBN, fol. 10'Oa;
cf. Yaqubi, III, 182.
.4. In Maqatil, p. 639, Isfahani states that after his failure
in getting the money he moved to Baghdad where he stayed
for a certain length of time. He then moved to Kufa and
J
started campaigning for the ricja min al Muhammad.
2l±0
0
attracted supporters both from the city and the surrounding
area, especially from among the A'rab, who were resentful
#
of the superiority which had been usurped by the Turks.
These A'rabs seem to have formed the main body of his
1
adherents. H.A.R. Gibb understands this to have been
a Shi'ite insurrection: "After the civil war between al-
* «
Amin and al-Ma'mun, a shi'ite rebellion in Kufa in 815 found
general support among the bedouins of northern Arabia and
V
the desert, fringes of Iraq. Prom then onwards bedouin move-
« «
*










The governor of Kufa, Ayyub b. al-Hasan b. Musa al-
• •
HashimI, intimidated by the growing strength of' Yahya, left
the city and camped with his forces on its outskirts, allowing
• *
.Yahya to enter it without encountering any opposition. He
9
9
immediately confiscated the bayt al-raal ^and after expelling
4
all the employees of the Caliph, brought Kufa under his own
1. Tab., Ill, 1516-71 Miskawayh, VI, 568; Munta2am, XII, 13a
I
2. H.A.R. Gibb, "The Caliphate and the Arab States", A History
of the Crusades, I, 83.
$
>
3. The amount of money in the bayt al-mal is believed to have
been two thousand dinar and seventy thousand dirham, in
addition to other valuables. Tab., Ill, 1517; Ibn
Junghul, III, 279a; cf. Yaqubi, III, 182; Maqatil,
0
p. 6l|.0: I?fahini adds that Yahya forced the money dealers
«
9





control. In order to gain more support from the' inhabitants
4 •
4
of the city, the two prisons were opened and all the
✓
prisoners set' free. When Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah b..Tahir
*
r
heard of all this, he ordered'his agent in the.. Sawad, 'Abd
• *
Allah b. Mahmud al-Sarakhsi to join Ayyub and crush this
.1 -
insurrection. In an-early engagement, Yafctya defeated
„ 6
and routed the forces of 'Abd Allih b. Mahmud, taking as booty
*2
all the materials abandoned by the latter.
♦ 1 •
9
The success of Yahya led another 'Alid pretender to
4
join the revolt,3 and this increased support brought him
A
* *
to a strength which was seen to present an actual danger to
1
4 9




military contingent, under the command of al-IJusayn b.
Isma'il, one of the army leaders of Baghdad, to reinforce
%










of 'Abd al-Rahman b. al-IChattab and forced him to .retreat.
to
Before Husayn b. Isma'il could come to the aid of 'Abd al-
• •
9
Rahman, Yaliya's troops had already entered the city and
5fortified its approaches. Support for Ya^iya continued to
9 ♦
1. Tab., Ill, 1517-8; cf. Maqatil, pp. 61j.0-l. •
2. Tab., Ill, 1518-9; Maqatil, pp.'61j,0-l.
3. A group of Zaydi's joined Yahyi's revolt. Tab., Ill, 1519.
>
ij.. Ibn Tihir designated certain distinguished generals to
to
accompany al-Husayn, among whom was Khalid b. 'Umran, 'Abd
— • v0* —
al-Rahman , b. al-Khattab, known as Wajh al-F'ils, -Abu al-Sana*« 1 1 i«*< — < ti in * \
'al- Ghanawi, 'Abd Allah b. Nasr b. IJamza, Sa'id al-Dababl,
Aljmad b. Muljammad b. al-Paqll, who was one of Isljaq b.
Ibrahim's followers and a group of Khassa of the ibiurasiniyya
Tab., Ill, 1518; Miskawayh, VI, 566-9.
5. Maqatil, pp. 61|.3-lj..
Skz
1
grow and had even reached into Baghdad itself, and it
*








the imperial troops in the neighbourhood of Kufa.
4
Yahya collected his troops and, ill-advisedly, gave
v
battle outside the walls of Kufa to the greatly strengthened
%
9
forces of the Caliph. The defeat he suffered marked the
O
end of his revolt; he himself was captured and slain. The




from the fear and uncertainty it engendered about his own
*
position, and restored Kufa to his authority. Although this
4
uprising failed to achieve its objectives, its example was
4
to teach others to-seek popular support in their opposition
4
to the establishment; and the increasingly parlous state of
the nation at the time encouraged such adventurers to think
4
4
that they could succeed where their predecessors had failed.
4
4
In 251/865-6, about the time the war between Baghdad and
Samarra was coming to an end", another 'Alid uprising took
4 *
place in Kufa under the leadership of al-Husayn b. Muhammad
v





The Caliph al-Musta'in, who in the struggle to retain, his
4
1. Miskawayh, VI, 568, leaves no doubt that he had great
support among the 'Emma of Baghdad.
2. Tab., Ill, 1519. Even al-Musta'In had sent forces under
the command of his Turkish generals. Yaqubi, III, 182;
Tab., Ill, 1523; see also Miskawayh, VI, 570.
4
3. His severed head was sent to Samarra, and later to Baghdad,
S
to be put on public display. In Baghdad this produced a
hostile reaction from the people, one of whom cried out9 ♦
to Ibn Tahir, "What would the Prophet say to this outrage
on his own flesh and blood." Tab., Ill, 1520, 1522-23.
9




throne was in Baghdad at the time, ordered Muzahim b. Khaqan
to march against the rebel. Al-]Jusayn, meanwhile, had
ft
increased his forces with contingents from the tribes, who
ft
saw this as an opportunity to register their own protest .
w «
1
against the Caliph and his Turkish soldiery.




was forced to flee from the city after the murder of several
ft
of his soldiers at the hands of the rebel and his followers,
e




and came under the rule of a new 'Alid pretender. Ibn
Khiqan, who had been sent to reinforce the position of the
ft
governor and to co-operate with him in restoring order,
•
ft
initially had no intention of using force to suppress the
• '
rebellion, but intended, rather, to persuade al-Husayn to
acknowledge the 'Abbasids right to rule.^ This is to be
*
seen from the fact that he sent a delegation to Kufa with
instructions for negotiating a peaceful settlement; but
when no reply was forthcoming he decided to fight the outlaws
ft
and restore 'Abbasid authority in the city.^" Despite the
ft
enthusiastic support given him by the inhabitants of the
ft
1. Tab., Ill, 1617; Kamil, VII, 110; Ibn Kathir, XI, 9.
2. Tab., Ill, 1617-8; Kamil, VII, 110; cf. Maqatil, p. 665.
Isfahan! states that when the rebel felt insecure at the
arrival of Ibn Khaqan he left the city and hid himself
from the enemy.
3. Tab., Ill, 1618.
ft
I4.. In Maqatil, p. 665, Isfahani states that as soon as al-
Husayn learned about this army he left for Samarra and
he reached the capital at the time homage was being paid
to the new Caliph al-Mu'tazz. AI-Husayn too paid his




city/ al-Husayn did not feel equal to continuous battle
with the massive 'Abbasid army; instead, he abandoned the
struggle and fled into hiding, leaving the victory to the
'Abbasids.-1- He was to appear once again in Kufa, leading
. •
another uprising against the Caliph, al-Mu tamid; this too
failed, and he was taken captive and imprisoned (269/882).^
*
In 252/866 an unidentified person from the Talibiyyin
ft
departed from Baghdad with a group of Shakiriyya heading
ft
ft
for Kufa.3 Maqatil, (p. 665) gives his name as Muhammad b.
Ja'far b. al-Husayn, who used to be the deputy of the rebel
*
al-Husayn. Our sources, as usual, remain silent about the
ft
reasons underlying the move, but, judging by subsequent
*
events, it would seem that he was intending to raise an
%
army against the Caliph, who was accused of being unable to
manage the affairs of the Muslims adequately. The rebel
ft
ft
was deceived by a proposal from Ibn Tihir that he should be
given the government of the city; however, when he accepted
this, he itfas easily captured, put in chains and sent to
ft 9
Samarra.^-
During the last years of al-Mu'tazzf reign more trouble
1. After the defeat of the rebels, Muzahim set fire to the'
I
A
two main districts of the city, destroying seven shopping
centres. This badly affected the economic life of the
city. Tab., Ill, 1618. Another (pro-Shi 'ite) account
says that in addition to the above, Muzihim gave orders
to set fire to thousands of houses. Tab., Ill, 1619J
Muntazam, XII, 20a.
2. Maqatil, p. 665; cf. Tab., Ill, 1620.
3. Tab., Ill, I683; Kamil, VII, 118.












of al-Husayn. They murdered the governor of the city and
9
9












they immediately deserted them. Deprived thus of any hope
of success, the two fled into hiding, and Kufa was again




During the short reign of the Caliph al-Muhtadi> 'All
9
b. Zayd b. al-Husayn b. 'Isa b. Zayd b. 'All b. Abl. Talib^
9
led yet another revolt in Kufa which was mainly supported by
9
the 'amma and the A'rab. It was suppressed by an army
♦ft
under the command of al-Shah b. al-Miykal sent by the Caliph,
9
in the course of which 'All b. Zayd lost his life.^+
ft
Three features of these revolts in Kufa are of particular
interest: firstly, all the leaders of the uprisings claimed
ft
to be of 'Alid descent, from which it may be inferred that
such a genealogy would attract support to them in this^region
ft
i .
in which was one of the holy places of the Shi'a. Secondly,
9
.s
a significant part of the support for revolution came from
the A'rab, who may have thought that the Caliphs were not
9
1. They were 'Isa b. Ja'far and 'All b. Zayd. Tab., Ill,
1709j' Muru,j, VII, I4.O2; according to Igfahani, the latter
did not appear until the reign of al-Muhtadi. Maqatil,
PP. 675-76,. 679.
ft
2. Muru,i, VII, p. lj.02.
3. Presumably, he is the same 'All b. Zayd who provoked the
ft
previous revolt, although the latter is- described as a
Husayni and he would obviously be Zaydi.




representing them any more and that the 1
• *
would mean the ultimate end of their own
urkish




hirdly, the fact that the insurrections kept breaking out
shows how disaffected this idea of the Islamic-heart-land
s
had become, and also, how apparent it.was to all that the
Caliphate was sinking into such weakness and impotence
4
that each new venture seemed assured of success.
1. Some of those were probably the A rab who had deserted
Samarra because of the intolerant Turkish policy.
Nu'man Thabit, p. 209.'
l\.. Trie Southern Region of the Sawad and Bahrayn
Apart from trie trouble which had taken place in Basra
ft
and the nearby area during the reign of al-Mu 'tasim,1 this
C
ft
region remained quiet and almost totally aloof from the
m
anarchy which dominated the 'Abbasid Capital. The sources
at our disposal do not throw any light on the type of
%
relationship which existed between Samarra and the region
ft
ft
concerned, but one may presume that this region remained
ft
loyal and obedient to the 'Abbasid regime, regardless of
V
certain opportunists who attempted to isolate this province
from the capital. Basra was of great importance to the
Caliph because it was the only port through which merchandise
*
could pass on its way to the Capital. Therefore anyone who
could bring the city under his command would be able to
ft
o
control the trade route to and from the Muslim Capital,
ft
and for this reason the Caliphs may have attempted to retain
#
their power over this city whatever the cost.
In 21j.9/863 'All b. Muhammad b. Ibrahim"' left Samarra
and headed for Bahrayn where he intended to cause disturbances
There he claimed he was 'All b. Muhammad b. Fa$l b. al-§asan
b. 'Ubayd Allih b. al-'Abbas b. 'All b. Abi Talib.^" This
honourable descent helped him to gather a considerable number
of malcontents round him for use in his own personal cause. ^
1. Yaqubi, III, 163; Tab., Ill, 1166-9.
2. B. Lewis, Arabs in History, pp. 88-9.
3. F. Samir, Thawrat al-Zanj, Baghdad, 1971, pp. 51-6ri» —^>
s.v. 'All b. Muhammad; EI1, s.v. Zandj.
lj..' Tab., Ill, 1714-35 Kamil, VII, llj.0; cf. Ibar, III, 301.
The Bedouins, x-trho had already associated themselves with the




the Turkish supremacy in particular and the 'Abbasid Caliphate
*
in general, felt that joining 'All b. Muhammad was an
*
opportunity not to be missed. ■ At first they succeeded in
winning over the majority of the inhabitants of Bahrayn;
i
but conversely, the increased numbers led to internal conflict
among the citizens themselves because of their divergent
*
opinions concerning the leadership. Consequently a real
■dispute arose amongst the inhabitants of Eajar, the capital
of the region. But those who supported All b. Muhammad
came to consider him as a prophet; they collected the
kharaj for him and carried out his orders indiscriminately.^
Despite the differences of opinion among the citizensof
Bahrayn and the trouble which occurred in Hajar, they all
z i
stood firm in the face of the Caliph's army which was sent
to suppress this anti-'Abbasid uprising. Eventually the
? 4
Caliph's troops succeeded in gaining control in Hajar while
the rebel and his supporters fled to a nearby place in the
%
desert.3
It is beyond the scope of this study to go into detail
about the nature of this revolt but it is probable that this
adventurer at first used his fAlid descent as a means to
gain power in order to challenge the 'Abbasid dynasty itself
and later he probably found that the easiest way to succeed
1. Yaqut, Buidan, IV, 953J of. P. Samir, pp. 56~57-
2. Tab., Ill, 17li-3; Kamil, VII, ll).0; Ibn Kathir, XI, 18.
3. Tab., Ill, 17I4J+; Ibar, III, 302. ..
249
*
in a rural society such as Bahrayn was to stress his 'Alid
*
4*
genealogy. At first he succeeded in doing so but later he
ft





was__revealed that his claim was false and that he was using
1
it solely for his own political goals. One must not over¬
look the fact that shortly after he started his military
activities against the 'Abbisids in the southern part of the
Sawid, he was completely successful in winning the support
*
of the black slaves who worked as peasants in the saltpetre-
producing area. For this reason he became potentially very
dangerous to the Caliph who took immediate steps to suppress
this revolt, but which took the 'Abbasid dynasty nearly
%
ft
fifteen years to accomplish (255-270/869-884/5).
|
After his defeat in Hajar 'All b. Muhammad moved from.
place to place and eventually travelled towards Basra where
he stayed with the tribe of Banu Zabi'a among whom he won •
many supporters. In 254/867-8 he took advantage of the
unstable situation in the city, which had deteriorated with
the continuous fighting between the two tribal groups, i.e.
Hilaliyya and Sa'diyya, and sent a delegation of four men
to persuade one of the parties to support him. When his
4
ft
men informed the citizens of Basra of his intentions and
%
ft
asked them to join their leader 'All b. Muhammad against
the 'Abbasid rulers, nobody accepted the proposition. The
.iund of the city, who had been informed of this delegation,
attempted to have the four men imprisoned but they failed to
1. Tab., Ill, 1745; Ibar, III, 302-3; cf. F. Samir, p. 58.
250
ft




back to their leader, he, with the rest of his sympathisers,
ft
ft »
left the city seeking a secure and suitable region from
which to conduct his anti- 'Abbasid campaign.^ . The governor
of the city, however, had severely punished those citizens'
• • t
of Basra whose inclinations tended towards the rebels, and
✓
finally a considerable number of them were imprisoned.
ft
Unlike the rebel in Kufa this adventurer was not
encouraged by the citizens of Basra, who remained loyal and
%
%
faithful to the central government despite its obvious weak-
✓




unlike the inhabitants of Hajar who had praised and enthus-
ft
ft
iastically encouraged 'All b. Muhammad to oppose the 'Abbasids
ft ft
ft
On the contrary, the inhabitants of Basra seem to have had
ft
more of a desire to suppress this revolt than did the
ft
ft
official forces. 'All b. .Muhammad found no refuge in
Basra and therefore left the place in secret. Later he
ft
was discovered and captured by the . 'Abbasid troops and taken
to Wasit where he was imprisoned. But 'All b. Muhammad




The number of his followers in the southern part of the
ft
ft
Sawad had increased rapidly; therefore after staying almost
ft
c
a year in Baghdad he returned to the former region and,
ft
V
immediately after his arrival, the governor of Ubulla^ was
*
1. Tab., Ill, 171|5 ff.; Ibar, III, 302; Ibn Kathir, XI, 19;
p. Samir, pp. 57-58-
2. Tab., III,17I|.9; Kam il, VII, 139; Ibn Kathir, XI, 3*
■ »
3« Ubulla was an unhealthy town which lay on the estuary
on the north side of its canal. The Muslims built
ft








forced to move out of the city and leave it at the mercy
.
9
of 'All b. Muhammad.1
.
*
Shortly after, the troops who were stationed in Ubulla
•
•









insurgent's army of slaves to increase their military
campaigns in order to bring the whole region under their
control, so that they would be able to threaten the position
| ♦
of the Caliph and appropriate the whole of the property.
6
belonging to the state. Immediately after, they marched




their leader, who intended to spread fear and panic among
#
the inhabitants of the area so that they would follow him.^"
4
But the citizens of Basra who had remained loyal.to
• |
the 'Abbasid Caliphs had raised an army against the rebels
who threatened the life of the city; but their forces met
their match in the strength of their rebel opponents..^
9
The defeat of the troops of Basra not only threatened the
Contd.] Ubulla'and made it their headquarters. Ubulla
was the main part of the Sawad, during our period of
study, as well as the biggest town after Basra. Yaqut,
Buldan, I, 96-98; P. Samir, p. 106. .
1. Tab., Ill, 1751-2.
2. Kamil,. VII, 1[|_3.
3. Qadisiyya is probably a small village near Basra because
our sources mention only the QadisiyyaC of Kufa. Yaqut,
9
Buldan, IV, 7-10. They also mention the Qadisiyya of
Tigris. Le Strange, pp. 50-52.
• ij.. Tab., Ill, 1753. '
r A









life of the city itself, but also the position of the
*
'Abbasids in both the Capital and the surrounding region as
ft
well. On the other hand, it did not mean the end of the





them to stand firm against the rebels* ambitions and to




this second army was not in a position to quell the uprising,
ft
ft
and at the'first confrontation with the enemy they suffered
ft






This victory was of great importance to the rebels,
giving them the chance to advance towards Basra itself.
*
< |
On their way to Basra they plundered and set fire to the
scattered villages in the area and while they were still
ft
A
pursuing their barbarous course they met with an army sent
« • "
from the capital under the leadership of Abu Hilal al-Turkl
ft
ft
which, however, also failed to achieve any lasting improve-
ment in the confused situation which obtained in that
region. The Caliph, al-Muhtadi, realized the dangerous
implications of this revolt and as soon as he heard about .




troops to reinforce the Caliphal army in the area. But
.
these forces met a similar fate during their first bout of
ft
fighting with the rebels. Thus the rebels' achievements
ft
.encouraged them to set up their own command in the area and
ft
ft
_ _ ^ * _
1. Kamil, VII, lLj-3-lj.. '
ft
2. It is reported that hundreds of soldiers were put to death
ft
and a few hundred more were captured and later murdered at
ft ft
the command of 'All b. Muhammad. Tab., Ill, 1765j
Kamil, VII, ll^Lj..





to disrupt the life of the capital, Samarra, by cutting the
♦
.
lines of communication between it and Basra, which was
ft
ft
still outside 'Ali b. Muhammad's command. 'All b. Muhammad
• •
exerted his power in the region to such an extent that in
ft
2.55/868-9 he even questioned the people returning from their
ft
pilgrimage as to whether they carried with them any sort of
merchandise-for the Caliph or not.^" Thus 'All b. Muhammad
• •
continued his policy of aggression against the villages and
i
the various settlements in the area of marshes, which enabled
ft
him to strengthen his position as. well as assisting him in
2





other hand, his military actions provoked the anger and
hatred of the citizens of Basra. Therefore they once again
ft
decided to confront his forces, in an attempt to put an end
ft
ft
to the disturbances in the southern part of the Sawad.
A
ft
Despite the. new forces which were sent against him, the
adventurer was in a position to win the battle and continued
ft
his advance toward the city itself. However, his attempted
takeover of the city failed and his army suffered heavy








The people of Basra x^rere heartened by this victory and
'
i
on 11+ Dhu al-Qi'da 255/21+ October 869, they mobilized their
» «
forces in an effort to achieve a decisive victory once and




1. Tab., Ill, 1768; Ibn Kathir, XI, 19.
ft
2. Tab., Ill, 1769 ft.
ft




campaigns in the region. Although this was the accepted
policy of the city, frustration and panic set in among the
inhabitants because of the well-organized military assaults
made by the Rebels on the surrounding area."'" They came to
0
realise that they were not in a position to win the i^arj
therefore they sent a delegation to Samarra asking for rein¬
forcements. As soon as the Caliph learned of the unstable
ft
0
situation in the southern part of the Saxrad he sent an army
4
0
under the command of Ju'lan al-Turkl. At the same time he
ft
4
appointed one of his'own men as governor of Ubulla in order
to secure and reinforce the position of his troops. The
*
army which marched towards the area was followed by several
P
regiments as rearguard support. The Caliph's troops failed
ft
to win the battle because of their ignorance of the nature
*
v
of the battlefield. The troops were comprised mostly of
horsemen which made it difficult to fight in an area covered
0
by hundreds of canals.^
0
- Shortly after their victory over the imperial troops,
the rebels captured and confiscated the cargoes of twenty-
0
m
four ships which had come to Basra from various parts of
the world carrying several kinds of valuable materials for
the Capital.^" The easy acquisition of these spoils to-
ft




1. Tab., Ill, 1779-80.
2. Tab., Ill, 1783-6.
3. Tab., Ill, 1786; Kamil, VII, I63; P. Simir believes that
the weakness of Ju'lan was the main reason for this defeat.
P. Samir, p.. 105.
ij.. Tab., Ill, I83I4..
4
%
encouraged the rebels to achieve further victories, and on
9
22 Rajab 256/16 June 870, while the Caliph, al-Muhtadi, was
engaged in his struggle with the Turkish mercenaries, the
♦ ♦
adventurer's army marched on Ubulla, entered it and set
*
— — 1
fire to it. When the citizens of 'Abbadan heard about his
4
♦
brutal assault on Ubulla and the defeat of the Caliph's army,
» < f
they immediately recognized his supremacy and guaranteed the
o
rebel their loyalty and obedience. Prom Ubulla he advanced
towards al-Ahwaz^ and after only a few clashes with the small
contingent from the city he entered it and captured the
governor.^- In 257/870-1 'All b. Muhammad and his troops
%




By the time of the Caliph al-Mu 'tamid's reign, 'All b.
^ f
Muhammad had become intensely dangerous and a threat to the
1. The town of 'Abbadan was on the seaboard on one side and
Sulaymanan at the other on the Dujayl estuary. 'Abbadan
still exists but now lies up the estuary more than twenty
miles from the present coastline of the Gulf. It was
inhabited by mat-weavers who used the Haifa grass of the
island for their trade; and there were great guard houses
%
round the town for the protection of the southern part of
the estuary. Yaqut, Buldan, III, .597-8; Le Strange,
pp. lj.8-9.
2. Tab., Ill, 1837.
■
3.. Al-Ahwaz is a town situated on the Karun river where it cuts
through a low sandstone ridge (on the Khuzistan plain).
Ahwaz continued to prosper under the Umayyad and 'Abbasids
and it was the centre of extensive sugar plantations, but
the serious Zanj rebellion caused a decline towards the
close of the 3rd/9th Century. Yaqut, Buldan, I, lpLO-llj.;
EI^, s.v. Al-Ahwaz.
k. Tab., Ill, 1837-8.-




whole Empire because of his strategic position and the number
of fighters who had joined him. Therefore., the Caliph
# 0













of the Sawad seems to have remained faithful to the Caliphs
despite its weak position. Meanwhile, 'All b, Muhammad
« 4
failed several times to win the inhabitants of the city over
• • '
4
to his cause even after their final defeat in 257/870. The
4
Caliphs, who were involved in their struggle to maintain
0 0
0




had sent several contingents of troops to the area in order
0
4
to suppress the revolt and restore security and safety to
4
4
the region. Although 'All b. Muhammad had gained the support
e
of the peasants in.the area, because they hoped to improve
9
• 0




achieve the ultimate object of his ambitious plans, to bring
✓









This region is of great importance in the history of
the 'Abbasid Caliphate not only because of its agricultural
production but also because of its strategic position on
. M *
1
the main trade routes. The area had recently been involved
in many political and military manoeuvres which even
threatened the authority of the Caliphs in Baghdad. Most
2
of these revolts occurred under the Kharijite adventurers.
i
During the reign of al-Wathiq the region once again became
unsettled and it is reported that Muhammad b. 'Amr al-
ft
Shaybani led a revolt in Diyar Rabi'a,^ advancing from there
to Mawsil where he was defeated and taken prisoner to Samarra
before being put to death.
This defeat did not mean the end of the trouble in the




campaigns directed against.the central government. The
deterioration of the situation in the capital had for some
time been an open invitation to adventurers to show their




2ij.8/861-2, during the short reigi of al-Muntasir, Muhammad
• '
b. 'Uraar al-Kharijl brought the area around Maxtfsil under his
own authority. He not only succeeded in conquering the
land but also in gaining for his cause the sympathy and support
.1. Yaqubi, III, 118-9; Tab., Ill, 631, 638, 6i).9| Azdi,
pp. 279-80, 299.
2. B. Lewis, Arabs in History, p. 88.
3. EI^, s.v. Diyar Rabl'aj Le Strange, pp. 101-8.






of the inhabitants. His successful political and military
♦
activities, however, seriously threatened the economic and
political situation in the capital. Therefore, as soon as
the Caliph heard about this revolt he sent an army under
s
»
the leadership of Ishaq b. Thibit al-Farghani to stem the
• ft
ft
trouble. Ishaq, however, succeeded in suppressing this up-
*
P —




mentions more trouble which broke out in the vicinity of
I
Mawsil and Bawazij^ at the instigation of Abu al- 'Amud al-
ft
Shari who retained some power over the region for a short
while. His manoeuvres seem to have proved very dangerous
ft
to the Caliph of Samarra, because al-Sharl had already gained
• »
ft
the support of a considerable number of Kurds as well as the
4
tribe of Rabi'a.^" Al-Muntasir ordered Sima al-Turkx to
t
lead the Caliphal army against this rebel and despite the
ft
strategic position of the anti-government forces, the Caliph's
ft




being, to the trouble in the region.^
ft
\
1. Dhahabj., Tarikh, XIII, 36a.
2. Tab., Ill, 1500; Muntazam, VII, 2a; Nu.jum, II, 326. It
is noteworthy that Ibn al-Athir who is' our main source of
information about this region does not make any reference
to this revolt: Kamil, VII, 66-76.
3. Bawazlj: a place near Tikrit located on the River Zab.
Yaqut, Buldan, I, 750.
Muruj, VII, 307.
5. Muru,j, VII, 307-8; Yaqubi, III, 180, considers that this
revolt took place during the beginning of the reign of al-
• Musta'in who sent Mankajur al-Farghani to suppress it,

















Within the limitations imposed, by the material
s








were nomadic or tribal individuals of the area, supported at




Tribal revolt may have been activated at this particular time
4
because of the domination by the Turks in governmental affairs
*
which-may in one way or another have affected the authority
» •
of the nomadic Arabs who preferred to see their fellow country
9





remained loyal to them. The Caliphs on the other hand re-
>
garded these military activities as a highly dangerous threat
to their position; therefore they took immediate steps to
4 9
crush any trouble as soon as it came to their notice.
4
The inhabitants of the region of Jazira appear, from
■*>
the series of accounts, as was the case with Kufa, to have
supported the local adventurers in taking over the command
4




force against the citizens themselves. But in Basra it
9
s
was evident that the people here were the main combatants
» 4
against the rebels in the area and it was the people who
took the initiative in opposing any attempt to separate their
J ' •
ft




The weak position of the Caliphs in Samarra and their
involvement in the internal struggle for power amongst the
% 9 %
%




Turkish officers, had offered many opportunities to the
various adventurers to exploit the political situation and
260
ft
attempt to exert their power over these regions. Moreover, .
these opportunists took advantage of the existing political
and ideological factions and used them as a: means of gaining-
ft
many supporters to their cause. For example, in Jazlra
ft
and its provinces, although personal ambition was the main
ft
reason for the uprising, it took the shape of the Kharijite
•I
movement. It is beyond the scope of this study to go into
|




an account would detract from the real object of this thesis,
namely to ascertain the attitude of the central government
ft
ft ft
towards the revolts in the various provinces. By so doing
it is hoped that a true assessment of the situation of the
i
'Abbasid Caliphate will result.
ft
ft
In Rajab 252/August 866, Musawir b. 'Abd al -Hamid al-Sharl
ft
led a. campaign from his headquarters in Bawizij against the
U
commander of the garrison, sahib al-shurta of Mawsil because
of the latter's seduction of Musawir's son who was in his
P
prison. Although the contemporary and near-contemporary
ft
*
historians do not provide us with enough information concern-
ft
ft
ing the reason for this revolt, the one mentioned above may
ft
■ contain an element of truth. However, there may have been
ft
other causes behind the conflict between sahib al-shurta and
e ft ft
4 *
Musawir connected with the struggle for power between the two
, •
of them.^ Musawir moved to Hadltha^ where the sahib al-shurta
ft
1. Kamil, VII, 117; Ibar, III, 292.
2. Kamil, VII, 117? Ibar, III, 292. It was reported that
ft
Musawir's son had secretly informed his father about the
. behaviour of the sahib al-shurta;
■3. Cf. S.F. Musili, Ta'rlkh al-Musil, I, Misr, 1923, 79;
Zarkall, al-A'lam, VIII, 105. '
I4.. Haditha: A small town located on the eastern bank of the






was living. As soon as the latter heard about Musawir's
I
advance towards the city he went into hiding. This enabled
Musawir to enter the town unresisted and free his son. This
4
4
easy victory strengthened the rebel1s position and encouraged
other citizens in the vicinity to join him against the rulers
of Samarra. This shows that the rebel's intention was not
merely to set his son free or to gain revenge on the wrong-
*
L
doing of sihib al-shurta but also to extent his authority
over the area and to threaten the 'Abbasid Caliphs. A
4
considerable number of A'rab; and Kurds joined forces with
this rebel and enthusiastically encouraged him to further
4
MM
action against the 'Abbasids. Thereafter he became in-
creasingly powerful and advanced towards Mawsil but failed to
enter the city because of its inaccessible fortifications.
On the other hand, Musawir did succeed in bringing the area
4
round the city under his own control. The Caliph, ai-Mu'tazz,
4
upon hearing the news of this assault, sent an army from
#
Saraarra to suppress it. As soon as Musawir came to hear
of this he left the area and went to Bawazlj, which he
4
thought was in a more strategic position than the nearby town,
4




In 253/866-7 he met and beat the Caliph's army which
• •
was forced to retreat after sustaining heavy losses.This
4
encouraged the adventurer and his supporters to advance through
4
4
1. Tab., Ill, 1689-90j Kamil. VII, 120-1; Ibn Kathir, XI,
. 12j Ibar, III, 292; Ibn Junghul, III, 263b., 28[|.a. It
is worth mentioning that Yaqubi, III, I85 gives a different
4
account of the beginning of this revolt.- He states that
4
Musawir' started his revolt in Diyar RabI 'a from where he








that he would eventually be in a position to conquer Samarra.
_ n
He reached Jalawla' where he met more troops, once again
sent by the Caliph himself but this force too met with the
same fate as its predecessors and failed to achieve even- the
4
4
least of its objectives, to stop the rebel forces advancing
>
%
towards Samarra.^ From here the rebel and his followers
marched towards Hulwan^ where they met with.strong opposition
9




25^/September 868 the Caliph sent another army against Musawir
which also failed to suppress this revolt.-^ Musawir became
the main power in the vicinity of. the Jazxra and brought
nearly all the surrounding area under his authority.
Immediately after this victory and with the ever weakening
4
9
position of the Caliph's forces, Musawir decided to invade
9
1. Jalawla': a town located on the commercial route to
W
Khurasan and only a distance of seven farsakh between
%
Jalawla' and Khanaqin. Jalawla* is one of the Tusuj
of the Sawad. Yaqut, Buldan, II, 107.
2. Tab., Ill, 169/4-; Kamil, VII, 12lj.; Ibar, III, 292.
3. Hulwan: a city on the border between Iraq and the
district of Jibal and on the bprder of the Sawad region.
It was one of the six big cities in the Sawad after Kufa,
Ba§ra, Wisit, Baghdad, Samarra and Hulwan. It was favoured
for its agricultural products especially figs. Yaqut,
Buldan, II, 316-21.
[(.. Tab., Ill, 1690-91; Ibn Kathir, XI, 12; cf. Kamil, VII>
12l±-25> where Ibn al-Athxr refers to a civil war in Mawsil
between the governor and the tribal elements.
'
•


















governor of the city 'Abd Allah b. Sulayman who had learnt
ft
about this campaign which was directed against him, had
9
•s
already mobilized his forces to meet this concerted challenge
ft
to his supremacy. In Jumada I 255/April-May 869, fighting
ft
broke out between the two armies which ended in a severe
T
defeat for the government forces. The victory of Musawir
spread fear and panic among the inhabitants of the region who
ft
felt that the easiest way to gain security for themselves was
to associate their cause with that of the rebel leader. There-
• '
fore, many of them joined the revolt, thus increasing its
ft
power and influence at the expense of the Caliph's authority.
• ft
Ibn al-Athir continues his account of the fighting and states
that during the same year, i.e. 255/869* Musiwir entered
p
Mawsil. The main reason for this victory was the cowardice
ft 4
* ft
of the ruler himself in facing the enemy because the citizens
ft
ft
of the city, in the words of Ibn al-Athir, had dissociated
ft
ft
themselves from him and inclined towards a policy of separation
from Samarra.3 It is surprising that Musawir did not make
ft ft
Mawsil his headquarters and Ibn al-Athir considers this was
due to the very crowded atmosphere in the city.^" But it
4
seems that this is not necessarily the main reason which led
ft
1. Kamil, VII, 127. Al-Tabarl presents different accounts
stating that in 255/867 there was fighting between the
Caliph's forces under the command of Yarjukh who was
ft ft
forced," under heavy pressure from the enemy, to retreat
to Samarra. Tab., Ill, 1706.
2. Kamil, VII, 139.
3. Kamil, VII, 139.
Ij.. Kamil, VII, 139.
26LJ.
him to desert the city and to take Haditha as his centre of.
activityj it may be that Musawir had no confidence in the
citizens and to avoid any possible clashes with them he
s ♦
moved to another nearby area.
Al-Ya 'qubl states that as soon as Musawir had gained
control of Mawsil, he turned his attention to Samarra. He
led his army down towards the Capital and camped at a
I
distance of three farsakh^ from it. The Caliph al-Mu'tazz
4
4
realized the dangers threatening his position and regularly
sent forces to try and. remove them from his Capital but his
forces failed to achieve any significant victory, while in
2
contrast the power of his adversary was rapidly increasing,
•
«
The separation of Mawsil from Samarra had an adverse
♦ *
effect on the latter and as it was described in al-Mas 'udl's
t
words, "Musawir al-Sharl.became more powerful (to the extent
*
of threatening the whole Empire) as he approached the Capital
4
with his forces.' Oppression and hunger were frequent
« ^ •
problems there because he cut off the supplies of merchandise."
4
% 1
He added that the A-'rab". took, advantage of these circumstances
%
*
to start their own activities, against the 'Abbasids. More-
s
over, al-Mas'udx considers this the main reason which led
the Caliph al-Muhtadl to send his army in an attempt to
suppress the revolt.3 Ibn al-Athir's view confirms al-Masfudl®
1. Al-farsakh: A distance of three miles or 5760 metres. See
m
Ahmad Rl;£a, Matin al-Lugha, IV, Beirut, 1377/1958, 386.
2. Yaqubi, III, 185-6.
4
3. Muru.j, VIII, 8. Al-Mas'udl, also, considers this the main
reason which led the Caliph al-Muhtadi to send his troops.
265
description of the situation as he wrote, "He (Musiwir)
stopped sending goods (amwal; to the Caliph which made it
difficult for the soldiers in Samarra to recdve their
regular salaries in the normal way.'^
ft
Musawir, however, began to extent his authority arid in
Dhu al-Qi'da 255A appointed one of his
followers as vice-regent over certain regions already
come under his control. 2
A
It must be remembered that his
authority was gained at the exp of the Caliph who failed
to achieve any military victory over the rebel mainly because
ft
of the weak position of the Caliphate at the time. On
other hand there was no mention of new military campaigns on
the part of Musawir at the.very beginning of al-Muhtadi's
ign, as he did not start his subversive activities unt
256/870 the end of this Caliph's ign The
latter, despite his involvement in the internal troubles in
ft
the capital, sent an army from Samarra under the command of
Musa b. Bugha, Baykabak and Muflih to suppress this revolt. 3
Al-Tabarl states that the Caliph's order came as a result of
the burning of the town of Balad near Mawsil by the rebel
k
ft
Although the Caliph's army had succeeded in
ft
*
altering the balance of power in the area in his favour, he
ft
failed to achieve his ultimate objectives.^ This so-called
1. Kami, 156.
2. Tab., Ill, 1736
1. Ibn al-Athir so
*
of other troops, sent, earlier, by the
Caliph, which suffered heavy casualties and were forced
to retreat. Kamil, VII, lJLj.7-
i+. Tab., Illi 1808.










removed the dangers which were strangling his capital and
boosted the morale of his soldiers. But ..as soon as the
Q ,




opportunity once more to regain control over almost all the
ft
territories he had formerly occupied. He still collected
4
for himself the revenues from the provinces' under his
I ' 4
"1
authority even during the time of the Caliph al~Mu'taraid.
ft
✓
In this way he continued his activities during the reign of
ft
this Caliph and his successors until eventually in 293/905
Jazira and Mawsil became dynasties semi-independent from the
ft *
2
Caliphate under the Haradanids.
•
•
Prom this short and general survey of the prevailing
4




it is clear that continuous trouble dominated the region
ft
and was encouraged by the weak position of the Caliphs who
9
were involved in the struggle for power both among themselves
and between the 'Abbasids and the foreign mercenaries. The
ft
leader of the revolt in Jazira was supported and encouraged
by the citizens of the region who were anxious to see it
separated from the Capital. This may have meant that the




will but, rather, reflected the desires of certain Turkish
*
officers. The Caliphs as well as the Turkish officers
realized the threat to their power posed by such revolts;
ft




1. Kamil, VII, 156-7-
2. EI^, s.v. Hamdanids. .
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Caliphs adopted a very hard line in suppressing the revolts
By and large, the main sour of combatants in this
revolt were the nomadic groups of people who probably
I










Syria did not long remain loyal to the 'Abbasid
4
4
Caliphate. As in other provinces several uprisings took
«
| *




or .background dating back to the Uraayyad period. This is
g
s
evident, for example, in the revolt of Tamlm al-Lakham, known
♦
>
as al-Mubarqa', in Palestine during the reign of al-Wathiq.^
But most of these uprisings were a direct consequence of the
4
4
brutal and savage treatment which the inhabitants of the
O







1. Yaqubi, III, 169. He states that this revolt was encouraged
» »
by tribesmen from Lakhara, Judham, 'Amila and Balqin, who
4
. _
advanced together towards Jordan. Ibn Taghri Bardi claims
.that al-Mubarqa' who was proclaiming for the Sifyani,
succeeded in bringing the peasants to his side and made
them his main body of support. He led a revolt in
Palestine during the reign of al-Mu'tasim who, after hearing
of this trouble, immediately sent Raja* al-Ha<jLrami with
forces to suppress it. Raja' was able to quell the
trouble because the peasants were more concerned with their
9
agricultural life which deterred them from joining the
rebelTs troops. Hu.jum, II, 2lj.8-9. Al-Ya'qubl speaks of
another revolt which broke out in Damascus under the command
s
of Ibn Bciyhas al-Kilabl whose main support was many clans
of the tribe of Qays. Yaqubi, III, 169.
2. Subki, Tabaqat al-Shafi 'iyya al-Kubra, II, 5kj- cf. M.K. 'All,
Khutat al-Sham, I, 196. The latter,'who copied Subki,
_ 4
praised the governor Ibrahim b. al-Mahdi for his successful
• •
policy in settling the conflict between the Qaysiyya and
Yamaniyya. But he also criticised al-Mutawakkil for
allowing .the Turkish rulers a free hand in administering
the province, a policy which gave rise to great problems
' 4 0




During the same period, a group of Barbars in Barga,"*" with
A
many supporters from Quraysh, revolted against their
•
•
governor Muhammad b. 'Abdawayh b. Jubila. As soon as the
Caliph al-Withiq learned about the situation in Barga, he
•P
ordered Raja* al-Hadraml, one of his most efficient leaders,
to take command of the Caliphal troops and march first to
t
Damascus to crush the revolt in that oity, and then move
from there to suppress the other revolts in Bilad al-Sham
P
and Bar^a. With the arrival of these troops in the region
v
the balance of power changed in favour of the 'Abbasid
Caliphate and eventually Raja* a1-Ha£rami succeeded, at least
✓
for a short time, in putting an end to the trouble. He
0 I
perhaps managed to achieve the restoration of 'Abbasid
9
authority over the whole of Bilad al-Sham and Barqa.
In 2J4.O/863-614. there was another revolt in #im? directed
•
« •
against the Caliph and his governor in the city. The
*
governor, Musa b. Ibrahim, under pressure from the citizens
of the town, was forced to leave the area which then fell
completely under the rebels command. When the Caliph al-
*
•
Mutawakkil learned about the situation he sent 'Attab b.
'Attab and Muhammad b. 'Abdawayh to put an end to this new
|
trouble in the region. They succeeded in quelling the riot
without using any force at ali and Muhammad was therefore
*
appointed as ruler of the city instead of Musi who had been
i
1. Bar^a according to Yaqut, Buidan, I,\573» was a large
province which contained many towns and villages and it
9
was located between Alexandria and Ifriqiyya. Its
largest city was Antabuls.
%
$











recently expelled from it. The new governor Muhammad b.
'Abdawayh was not in a position to maintain peace and
m
security in the area; therefore in 2I4.I/855 new trouble broke
*
out, directed mainly against him personally. But the ruler
t,
proved his ability and 30und tactics when he overcame this
#
resistance and was thus in a position to rid himself of all
the important leaders in the riot, by sending several of
9
p
them to Samarra where they were put to death.
During the period betx^een the murder of the Caliph ai-
Mutawakkil and al-Mus'ta 'In's rise to pox^er there is little
mention of any new trouble in the region and it seems to have
remained quiet. This was possibly due to the savage and
inhuman policy of the 'Abbasid agents in Syria. It may be
ft •
ft
that there was no new adventurer in the area who could
gather round him the considerable amount of manpower necessary
to challenge the 'Abbasids' authority; so the inhabitants
of Syria, despite the tyrannical policy of the 'Abbasid
» .
governors, remained apparently loyal to the Caliph of Samarra.
Al-Ya^ubl mentions that a revolt broke out in Jordan
*
at the beginning of al-Musta 'In*s reign. The ant i-'Abbasid
1. Yaqubi, III, 177; Tab., Ill, llj.20-1. It is recorded
that the Caliph gave instructions to 'Attab b. 'Attab not
to' enter into war with the citizens of the area but to ask
them if they would accept the proposal of the Caliph which
included the appointment of Muhammad as their governor
instead of Musa. And even if they refused he was not to
initiate a battle with them.
2. Yaqubi, III, 177; of. Tab., Ill, 1J+22—L|_, where he gives a
detailed account of the event stating that even the
9
Christians stood against this tyrannical ruler. The Caliph
immediately sent forces from Damascus and other provinces
to support the governor. After he had succeeded in
crushing the revolt the Caliph rewarded him and his men
with valuable gifts.
271
rioters succeeded in gaining control over the whole of the
%
. . «
area and were able to put down several attempts by the
governor of Palestine to restore the 'Abbasid Caliphate's
authority over the region. The citizens of Jordan, under
the leadership of a man known as al-Qataml, were in control
g
of the whole region and stopped sending.their revenue to the
9
Qdpital. This action was a potential danger to the Caliph
9




great need of this revenue to maintain his position by
I
4
offering it to his Turkish mercenaries, whose demands for
greater salaries could not be ignored. The new leader in
Jordan remained in power and enjoyed the support and encourage
4
ment of his subjects until the arrival of the Caliph's troops,
# »
who were mainly Turkish soldiers under the command of Muzahim
b. Khaqan. The latter was in a position to win the battle
against his opponent and restore 'Abbasid authority over the
district.^- At the same time in 2I4.8/862 yet another riot
broke out in Hims this time led by the citizens of the city
•
«
themselves, in protest against the policy of the governor
4
Kaydar b. 'Abd Allah al-Ushrawsani. The governor tried in
*
4
vain to restore law and order and was forced to flee to
4
another city, while several of his soldiers were put to death.





authority over the insurgents, appointed 'Abd al-Rahman b.
Habib al-Azdl as governor of the city, but he died before
%
9
arriving in the area. Therefore the Caliph appointed al-Fadl






b. Qarim, who was warmly welcomed.by the citizens of the
ft












were intending to revolt against the 'Abbasids' authority,
✓
and he succeeded in putting to death several of their
"I
leaders. By so doing al-Fadl probably thought that it
ft
would help him in one way or another to maintain his position
ft
and put an end to any possible attempt in the future to
ft
curtail the 'Abbasids® power in this city. ■ But his policy
ft
was seen to have disadvantages, when the citizens raised
ft
their voices in protest against his premature action. Al-
ft
Fadl was not in a position to protect himself from the angry
ft
crowd, and was forced to retreat from his headquarters to a •
ft
ft
ruined palace nearby to defend, himself. But even with his
ft
removal to this other palace , the governor was not able to




soldiers succeeded in killing him.
The citizens of Hims, realizing the consequences of
ft ft






region from the governor of Damascus whose own position was





the governor of Damascus before he could prepare his troops
ft
ft
and accordingly they marched towards the region under the
ft
ft « ♦
command of Ghutayf b. Hi'ma al-Kalbi. Ghutayf b. Ni'ma and
✓
ft
1. Yaqubi, III, l'8lj Ibn 'Adim, Zubdat al-Halab min Ta'rikh
Halab, I, 73.
ft
2. Yaqubi, III, 181.







his forces failed to achieve their objectives and were forced
to retreat to their own city again. Despite the continual
trouble in Samarra and the weak position of the Caliph al-
9 I
Musta 'in, the latter sent an array under the leadership of
Musa b. Bugha, aided by the loyal rulers of several cities
in the region, to crush the trouble in the .area.- As the
Caliph's troops, approached the city, the citizens, especially
0
those of the tribe of Banu Kalb, mobilized their forces under
the command of a man known as Dabir al-A'/far. Then fighting
0
broke out between the two sides and ended in a decisive defeat
for the gim§ array. As soon as Musa and his troops entered
the city he gave his soldiers licence to loot and plunder it
for three days. Moreover, instructions were given to set
»
»
fire to several houses and for the property of the merchants
m
1 - -
to be confiscated. Despite his victory, Musa failed to
capture the leader of the revolt who had already fled and




citizens paid at the hands of Musa and his army vras the
9
harshest that they had ever suffered,, and a speedy recovery
was impossible. After its defeat the city of gim§-^ remained
>
quiet, and faithful to the 'Abbisid Caliph, despite the
9
resentment felt .by its citizens to the tyrannical actions
0
0
adopted against them by Musa b. Bugha. But al-Ya 'aubl, in
a very brief statement, mentions that Ghutayf was in control
of the city during the first year of al-Mu'tzzz's reign, i.e.
0
1. Yaqubi, III, 182} Tab., Ill, 1533-ij.} Sibt, XII, 13b, Ibn
Kathir, XI, 6, .
% •
2. Tab., Ill, 153k-
0
3. In his attempt to control the city, the Caliph al-Musta'in
put Hims and Qinnasrin, in 250/861^ under the direct rule
P





252/866 and was put to death by Muhammad b. al-Muwa'lid who
4
had been sent by the Caliph to Palestine to quell the revolt
9
4 •
there. The Banu Kalb, however, antagonised by the murder of
4
their leader Ghutayf, once more rose up against the general,
1
who then fled back to Palestine.
4




a revolt which broke out in 2I4.9/863 in Ma'arrah^ under the





members of his own tribe the Tanukh. He marched with his
troops to Qinnasrln^ and made it his headquarters until the
arrival of Muhammad b. al-Muwalid who successfully persuaded
• *
Yusuf to come over to his side. But later on, Yusuf took
•
.
advantage of the troubled situation in Hims, which had
t
resulted in the escape of Ibn al-Muwalid to Palestine, and
•returned to Qinnasrln himself.^ But al-Ya'qubi, who presents
4
this account, does not complete it and we have no information





province seems to have remained quiet during the whole reign
1. Yaqubi, III, 181. Ibn al-'Adlm (Zubdat, I, 73) mentions
that the citizens of pim? refused to acknowledge al-Mu'tazz
as Caliph and continued supporting al-Musta'in. Ahmed b.
al-Muddabir, who was al-Mu'tazz's representative, advanced
towards Aleppo and besieged it but he failed to achieve
total, success. Shortly after, the citizens paid their
homage to the new Caliph and Ibn al-Muddabir became the
governor of this city in addition to Qinnasrin.
2. Ma'arrah or Ma 'arrat al-Nu'man, after al-Nu'man b. Bashir
who died there, is a large city between Aleppo and Hamat
and during the period under consideration it was considered
as one of the £im§ towns. Yaqut, Buldan, IV, 57lj--6.
3. Qinnasrin was one of the ancient cities in Syria. It came
under Muslim rule in 17/639. It is very near to 'Awasim
and Aleppo. Yaqut, Buldan, IV, 181+— 7*
k. Yaqubi, III, 182.
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During the short reign of al-Muhtadi, yet another up-
4
rising broke out in Hims under the leadership of Ibn 'Akkir
g
who was able-to take over the administration of the city-
after the governor Muhammad b. Isra'Il had escaped. Then
t
4
Ibn 'Akkar followed hard on the governor's heeis and several
clashes took place between the two forces which eventually
'
•
led to the murder of Ibn 'Akkar and the return of Ibn Isra'il
to rule over the city.
>
Thus the•inflammatory situation in Samarra had led to
an unstable position in the region of Syria. Moreover, it
•
«
encouraged several opportunists to match their power against
that of the weak Caliphs and their deputies in the region.
The adventurers were in a position to gather round them a
• ♦
g
considerable a mount of support and to direct this against
the agents of the Caliphs in a bid to retain their power.
g
These circumstances even led certain of the Caliphs' ambitious
governors to take advantage of the instability and gain
I
g
independence for their region from the capital, or in other
words, from the 'Abbasids' control. This can be seen in
g
the revolt of 'isa b. al-Shaykh al-Shaybani, the governor of
2
the provinces of Palestine and Jordan* According to al-
Ya 'qubl the governor of Damascus, Nawsharl b. Tajil al-Turki,




of Palestine, who showed discontent with the Turkish supremacy.
1. Yaqubi, III, 188.





Therefore, a fierce battle took place between the two armies
in Jordan which ended with the defeat of 'l"sa and the
*




from there he went to Egypt. His defeat offered Nawsharl
t ' ^ M m
the chance to bring Palestine under his control. Al-Ya qubi
account -of this event is ambiguous and misleading but 'Isa
s
probably regained the governorship of Palestine after the
9 %
9
expulsion of Nawshari. by Muhammad b. al-Muwalid who had been
t 1
sent to the region by the Caliph al-Mu tazz. Other sources
%
9 0
do not mention the battle but rather indicate that 'Isa b.
% •
9





and stopped the revenue of the region from being sent to
9
♦




over Damascus in addition to applying himself to the equally
• 9
9










sent from Egypt to the Caliph of Samarra arid which was
9
O
estimated at seven hundred and fifty thousand dinar.
9




was not in a position to send troops from the capital to crush
the revolt; therefore he asked the governor of Egypt, Ahmad
^ 9
b. Tulun, to raise an army against the rebel and to restore
9
9




1. Yaqubi, III, 181}.; see also Ibn Shaddad, al-A 'lag al-Khatira
/
Damascus, 1382/1962, II, 121}..
2. Kami1, VII, 119; Ibn Shaddad, II, 121}..
3. Ibn Sa'id, Sirat Ahmad b. Tulun, p. 11; Ibn Sa'Id, al-
Mughrib, I, 80; Kindi, p. 181}.; cf. Yaqubi, III, I85,
where he states that 'Isa escaped to Palestine from the
Turks who decided to murder him in revenge for the death
[Contd.
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was eager to extend his authority and to gain the Caliph's
approval, appreciated this suggestion and immediately led
his troops to suppress the uprising
1
It is noteworthy that, apart from the-latter revolt in
9
Syria,- all the rebellions were led and encouraged by the •
citizens of the province. This been linked with
*
w
the transference of power in Samarra from Arab hands to the
army of foreign slaves. For this reason we find that tribal




who seem to have had no political aim other than the retention
of power, or of making known their discontentment, and their
0
objections to the policy of the 'Abbasid rule. In addition
to the Turkish supremacy, which had possibly led to this
%
resentment in the first place, the struggle for power in the
\
capital had encouraged many adventurers to appear on the
0
9 9
political s.cene and to enjoy, at least for a short time,
their authority over one or two provinces. Thus the
conflict among the members of the 'Abbasid family and their
I
conflict with the Turkish officers were the main factors
leading to the unstable situation in Syria and the other
provinces The Caliphs, however, tried to crush these
revolts at any price, in an effort to maintain peace and
Contd.] of Ibn Nawshari who had been killed in the last
In Palestine 'Isa gained enough confidencebattle.
#
to lay hands on the revenue from Egypt which was sent
to Samarra and prevented the Caliph from receiving the
Capital which was of great importance to him.
Ibn
cf. Yaqubi, III, 18L(..
9








order in the region, besides, retaining their authority.
But even with the adoption of a hard line towards the
V
populace, neither the Caliphs nor their agents were able to
'
eliminate them entirely; on the contrary their severe
ft
measures and punishments proved useless against these • •
4
ft
determined rebels. The main factor which helped the 'Abbasids
4




co-operation between the leaders of the various revolts
which broke out in different places and at different times.
Although the natives of the area were not in a position to
1
gain their independence from the Caliphate, immediately
after this period Syria separated herself from the rest of


































It is evident that there were several outbreaks of
ft
ft




region; these revolts were overpowered by the Caliphs, .
•
.




participated in the uprisings were faced with severe punish-
t - . 1
ment from the Abbas ids themselves.
i
ft
Since the time of al-Ma'mun Egypt had been given as
*
appanage to one of the powerful leaders at the court who in
ft •
turn sent his own deputy to direct the affairs of the
ft
P
province on his behalf. But at the time of al-Mutawakkil,
ft ♦
Egypt, with the other western provinces, was designated by
ft
ft
the Caliph to his son, al-Huntasir, who, like the Turkish
ft





'l.. Yaqubi, III, 169; Kindi, p. 188; Nu.ium, II, 207-8;
S. Lane Poole describes al-Mutasim's treatment of these
ft
people saying, "When al-Mu 'tasim, "brother of the Caliph
ft
and afterwards Caliph himself, came to the rescue with
ft ft
lj.,000 Turkish troops, he found the city blockaded by the
ft
Arabs; he dispersed them (879) and killed their chiefs.
Five months later, he returned to Baghdad, 'driving a crowd
*
ft
of wretched barefoot.prisoners before his savage troopers;
s
and the insurrection broke out afresh and spread among the
ft
ft
Copts; and at last the Caliph resolved to go to Egypt in
0
ft
person." A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages. VI, London
1901, 37.
2. B. Lewis, "Egypt and Syria", CHI, I, 176-7, states that, al-
Ma'rnun inaugurated a new system by giving the province of
Egypt as an appanage to his Khurasan! general, 'Abd Allah
♦ ft
b. Tahir.






It appears that there was an anti-'Abbasid movement in this
province led by the 'Alids, because in 235/850, al-Kindi
A
records that Ishaq, b. Yahya, who was the wall (governor) of-
a •
Egypt, received a message from both the Caliph and his son
9
al-Muntasir, ordering him to deport the Talibiyyin from the
4
region to Iraq. The Talibiyyin were, therefore, forced to
leave the area and on their arrival "in Iraq were obliged to
a
■1
move to Medina instead. The last Arab governor of Egypt,
4
4
'Anbasa b. Ishaq al-Dabbi, 238-ij2/853-57> was among the best
of the rulers of that region, as he kept a tight hold over
9
his officials and showed his subjects more good will than
• P
they had ever known before. After four years of wise
government and valiant service 'Anbasa was recalled and a
%
series of Turkish rulers proceeded to misrule the provi.nce.3
fc
4
It has been suggested that this change from Arab to Turkish
✓





of the Caliphate and which led to the extinction of the
✓
1 ♦
temporal authority of the Commander- of the Faithful.^"
« 4
Because of the tyrannical policy of the governor Yazid
* 9
b. 'Abd Allah al-Turkl, Muhammad b. 'All b. al-Husayn b. Abi
Talib, known as "Hadri", gathered round him a considerable
number of supporters to try to regain Egypt from this savage
*
i
ruler. His attempt failed, partly due to the lack of co-
A
Q
operation amongst his body, of support and partly because the
t,
« •




1. Kindi, p. 198; Khitat, I, 312.
*
2. Kindi, pp. 200-202; cf. S. Lane Poole, VI, 1+0.
3. Kindi, pp. 202-3.
• • •











sympathisers. Then in 2lj.8/862, Yazid b. 'Abd Allah was
i
able to place Muhammad and his followers under arrest. They
• «
received very inhuman treatment and eventually Muhammad with
a few of his people were expelled to Iraq.^
Because of the unrest of the 'Alids and their • •
0
sympathisers in the province during the pre-al-Muntasir
Ck
Caliphate, the latter, shortly after his ascent to the throne,
took very harsh measures against the 'Alidsin Egypt. Al-
Kindi presents a list of these new regulations which included
«
the following points;
a) No 'Alid could be given a domain, day'a, or be
I
4
allowed to ride a horse, or travel from Fu^a^ to








c) If there was any conflict between a !falibi and a non-
✓
0
Talibi, judges at the court must hear the non-Talibi
— p
claim and accept it against his enemy the Talibi.
From this passage the kind of policy the 'Abbasids had
0
followed in Egypt'is quite evident, as is the position of the
Arabs as a whole under these inhuman measures adopted by the
*
Caliphs' governors. It seems very likely that the tyrannical
+ 0
policy of the governors was one of the main reasons behind
. •
the several revolts which took place in Egypt, others being
0
the weak position of the Caliphate, and the emergence of a
4




1. Kindi, pp. 203-201)..
0
2. Kindi, p. 20Ij..
The Caliphs, however, encouraged their deputies to practise
0
4 9
the policy which th6y thought would serve them best; there-
fore, the former used force as the only means to maintain
t
4
their authority and to collect the revenues of the province.
4
_ *
But even with these restrictive measures the 'Abbasids and
their deputies were not able to maintain law and order in
Egypt. Thus, several revolts broke out in the area,
9
0
directed mainly against the 'Abbasids and their fellow-
4
supporters, the Turkish mercenaries. These revolts, as we
%
shall see below, had adversely affected the position of the
e
4
'Abbasids and led eventually to the separation of Egypt from
0
the 'Abbasid Empire.
As a reaction against the Turkish policy of placing al-
%
Musta'in on the throne instead of al-Mu'tazz, Safwan al-tlqayli
revolted in Egypt, refusing to acknowledge the Caliphate of
0
al-Musta'in, declaring that the rightful Caliph was al-Mu'tazz
t •
Although Safwan was enthusiastically encouraged by the natives
in his rightful protest, he retracted his objections when he
4
learned that almost all the dignitaries in Egypt had accepted
without any prejudice the legitimacy of al.-Musta'in's Caliphat
Apparently Safwan used this incident as a means to exert his
0 »
influence against the 'Abbasid dynasty in general and against
the Turkish leaders in particular. A considerable amount of
9
support came as a result of the reaction to the governor's
P
policy, and the citizens probably thought that under the
leadership of Safwan they would be able to put an end to
the tyrannical policy of the Caliph's deputies. Safwan
4










through his secret agent in Egypt, 'amil al-barid, that Safwan,
ft
ft
completely insincere in his attitude towards the 'Abbasid
• • «




establish an independent state. Acting in accordance ifith
I .
this information the Caliph, al-Mu'tazz, ordered Sima al'-Sharabi,
ft
one of his Turkish officers, to lead an army against Safwan
4




Egypt' Al-Yafjibl, who informs us of this revolt, does not
continue .his account of it but instead states that the army
which had been despatched by al-Mu'tazz did not go straight
»
«
to the areaj it stopped on the way to deal with another
-I
revolt in the region. Since the sources remain silent, our
knowledge concerning this uprising is only partial and we have
*
v
no clear information about its consequencese We can only
ft
speculate from the subsequent events that the army was able
to put down the revolt and to restore the" 'Abbasids* authority
ft ft
for a while.
In Rabi' I 252/February 866, another movement began in
s
Egypt, in the vicinity of Alexandria, led by Jabir b. al-Walid
al-Mud^lijl who was successful in invading and controlling /—
•
•
all the villages, towns and cities around Alexandria. The
• •
ft
governor of the city took immediate steps to combat this





they were not powerful enough to face such strong resistance
ft
6
and therefore failed to gain a victory, despite the regular
ft
V
reinforcements sent by the governor. The rebel was still
4
4
encouraged by the situation, and extended his authority to
ft
1. Yaqubi, III, 18^-85.
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»
include the nearby settlements."*" His continual victories
4
4 |
had strengthened his position, enabling him to challenge
4
4
the.governor even at his headquarters. Therefore, he and
9
4
his troops marched on Alexandria and besieged the city for
m
a while. Despite the oppression which the citizens faced
.
during the period of the siege they refused to submit to the
4




to conquer the city.





area at this time and which made the situation even more
I »
9
dangerous for the Caliph of Samarra. This uprising was led
♦
|
by an 'Alid pretender, 'Abd Allah b. Ahmad b. Muhammad b.
»
4
Isma'il b. Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah b. 'All b. al-Husayn b.
4
'All b. Abi Talib known as Ibn al-Arqat, whose first
4
♦
appearance on the political scene was with the previous
adventurer, Jabir al-Mud liji; but after the latter's un¬
successful attempts to invade Alexandria, Ibn al-Arqat took
t
over the rebel leadership. As soon as the Caliph al-Mu'tazz
4
learned about this revolt, he despatched his troops from
¥





security to the province. Ghulbak al-Turki, who led the
♦




and kill several of his supporters. ' Ibn al-Arqat, after
♦
9
his defeat at the hands of the Caliph's troops, joined
4
✓
forces against the 'Abbasids3 with yet another rebel in the
1. Sawarus b. al-Muqqafa', Ta'rlkh al-Batariqa al-Misriyya
2. Sawarus
91+3* 39; Kindi, pp. 205-206.
J
1-Muqqafa ' II, 39-lj.O.
3. Abu Harmalut was the leader with whom Ibn al-Arqat joined








area. When the Caliph al-Mu'tazz learned about the
4
deterioration of the situation.in Egypt, he sent troops
from Samarra under the leadership 'of Muzahim b. Khaqan
*
to enforce the commands of the ruler in the province and to
4
co-operate together with him in restoring order to the area.
I




putting down the revolt of Ibn al-Arqat and the latter,
0
after his defeat, asked Muzahira for a guarantee of safety
on his life which he ivas given."'"
0
In Rabi' I 253/February-March 867* another revolt broke
0
O — — — ■
out in the Hawf which obliged Muzahim b. Khaqan.to leave his
✓
palace and travel hastily to the area. Muzahim mobilised
• •
.
his forces and succeeded in winning the battle against the
0
rebels- despite his unfamiliarity with the nature of the
0
battlefield. He even captured the leader of the revolt who
0
P
was then taken back with Muzahira to his headquarters Mean-
0
• i
while, Muzahim was honoured by the Caliph for his successful
* •




instead of Yazld b. 'Abd Allah al-Turkl. ' Muzahim, after
m
0








superiority over the northern part of Egypt. Therefore,
6 9
%
Muzahim commanded Yazid to lead his troops against the rebel,
and shortly after their despatch, Muzahim himself joined
% 9
1. Kindi, p. 208.
0
2. Hawf: two districts in Egypt; al-Hawf al-sharql lies towards
Bilad al-Sham and al-Hawf al-gharbl, near Dimatta. But
these two districts were joined to each other. Yaqut,
Buldan, II, 365.
3. Kindi, p. 209; Hujurn, II, 337.
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them and together they were able to crush the revolt. Then
9
Jabir appealed for mercy for hi3 life, and, on being assured
*
of his safety, he surrendered to Muzahim who immediately sent
him to Samarra in Rajab 25ij-/July 868.^ Muzahim proved to be
• ^
* P
an efficient military leader as well as an able administrator,
*
in quelling the trouble and in restoring peace to the region
after a certain period of struggle for power among the local




In 25i|./868, the Caliph al-Mu'tazz had given Egypt as
appanage to the Turkish general Baykabak, who in turn had
ft
appointed Ahmad b. Tulun d. 270/881;., as his deputy in the
2 - -
area. The arrival of A£mad b. Tulun in Egypt initiated a
new phase in the history of this province because he
realised the weakness of the Caliph's position in Samarra
and had every intention of making Egypt an independent state
under his own control, an aim which he eventually achieved.-5
Shortly after Ahmad*s arrival in Egypt a revolt - whose
4
leader, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah b. Ibrahim b. Tabatiba, was
ft
6
of 'Alid descent - broke out in the northern area but it
'
kdid not last long and Muhammad was put to death. Ibn al-
ft
Athir states that this leader proclaimed his right to the
Caliphate in opposition to the weak and unsuitable 'Abbasids.^
1. Kindi, pp. 209-210j Nu.i'um, II, 337.
2. Tab., Ill, 1897? Balawi, p. 33; Nujum, III, 5-6;* cf. Kindi,
p. 212 where he states that the Caliph al-Mu'tazz himself
appointed Ahmad b. Tulun for this office.
3. B. Lewis, 'Egypt and Syria', CHI, I, 178.
Kindi, p. 212; Kamil, VII, llj.8; Nu.jum, III, 6.






It is noteworthy that this is the first rebel in Egypt who
ft
J •
actually claimed a right to the Caliphate and clearly made
ft
<ft
it his political goal. The previous.adventurers had
ft
<
always been uncertain about their objectives apart from
ft
their desire to hold power.
ft
ft
Another 'Alid, Ibrahim b. Muhammad b. Yahya b. fAbd
ft
Allah b. Muhammad b. 'Umar b. 'All b. Abi Tllib, known as
4
Ibn al-Sufl al-'Alawi, rose against the 'Abbasids in 253/867
ft
ft
in upper Egypt but his revolt seems at first to have been
*
ignored by them. Ibrahim provoked the anger of Ibn Tulun when
■l
in 255/869 he invaded and plundered the city of Isna
4
putting a fair number of its inhabitants to death. Therefore
Ahmad b. Tulun ordered his forces to move into the area. Ibn
Tulunfs troops failed to crush the revolt because of the
ft
A
entrenched position of the rebel and his knowledge of the
• " »
nature of the battlefield. But this failure did not prevent
4
ft
Ahmad b. Tulun from sending to the area new forces who, with
their sophisticated weapons,, were in a position to defeat
ft
9
the rebel and disrupt his forces and on 3 Rabi' II, 256/H4.
ft






Ibn Tulun, who succeeded in bringing to an end the
explosive situation in Egypt, was encouraged'to exert his
own authority and to enjoy a form of autonomy in the province.
1. Isna: the city was located at the end of upper Egypt, and
ft
the only big city beyond it was Aswan. It was very
famous for its agricultural and commercial life. Yaqut,
ft
. Buldan, I, 265-266.
ft










The murder of Baykabak at the request of the Caliph al-
4
0
Muhtadi meant a great victory for Ibn Tulun because Egypt
4
was then offered to Yarjukh, another Turkish general, who
4 m
0
was in very close contact with Ibn Tulun. Yarjukh
«
immediately approved Ahmad*s position as he had extended his
I 0
1
authority to include Alexandria and Barqa. Shortly after,
4
9
Ahraad was able to bring Syria under his own power when the
Caliph invited him to crush the revolt of 'Isa b. al-Shaykh.^
Eventually Ibn Tulun with his apparent obedience to the Caliph
0
0
of Samarra took advantage of the opportunity to establish a
4 •









Despite the long struggle for power of the western
provinces against the 'Abbasids, they finally succeeded in
obtaining their autonomy and remained on good terms with the
central government by sending the annual revenue. It is
noteworthy that the Caliph tried hard to suppress any attempt
0
to separate these provinces from the central government,
0
especially when the uprisings took place under an Arab leader.
This can be seen in both Egypt and Syria as well as in other
9
_
provinces. The Tulunid dynasty was the earliest manifestation
f 4
of a political crystallisation in the unruly and heretofore in-
articulate Turkish element in the heart of the Caliphate.
0
Other and more important Turkish dynasties were soon to
followi The case of Al?mad b. 'J'ulun was typical of the founders
of the many states during the decline of the Caliphate.^
1. Kamil, VII, 126; Ibar, III, 195; Balawl, pp. 14.5-1j:6.
2. Nu.1 um. Ill, 7.









Even al-Hijaz, which had remained almost entirely aloof
ft
*
from the internal struggles of the 'Abbasid state, was now
ft
ft
provoked to action, probably by the increasing influence of
.
the Turkish mercenaries. The tense political situation
facing the area in 230/81j.5j especially in Medina, was caused
- T 1 t -
by the continual raids by the tribe of Banu Salim. Al-Ya qub
ft
clearly states that they paid homage to their leader 'Aziza
• ft
al-Khafajx and designated him as Caliph.^ * Muhammad b. Salih
ft
' ft »
b. al-'Abbas al-Hashimi, the governor of Medina, took firm
4
steps against the rebels by immediately ordering Hammad-b.
ft




reinforce the troops of Medina. He prepared them to face
all possible attacks by the A'rab and to move right to the
heart of the trouble and bring it to an end. Hammad was
%
killed in a battle, after which his men dispersed. This
victory over the imperial forces encouraged the rebels to
»
continue their barbarous deeds which strengthened their
ft




authority of the 'Abbasid governors. It is clear that the
_ ft
Caliph sent his troops as quickly as-possible to crush the
ft »
■trouble in the area, mainly because of the importance of
ft
Hijaz from a religious point of view. Moreover, this up¬
rising seems to have seriously threatened the 'Abbasids1
ft
1. Tab., Ill, 1336; Kamil, VII,. 8j Ibar, III, 271; ef.
Yaqubi, III, 16 9.
2. Yaqubi, III, 169; cf. Tab., Ill, 1336, where he gives the
name 'Uzayza b. Qufctab al-Sularax. Moreover, he does not
. mention that they nominated him as Caliph. -





authority, since its followers had already recognised their
ft
leader as the legitimate Caliph. The defeat of the Caliph's
troops encouraged the rebels to extend their raids to the
scattered villages on the route between Mecca and Medina, even
ft
W




two cities. • These activities on the part of the tribesmen
ft
once again provoked the anger of the Caliph who, immediately
«
after hearing of the defeat of Hammad's army, ordered one of
ft
_




suppress the revolt. The Caliph's army, after heavy
fighting with the rebels, eventually succeeded in crushing
them and Bugha al-Kablr inflicted severe punishments on the
ft
captives,^" the worst that they had ever experienced. This
ft
could be interpreted as Turkish retaliation against the A'rab
elements, whose revolt had been directed mainly against the
increasing influence of the Turkish mercenaries at the court.
The punishments inflicted on the tribesmen proved
v
futile, as, shortly after this revolt, yet- another broke out
ft
ft
in 23l/8!j.6 in the vicinity of Fadak2 led by the tribes of •
ft
Banu Fizara and Banu Murra.3 Meanwhile, the captives whom
ft
Bugha al-Kabir had put in prison, took advantage of this
1. Yaqubi, III, 169-70; Tab., Ill, I336-8; Miskawayh, VI,
53k-35.
2. Fadak was an ancient, small town in the northern part of
Hijaz near Khaybar and, according to Yaqut, two or three
days journey from Medina. Fadak owes its fame in the
history of Islam to the fact that it was the object of
disagreement and a particular decision by the prophet and
that it gave rise to a dispute between Fa^ima and Abu Bakr.
EI2, s.v. Fadak.
3. Tab., Ill, l3i+2.
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revolt and planned to escape; but they failed and met with
severe penalties which cost most of them their lives 1 As
soon as the tribesmen in Fadak heard about Bugha's advance
*
4
towards their area, they became very alarmed and moved
away from the district in various directions in order to








capturing a few of the rebels, taking them back to Medina.
Another revolt broke out in 232/8I4.7 in al-Yamama^ led
4
by the tribe of Banu Numayr, who succeeded in taking over
administr of the province and in bringing the whole
area under their direct control. The Caliph al-Wathiq him-
i
self ordered Bugha al-Kablr to march on the area and crush
the rebellion. Although Bugha initially was not able to
4
win the battle, later on, with the arrival of reinforcements,
he defeated Banu Numayr who suffered heavy casualties ft It
was recorded that the main reason for the trouble throughout
the area of Hijaz was the increasing power of the army of the
Turkish slaves whom the A'rab would no doubt have considered
as usurpers of their own power. 5 However, the lack of any
1. Tab., Ill, 1338-lj.O; Kamil, VIII, 12-13.
2. Tab., Ill, 131+2.
4
3. Al-Yamama was a district in central Arabia which was
originally called Jaww "The bottom of the valley". Al-Yamaraa
lies on the long ridge of the 'Arid, to which belongs its




1+. Tab., Ill, 1358-63; Kamil, VII, 18-17.
5. Tab., Ill, 1359, states that Banu Numayr told the messenger
of Bugha, Muhammad b. Yusuf al-Ja'farx, "You were born among
us but after you grew up you did not respect the prohibitions
0
(then you were expelled). And now you have gone further,
to the extent of bringing these slaves and 'ulu.1 to fight us. If
powerful government capable of forcing its subjects,
ft
especially the A'rab, to respect law and order probably
♦
0





In 251/865 Banu 'Uqayl in Mecca provoked more trouble
« •
in the area by severing communications between Mecca and
Judda. They thus challenged the 'Abbasid troops stationed
in the province. The governor of Mecca launched his assault
0
0
against the rebels and inflicted heavy losses on them. It
&
0
must be remembered that other A 'rab in the area took advantage
« »
ft
of this situation and made raids on the various villages in
ft
1




in prices due to the lack of a capable ruler who could
maintain peace and security in the region.
*
.
Shortly after this trouble, a new revolt broke out at
ft
the instigation of a new adventurer Isma'il b. Yusuf b.
ft




Taiib who was believed to be of 'Alid descent. As soon as
0
the governor.of Mecca heard about this new uprising he moved
out of the city, leaving it at the mercy of the rebels, who
.1., Tab., Ill, 16IU|.; Kamil, VII, 111. The ruler, Ja'far,
« ft




2. Tab., Ill, .I6I4.I4.J cf. Maqatil, p., 669. Although Isfahan!
mentions this revolt in very vague terms, comparing it with
. that of the other 'Alids, he clearly states that he did
not wish to discuss him and his revolt in detail because
<





plundered the house of the governor himself in addition to
A
several other houses which belonged to the officers of the
*
•
Caliph. Moreover, Isma 'il b. Yusuf confiscated the money
4 9
9
which had been sent to reconstruct the Ka'ba in addition to
<
4
the gold and silver contained in it and set fire to certain
parts of Mecca."*" Despite his entrance to Mecca he was not
sure of the-loyalty of the natives of the city; therefore
9
for the sake of the peace and security of his followers,
1
9








Isma '11 to extend his authority to Medina since he did not




When the governor of Medina learned about this threat to
P






do not mention whether or not the rebel entered Medina, and
4
if he entered it, what policy he adopted. Neither do they
9
present the attitude of the inhabitants of the city towards
9
him. It may be that the citizens of Medina showed no
9
sympathy for him and were displeased at his venture; and
for this reason Isma *il did not settle there with them, but
9 *
4









inhabitants who objected to his policy, therefore he besieged
•1. Tab., Ill, 16I|4; Kamil, VII, 111; cf. Yaqubi, III, 183,
• f
where he considers the place of the uprising to be Medina
4
■ instead of Mecca. • Al-Ya 'qubi even believes that the
• «
. . main reason behind this revolt was the personal conflict
between the governor of Medina and Isma 'il b. Yusuf.
2. Tab., Ill, 161|4.
2%
the city for a time. Despite the difficulties which the
9 *
4
citizens faced during this siege, they refused to surrender
to the rebel's authority and when Isma'II found that there
0
was no advantage to be, gained from continuing with the siege,
he removed his forces to Jadda where, on his arrival, he
confiscated.all the property and goods which had arrived
there from various parts of the world."'' Thus he gradually
*
I
became more dangerous to the 'Abbasids, until he was almost
4
T
the only man with any authority in the whole region of Hijaz
. •
despite his unpopularity among the citizens. The region
I t
itself was of great importance not only for the Caliph but
also for all Muslims, if they were to be sure of their safety
4
0
in the area during the pilgrimage. Isma'Il, whose power was
still increasing because of the lack of any strong opposition,
9
• 9
continued his barbarous schemes of plundering and confiscating
property. He may have taken advantage of the deteriorating
J
9
situation in Samarra caused by the civil war between al-Mu'tazz
4
and al-Musta'in, which prevented both of them from sending
A
troops to crush the trouble in Ijlijaz. On the other hand,
Isma 'il was unable to win the favour of the majority of the
0
inhabitants despite his honourable genealogical line. His
•
•






Eventually the Caliph al-Mu'tazz sent his troops to the




restore peace and security to the region so that the
0





inhabitants would be able to live their daily lives and the
« «
nI •
pilgrims would have safe conduct. However, the Caliph's
*
• ♦
troops failed to suppress the revolt and did not even
succeed in securing the pilgrimages in that year, 251/865,
and therefore thousands of people failed to complete the
9
%
rituals of their religion and thousands of others died. It
is surprising that even with his final victory over the
imperial troops Isma'II neither won more supporters, nore
0
1
remained in Mecca itself, but instead left for Jadda. It
0
0
is noteworthy that this war lord, in spite of his successful
0
military manoeuvres, did not enter such cities as Mecca,
0
0
Medina and Jadda but always camped on the outskirts. After
0
his departure from Mecca, Isma 'il did not launch any more
<





Al-Mas'udi states that after the death of Isma 'il, his
I
brother Muhammad succeeded to the leadership of the A'rab
revolts against the 'Abbasids. Muhammad met with the
. •
Caliph's troops under the command of Abu al-Saj in a decisive
battle, the Caliph's troops eventually defeating the rebel,
and forcing him to flee from his headquarters.^ Muhammad
0
moved from Jadda to Yamaraa and then to Bahrayn and-was able
to bring the tribal elements in these provinces over to his
• \
0




this account, neither completes it nor gives us enough
0
0
1. Tab., Ill, 161^5.
2. Tab., Ill, 1686; Muru.1, VII, 395-
3. Muru.1, VII, 395-
information about the consequences of the new campaigns
ft '
ft
launched by Muhammad against the Caliph. But the appearance,
of Muhammad may have intensified the situation more than ever
A
before, because al-Mas'udi also mentions that quite a few of
ft
ft
the 'Alids had left Hijaz for Egypt, because of fear of a
0
possible civil war in the area, in addition to the prevailing
ft!




We can conclude from the above brief presentation of the
situation in Hijaz, that the trouble which had been provoked
ft
ft
in the area was. led mainly by the tribal elements who found it
difficult to accept the supremacy of the Turkish mercenaries.
• 9
It is worth noting that the urban section of the population
ft




steadfast in their traditional respect for the House of 'Abbas
despite the latter*s delicate position. Even with the
ft




faithful to the 'Abbasid dynasty. Despite the immediate
reactions from the Caliphs to the uprisings in Hijaz and the
heavy measures which were inflicted upon the rebels, the
ft




1. Muru.i, VII, I4.O3.
2. Al-Mas'udi, too, alludes briefly to another revolt which
had broken out in Medina by this time and which was led
by an 'Alid descendant known as Ibn Musa b. 'Abd. Allah b.V
Musa b. al-Hasan b. al-Hasan b. 'All b. Abi Talib. Muru j,
ft
J
VII, I4.O3• But there is no mention in our sources of
such a revolt. Moreover, al-Mas'udi does not refer to the
ft <
\











It was the inflammatory situation in the Capital, Samarra,
which encouraged the tribal elements in Hijaz and elsewhere
.










D. The Eastern Provinces
1. Tabaristan^
%
The Caliph al-Musta 'In rewarded Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah
ft
b. Tahir, who had crushed the revolt of Yahya b. 'All in Kufa
» • ♦
with appanages in Tabaristan from the Sawafi al-Sultaniyya,
"the lands of the Caliphs themselves," which adjoined the
9
public grazing land. Sulayman b. 'Abd Allah was the deputy
9





but the real authority lay in the hands of another deputy,
Muhammad b. Aws who was assisted by his two sons, who were
*
_ o
governors of several cities in Tabaristan. These latter
*
were still young and incompetent, and as a result of their
tyrannical behaviour the inhabitants of the region suffered
ft
♦
gross ill-treatment. The citizens of Tabaristan were on
9
good terms with their neighbours in Daylam, who returned
<
this respect and friendship. They completely rejected
ft
Muhammad b. Aws, and their hatred of him was further in-
•
v
creased by his successful raid on Daylam in '250/8614.-65s which
• ft
1. Tabaristan was the region of high mountains, for the most
part occupied by what is at the present day known as the
Alburz chain lying along the south coast,of the Caspian
sea, being to the east and to the north of Qumis. Yaqut,
Buidan, III, 501-507; Le Strange, pp. 368-76.
2. Tab., Ill, I52JL4.5 Miskawayh, VI, 571; cf. Ibn Isfandiyar,
pp. 157-8, who mentions only one son of Ibn Aws, the
governor of Kalar. His father*s tyranny and harshness
were such that all who were able, sold or abandoned their*4
9
4
houses and migrated elsewhere. Every year taxes were
♦ |
levied three times, once for Muhammad b. Aws, once for his






they feared would damage their good relations with the
Daylams. This anger and hatred of the governor. x>ras
• I «
aggravated by his own foolish actions and by the behaviour
ft
of Jabir b. Harun who had been sent here by Muhammad b. 'Abd
* 1
Allah b. Tihir to collect the revenues from his property,
• • •
ft
Jabir did not confine his tax-gathering to his master's
*
ft
property, but extended it to the public land, also. Such
ft ft
conduct led the inhabitants of the region to plan possible




and this period, when the Caliphate was struggling for its
ft
survival and would be unable to back up the troops of the
p
. local governors, seemed the opportune moment. Political
*
0
and economic factors were the main reasons.for dissatisfaction
in the region and it- appears to have had little to do with
ft
• ft




The inhabitants of the region grouped themselves under
the leadership of two local notables in protest against the
ft
rapacity of the tax collector,^" and they were urged to stand
V
1. Tab.-, Ill, 152k; Miskawayh, VI, 571.
2. Cf. W. Barthold, p. 21L|.. E.G. Browne, I, 31^9» considers
this revolt as the struggle of the Persians to establish
their own traditional way of life and ah attempt to give
fresh expression to their marked preference for Shi'ite
doctrine.
♦
3. Ibn Isfandiyar, p. 162; W. Barthold, p. 2124-.
Ij.. They were Muhammad and Ja 'far the. sons of Rustam. Tab.,
Ill, 1526. According to Barthold, p. 211;., they were Shi'a,
s
but al-Tabari does not mention their religious complexion,
ft
.merely stating that they were very respectable people. Ibn
Isfandiyar, who gives a very ambiguous account of the
beginning of this revolt, does.not mention the sons of











firm against such tyranny. As soon as Jabir lsarned about
9
the reaction which his policy had provoked he fled, to join
♦ 9
Sulayraan b. 'Abd Allah in the hope of finding safety and
9
security. Then the two leaders of the opposing forces began
9
to realise the possible consequences of Jabir's flight and
became particularly afraid of Sulayman's reaction.to it,
9
Therefore they sent a delegation to their neighbours in Daylam
9
✓
asking them to join in their revolt against the tyrannical
9
9
policy of the rulers of that region. The Daylamls, who had
«
«
recently suffered at the hand of Muhammad b. Aws' raid,





operate with them in repelling any future attack from their
9
common enemy."'"
It was felt that the insurrection should have a person
of greater prestige at its head, so an approach was made to
9
9
one of the local Talibiyyln, Muhammad b. Ibrahim, proposing
that he should lead the citizens in their struggle for
0
justice. Muhammad declined, but at the same time advised
I




who, according to Muhammad, was more fitted for such leader-
o
ship than himself. Accordingly a message in the name of
» » ♦
9
Muhammad b. Ibrahim was sent to al-JIasan b. Zayd in Rayy.
1. Tab., Ill, 1326-271 Miskawayh, VI, 371-72.
2. Tab., III, 1327.
3. Tab., Ill, 1527-28j cf. Ibn isfandiyar, p. I63, who states
that the inhabitants of the region sent deputations to the
Sayyid Muhammad b. Ibrahim b. 'All b. 'Abd al-Rahman b. al~
Qasim b. al-gasan b. Zayd b. al-^asan b. 'All b. Abl Ta'lih,
who was in Ruyan, and begged him to receive their oath of
allegiance so that, perchance, by his blessing,' God might
free them from the tyranny under which they lived.
301
/* ft • >>
The messenger succeeded in persuading al-Hasan to accept
ft
ft




leader in the. struggle against the policy of the 'Abbasid
dynasty from their tyrannical rulers. As
0 * * i % • *
soon as al-Hasan arrived in the province all the inhabitants
t *
ft *
of the area, including the Daylamls, accepted him as their
ft
sole leader in the fight against Sulayman b. Tahir
1
ft 0
Although our sources present this revolt as being
» 9
ft
::mainly of Shi'a ideology and origin, the main reason for it,
<
• *
as is suggested- in the above discussion, was the tyrannical
ft ft
• •
policy of the Caliphs' agents and their deputies in the
.prov in c e It was a purely economic and political revolt
ftr
aimed at re-establishing justice and peace in the region.
• ft






with more popularity. The arrival of al-Hasan b. Zayd
ft





the governors, and they even succeeded' in expelling the
agents of Muhammad Aws from severai places, forcing them







the people in the area surrounding Tabaristan heard
When
the
♦ . ' •
success of al-Hasah b. Zayd they immediately submitted to
his authority-, acknowledging his leadership. 2 His power
ft
therefore, became a potential danger, not only to the
♦
• #




the decline due to the behaviour of their agents, but also
1. Tab.', Ill, 1527-2-9; Ibar
ft
Ibn Isfandiyar, p. 163
2. Tab., Ill, 1526-29; Miskawayh, VI, 572; Muntazam, XII,







to the Caliph, to whose numerous problems in the Capital
9




various regions with their continuous revolts. This led
0
ft
the Caliph of Samarra and his ruler in Khurasan, to send
ft
ft
forces to combat and suppress this revolt.
»
0
Al-Hasan b. Zayd took advantage of these circumstances
and started his military campaigns by advancing towards Amul
ft
where he defeated the forces of Muhammad b. Aws and seized
the city (23 Shawwal 230/29 November 86ij.). • Muhammad b. Aws
was very fortunate to escape with his life, and he took
• ft
\
refuge with Sulaymin b. 'Abd Allah who was stationed not far
from Amul. This victory of air-Hasan over the 'Abbasid
f ♦
forces in the region encouraged many different types of
ft
people to join the revolt. Among those who associated
ft " ♦ r
ft ft
•themselves with him were the ga 'allk (vagabonds) and the
ft
*
hawziyya^ in that region.3 Al-Hasan's army was now in a
0 »
ft
position to launch attacks on the nearby places and bring





Al-Hasan stayed a few days in Amul to collect the
J
revenues from the region for himself instead of for the
Caliph of Samarra,implying that he now considered himself
1. Tab., Ill, 1529-30; cf. Ibn Isfandiyar, p. I6I4.. Isfahani,
Tarikh, p. 170 states that in 250/861^-65, al-Hasan b. Zayd
succeeded in expelling Sulayman from the whole of Tabaristan
2. ^awziyya were groups of isolated people who refused to mix
with others. Ahmad Ruijla, II, 191^.
3„ Tab., Ill, 1530; Miskawayh, VI, 573^
r » •
I).. Ibn Isfandiyar, pp. 165-70.
0
5. Ibn Isfandiyar, p. 169, adds that Sulayman fled from his
palace and sent a courtier to Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah b.







the only legitimate ruler. Meanwhile, he prepared his
forces to meet Sulayman b. 'Abd Allah b. Tahir and his
0
4
troops who were now marching against him. Al-Hasan and
- 1
his troops moved into Sariya, the former headquarters of
t
Sulayman, and began to assume authority over the whole of the
4
province. Therefore al-Hasan entered Sariya with his troops
O
and made it his own headquarters. The entry of al-Hasan b.
fc
Zayd into Sariya meant the end of the 'Abbasid rule in that
city and the whole of Tabaristan fell into al-Hasan's hands.
t *
#
He did not only confine his activities to this region;
9 *
9
immediately after this victory he sent one of his relatives
4
I 4
with troops to invade the important city of Rayy which was
eventually brought under the control of the Talibiyyin of
#
Tabaristan. By invading Rayy, al-Hasan b. Zayd extended
his jurisdiction as far as Hamadhan.^ And when the news of
9
4
his manoeuvres and military achievements reached Samarra,
4
#
the Caliph al-Musta'in immediately ordered Isma'il b. Farasha
9
to take command of the imperial troops and go to Hamadhan,
where he was to remain and so-prevent a possible invasion by
al-Hasan's troops.^"
. It is noteworthy that the Caliph's instructions to the
1. Sariya was the residence and centre of the Tahirids'
9
activities in Tabaristan. Yaqut, Buldan, III, 10; Le
Strange, p. 370.
2. Tab., Ill, 1530~31; Miskawayh, VI, 51k-> Isfandiyar,
I *9
pp. 170-71J Yaqut, Buldan, III, 10.
3. Hamadhan, in the province of Jibil, was to become the
capital of this region under the Persian Saljuqs. Yaqut,
Buldan, IV, 981-92; Le Strange, p. 186.






leaders of his army were not offensive but rather defensive
.
• -
in character.. This would imply that the Caliph was in •
ft
*




own dangerous enemy or, in other words, al-Musta'In seems
• •
9
to have been unwilling to enter into any direct confrontation
9
with his enemy al-Hasan b. Zayd. Al-Tabari explains these





to the fact that the area beyond Hamadhan was under the
ft
ft
control of the Tahirids, where they were left to enforce




as well. But even if this was so, it did not prevent the
• #
Caliph from co-operating with the Tahirids who in reality
•
•
were only the deputies of the Caliph in the region, to put
an end to their common enemy because a threat to the Tahirids*
%
position effectively meant a challenge to the 'Abbasids'
ft
authority. If the Caliph had been in a position which
m
enabled him to make a positive move against his rival he would
ft ft ft "
ft
have done so, no matter whether his agents, the Tahirids, were
ft
ft
there or not. But if one looks carefully at the situation
in the Capital, one can see the real reason why the Caliph
gave such orders to his general Isma'II b. Farasha.
Rayy came under the control of al-Hasan b. Zayd who had
ft
delegated the affairs of the city to one of his relatives
O




1. Tab., Ill, 153I4..
A
2. Cf. Isfahani, Tarikh, p. 1?0. He considered Muhammad b.
* »
Ja *far a rebel who rose up against the 'Abbasids, in other
•
*
words, the Tlhirids, in Dhu al-Qi'da, 250/December-January





policy soon provoked the anger and hatred of the natives.
Muhammad b. Tahir took advantage of this resentment, sending
his troops under the leadership of Muhammad b. Mikal-. After
*
fierce figjhting, Ibn Mikal eventually succeeded in capturing
• 4
Muhammad b. Ja'far and- entered the city, bringing it once
>
again under the domination of the 'Abbasids. But shortly




the area, who murdered Muhammad b. .Mikal and regained control
*
of the city.^" Al-Tabari refers to a revolt in the city
4
directed by the two 'Alid pretenders who challenged the forces
O
of Muhammad b. Tahir, the latter fleeing to Qazwm. ■• But al-
%
T^abari does not mention whether these 'Alids were in allegianc
» 9
9
with al-Hasan b. Zayd or not, nor the reason behind their
4
revolt. It is obvious that they were seeking prestige and
• 9
4
power by taking advantage of the weak position of the Caliph
4
and the continuous trouble in the capital Samarra, which
4
0
factors enabled them to achieve their ambitions. There was
much doubt concerning their co-operation with Muhammad b.
0
Zayd because each was intending to strengthen his own
position and gain more territorial power. Al-Tabari also
♦
m




informing the Caliph al-Musta'in of his victory over the
forces of al-Hasan b. Zayd in Rayy, this letter arriving in
the Capital in 251/865.3
4
i «
_ _ _ 4
1. Tab., Ill, 1532; Miskawayh, VI, 571jJ Kamil, VII, 81-82.
2. Tab., Ill, 1533, 1585. Qazwin was a famous city between
Rayy and Abhar. Yaqut, Buldan, IV, 88-91.
3. Tab., III, 1586.
306
In Rabi ' I 251/May 866, another revolt broke out in
_ 1
the region of Qazwin and Zanjan under th6 command of al
ayn
ft ♦
b. Muhammad b. 'All b. al-Husayn b. 'All b. Abi Talib, known
ft
♦ »
» , * • *
as KawkabI, who succeeded in seizing control over the area
ft
- 2
and expelling the governor of the Tahirids. Wh
Caliph, al-Mu'tazz, learned about' the situation in the area,
ft
9
he ordered Musa b. Bugha to march there with the Caliph's
ft
troops. The Caliph instructed his general to co-operate
ft
ft
in his military manoeuvres with'the forces of the local ruler
t
I
who knew the character of the province better than Musa and
9 m




of this action but one of our later historians, Ibn Junghul,
states that the army which was sent by al-Mu'tazz achieved
9




rebel in Dhu al-Qi'da 253/Decernber .867. Musa then success-
> 1
ft
fully entered Qazwin and peace and security returned to the
area.^" Moreover, this victory was of great importance to
*
ft
the Caliph of Samarra because it brought back the authority
ft ft
ft %
and sovereignty of the 'Abbasids to the region. In regaining
1. The city of Zanjan-lay about fifty miles to the north
west of Abhar and was on the Zanjan river which flowed
ft
west to the Safid Rud. It was on the high road into
%
Adharbayjan. Yaqut, Buldan, II, 9i4.8-l4.95 Le Strange, p.
2. Tab., III,. 1614.3;- Isfahani, Tarikh, p. - 170; Maqatil does
not mention this revolt.
✓
3. Isfahan!, Tarikh, .p. 170. believes that Musa b. Bueha was
sent by Muhammad b. Tahir.
ft




control of the area, the Caliph was encouraged to take
ft
further steps against his rivals in Tabaristan and other
ft
* »




Shortly after this, Musa b. Bugha had the courage to
ft
* •
put down another revolt which had broken out in Hamadhah
ft
under the leadership of 'Abd a1-'Aziz b. Abi Dalaf who had
been the agent of the Caliph in the area until he realised
4
ft
the Caliph's weak position and decided to challenge the
ft
'Abbasids' authority in order to achieve a kind of autonomy
ft
ft
for the area, under his own control. This new adventurer
ft
failed, however, to achieve any of his objectives and fled
» ft
from the forces of Musa when they threatened his position.
ft
ft
When his followers saw what had happened to their leader
ft
ft
they scattered to various districts and showed no further






This easy victory encouraged Musi and his forces to advance
towards Tabaristan and put an end to al-Hasan b. Zayd.
ft




evident that his power increased noticeably in Tabaristan,
p
Daylam and the surrounding provinces, despite his recent




according to al-Tabarl's account. In 255/868-69 Muflih,
ft
one of the Turkish leaders, was sent by the Caliph, al-Mu'taz
to reinforce Musa's troops and to co-operate with him in an
1. Tab., Ill, I686j Al-'Ayni, XVII, Part 2, 31a.
ft
ft










attempt to end the trouble in Tabaristan. Muflih's
forces opposed the troops of-al-Hasan b. Zayd with a fierce






Al-Hasan b. Zayd, under pressure from his enemy, was forced
ft 0
ft




fore, Muflih was able to enter Amul, the centre of. the
resistance, and burn the houses of al-Hasan b. Zayd who fled
ft
O





Daylamites, being afraid of Muflih, abandoned al-Hasan b. Zayd
ft
but at this juncture Muflih received orders from Musa b.
Bugha to return at once, which he did. So the citizens of
the area once again began to gather together around al-Hasan
b.: Zayd, and they brought him back to Amul on 22 Ramadan
ft







. The Caliphs, having also to cope with the explosive
0
situation in the Capital, were unable to maintain their
0
0
authority over Tabaristan, Daylara and the surrounding provinces
0
which came under the control of Hasan b. Zayd. The separation
0
0
of Tabaristan from the rest of the Empire came to be
%
0
considered the establishment of the first 'Alid dynasty in the









them from retaining their power in that region. But even
, *




proclaim their right to the Caliphate.
1. Cf. Ibn Isfandiyar who gives various reasons which could
have led to the despatch of these troops. It deals with
'
the death of one of Muhammad.b. Tihir's agents.
ft 0
2. Tab., Ill, 1698; Sibt, IX, 291a; Ibri Isfandiyar,
pp. 179-80; Ibn Kathir, XI, 15.
0




Sistan-had been the centre of the Kharijites' activitie
since the early establishment of the 'Abbasid Caliphate. The
9
Kharijites were not only Arabs, a considerable number of
« •
p
Iranian people also being found among them. According to
Ta'rikh-i Slstan, this region had stopped sending revenue
o
., _
to the Caliph before the period under consideration.-' Sistan
was included in the appanage of the Tahirids and was there-
ft
fore ruled directly by them. It remained the focus of the
ft
ft
Kharijites1 revolts and disturbed the security of the whole
province. Their activities were on the increase and grew
more effective with the waning power of the central
/ •
ft
ment generally and the Tahirids in particular.. The natives,
ft
on the other hand, had probably lost confidence in the ability
ft
• ft
of the 'Abbasid Caliphs and their agents in the area, the




Kharijites which were always accompanied by fear and panic
among the inhabitants of the region. Therefore they
govem-
1. Slstan, which the earlier Arabs called Sigistan from the
ft
Persian Sagistan, was part of the surrounding lowland
country and to the east of the Zarah lake, which more
especially includes the deltas of the Helmund and other
rivers which drain into this inland sea. S1stin was also
a
rncalled Nimruz in Persian meaning 'Mid-day', or the soutl
land, a name said to have been applied to.the province in
ft
ft
regard to its position to the south of Khurasan. Istakhri*
p. 21}.9; Ibn Hawqal, p. 301j Yaqut, Buldan, III, ljJL-!|£.
2. For details of the Kharijites' revolts in Sistan during
•the early 'Abbasid period see C.E. Bosworth, Sistan under
ft
the Arabs, Chapter IV and V.











organised their own military bodyguard, calling them
muttawwi 'a (volunteers)^* and they took the initiative in







This volunteer army was under the command of §alilj b.
ft
Na$r or Nasr al-Kinani,2 whose power was strengthened by the
9
joint forces of Ya'qub b. al-Layth al-Saffar.^ Together
they succeeded in quelling the trouble in Bust,^* and in
ft
239/851]., brought it under their control instead of that of
*
the Tahirids,^ but they were not in a position to retain
A
permanent control of the city. The great obstacle to this
ft
1. Professor Bosworth states that it was mainly 'Ayyarun who
composed the body of this army. C.E. Bosworth, Sistan
under the Arabs , p. 122. v
s.
2. Wafayat, II, 312e ' According to Ibn Khaldun he was one of
the descendents of ahl al-bayt. Ibar, III, 293-1]-.
3. C.E. Bosworth, *The armies of the Saffarids', BSOAS, XXXI,
1968, p. 539. According to M. Forstener there was no form
of co-operation between Ya 'qub and Saiih but, on the contrary,
Salih was Ya'qub*s rival and several fights took place
between the two. Eventually Ya 'qub succeeded in having
ft
Salih captured in 2i|.9/86i|.. M. Porstener, *Ya'qub b. al-
Lait und der Zunbll', ZDMG. CXX, 1970, p. 7U--
> ft
!].. Bust was the second largest city of Sistan in the ij.th (10th)
century. Its people were living in comfortable circumstances
and are described as dressing after the fashion of the men
4
of Iraq and as being for the most part merchants who
traded with India. The neighbouring lands were extremely
fertile, growing dates and grapes, and Bust was accounted
the chief town of all the mountainous country of eastern
Sistan. Baladhurl, pp. 555, 561, 565; I§t?akhri, pp. 21]!].,
2l|5, 2l].8; Ibn £awqal, pp. 302, 301]. j Yaqut, Buidan, I,
612-30; Le Strange, pp. 3ij.l4.-l45.
5. Wafayat, II, 312.
ft
6. Isfahani, Tarikh, p. 169.
311
was the legitimate governor of Sistan'appointed by the
* ♦
r





province with reasonable success.for fourteen years. Ibrahim
*.
*
was aware that Bust was a permanent focus of - disaffection and
< » <
* ft
disturbances which often spread subsequently into Sistari.
Therefore, his first move was to send his.son Muhammad into
• ft













But the latter soon reorganised his army and eventually
compelled Muhammad to leave the city. According to Ibn
Khallikan Tahir. b. 'Abd Allah, the governor of Khurasan made
ft
a successful attack on these troops and forced them to
%
relinquish their control of the city, their leader Sali£ b.
p
al-Nasr or Naijlr dying immediately afterwards. The leader-
ft
I




Dirham b. Nasr who, from the increase in the number of his
ft
ft
supporters despite the recent defeat of their forces,^ seems
t
to have been popular among the volunteers.^- Moreover,
ft
ft




years (2I4J4.-21+7/858-861).. During this period a gradual
• •
ft 9





1. Ta'rikh-i Sistan, pp. 193-200; C.E. Bosworth, pp.117-8.
2. Wafayat, II, 312; cf. Ta'rikh-i Sistan, p. 199.
ft
ft
3. I§£akhri, Kitab al-Aqillm, p. 120 does not mention the
ft
role of Salih b. Wasr arid considers Dirham to be the first
0 • • •
leader of the-volunteer army which succeeded in controlling
Sistan. .
s








obviously superior bravery and ability as a leader. The
% 9
final break.is ascribed here to the attempt by the jealous
%
*
Dirhara to assassinate Ya'qub, Dirham having become so fear-
ful for. his own safety that he feigned illness and remained
• • 9
1 ^
enclosed in his house in.Zaranj. According to Ta'rikh-1
Sistan, the plot failed and some fighting followed, out of
9
« -
which Ya 'qub emerged victorious and was recognised as Amir
9
of Sistan on 25 Muharram 247/10 April 861.^ But al-Isfahani
t •
i *
in his Ta'rikh, (p. 169), considers that Dirham was the chief
leader of the volunteers during the short reign of al-Muntasir,




proved himself a more . efficient leader than Dirham, the
0
combatants relied on Ya'qub, and this attitude led Dirham to
I
• •
abdicate his position, offering it to Ya 'qub and leaving the
0
9 %
army.^ Our historical chronicles do not present clear
9
1. Zaranj or Zarang was the capital of Sistan during the Middle
Ages. In the third (ninth) century it was strongly forti¬
fied, consisting of an inner town surrounded by a wall
having five gates beyond which were the suburbs of the
4
outer town, enclosed by the outer wall, which had thirteen
gates, these latter opening across a great moat filled by
springs and by the overflow of the canals. Le Strange,
PP. 335-340.




3. Ibn al-Athlr states that Tahir b. 'Abd Allah the governor of
Khurasan, was carefully watching the situation in Sistan and
in order to retain his control in the area, in one of his
treacherous plots, he succeeded in having Dirham captured
4
and sent in chains to Baghdad where he remained in prison
• V
for a period of time. The volunteers, however, honoured
Ya'qub b. al-Layth al-Saffar by choosing him as their










gives the same•account as al-Isfahani.
fr *
It is noteworthy that despite the agitated politico-
9
4 9
military situation in the eastern provinces of the Empire,
4
#
the Caliphs seem to have remained aloof from it. This
• - •
was probably due to the continuous struggle for power among
• ■
the 'Abbasids which prevented them from solving the troubles
4
9
in the provinces. The weak position of the Caliphs and
9
their agents the Tahi'rids encouraged these rebels to exert
1 -
their power and domination. Therefore, in 2I4.8/862 Ya'qub
- ?
started his military campaign by advancing towards Harat
threatening the position of the £ahirids in the whole region.3
4
In 253/867 Ya'qub met the forces of Muhammad b. Aws, who was
9




1. D. Sourdel, "'Abbasid Caliphate", CHI., I, 129.
9
2-. Harat was a great city in the province of Khurasan consisting
. of a citadel surrounded, by a wall with four gates. The
9
city measured half a league square and the government
house was at a place called Khurasanabad, a mile outside
the town-on the western road towards Fushanj. At each of
the four city gates within the town was a market. Le Strange
pp. i|.07-09.
%
3. Tab., Ill, 1500. E.G. Browne regards Ya'qubfs manoeuvres
as a revival of Persian independence. Moreover, he also
considers him as having strong Shi'ite leanings. E.G. Browne,
A Literary History, I, 3l\h, 3t|-9; cf. C.E. Bosworth, "Notes
on the pre-Ghaznavid history of Eastern Afghanistan", IQ,9
4
9
IX, 1965> pp. 22-23. Moreover, C.E. Bosworth in his recent
article, "The Armies of the Saffarids" BSOAS, XXXI, 1968,
PP. 535-36 considers the mistrust arid hatred which Ya'qub
held towards the 'Abbasids as the main reason for his
9





al-Saffar won the battle and entered the city.^ This
ft
victory was of great importance to al-Saffar because it
strengthened his control over the area and decreased the
danger from his main opponents, the Tahirids. Furthermore,
ft
it encouraged Ya 'qub to extend his authority to the other
ft
ft
settlements in the vicinity in order to challenge the
m




rule in Khurasan. Ibn al-Athlr states that this victory
ft
spread fear and panic hot only among the Tahirids but also
ft
among the nearby governors whose positions were threatened
by the emergence of Ya'qub's power.
In spite of this defeat which badly affected the
'Abbasids' authority in the eastern provinces, the Caliphs
ft
of Samarra, physically distant from this agitated situation,
I
were always - engaged in attempting to solve the continuous
ft
trouble in the capital. Moreover, it appears from the
y ft
text of a later historian that immediately after this victory,
ft
the Caliph al-Mu'tazz recognised Ya 'qub as the legitimate
ft
- _ _ O
ruler of Harat and Sistan. This could be considered as
1. Tab., Ill, 1698; Kamil, VII, 12lj.; ¥afayat. II, 312-13;
Nu.lum, II, 326-27; Ibar, III, 291+.
2. Kamil, VII, 123; M. Forstener indicates that Ya'qub moved
towards the Turkish tribes who lived in the region of
Sistan and brought it under his authority after the murder
of its king Zunbil and several of its generals. M.Forstener
"Ya 'qub b. Lait und der Zunbil", ZDMG, CXX, 1970, p. 71.
3* Jbar, 2914.; cf. Barthold, p. 217. H. Bowen suggests
that the authority of the Tahirids was challenged by a
brigand who had succeeded in gaining control of the whole
of the province of Sistan. The Tahirids' ruler attempted
s
to buy him off with a governorship but this only encouraged





the main factor in encouraging al-Saffar to extend his
• <
9
authority to include other provinces. Ibn al-lfaqtaql
4
♦ 0
states that al-Mu'tazz was believed to have adopted a lenient
attitude towards al-Saffar because of his delicate position




hope to protect his capital from the danger of this energetic
4
war-lord who had succeeded in bringing to his side a large
• *
4
body of fighters. On the other hand, if this report were
true, the Caliph then apparently would not have objected to
9 /
%
the emergence-of any new power in the area so long as it
v
>
remained faithful to Samarra by sending the annual revenue
and mentioning the Caliph in the Friday prayer and in the
monetary system. Ibn al-Athir states that al-Saffar remained
4




him. He even pretended that the Caliph himself ordered him
►
to fight the Kharijites.2
* »





of sending any forces against the rebel in Sistin which was
-
0
a, matter of great interest if we compare his attitude towards
*
0
this revolt with those of the other provinces in which the
4 '
Caliphs always tried to crush the trouble at any cost. It
n
may be suggested that .the Caliph al-Mu'tazz, realising his
4
4
weak position and inability to retain absolute 'Abbasid
> i









a quasi-'Abbasid influence over the region. Thus, he was
1. Fakhri, p. 181.
— •
2. Kamil, VII, ■•125 • .Ibn Khal-likah speaks about the valuable




returning to the same policy which had been adopted by
• »
the Caliph Harun al-Rashid towards North Africa when the
ft
latter I8I1/8OO m
the integrity of his Empire, and therefore acknowledged the
ft,
Aghlabids' authority, who in turn continued to send the 'arinual








may have encouraged the latter to extend his authority over
1
the surrounding provinces, as shortly after, the Caliph
ft
ft
bestowed on Ya'qub the governorship of Pars.
1. For Ya'qub's military activities in the east see
M. Porstener, "Ya'qub b. Lait und der Zunbil", ZDM>.












Tahirids and came under their direct rule. Since that time
ft
ft
they had always sent their agent3 to the area in order to
9 :
maintain their supremacy which in one way or another directly
ft
affected the supremacy of the Caliphate. While Ya'qub was
engaged in extending his authority in Slstan and other
ft
provinces at the expense of the Tahirids, a revolt broke out
in 21^9/863 in the vicinity of Pars, led by the jund of" the
ft
ft
province themselves. This revolt seriously affected the
ft
position of the Tihirids because it was mainly directed
4
/
against the governor al-Husayn b. Khalid, who was the deputy
ft
of Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah b. Tahir. Moreover, it diverted^ ft
ft
%
the attention of the Tahirids from the increasing poller of
Ya 'qub who obviously could be considered the main source of
opposition to the Tahirids. The jund, however, confiscated
a sum of money which was on its way to Samarra and from which
the rebels took their own arzad»^ The rebels organised them¬
selves under the leadership of 'Ali b. al-Husayn b. Quraysh
1. Pars is the arabicised form of Pars which itself was de-
ft
.rived from Parsa, the Persis of the Greeks. It was one
of the famous eastern provinces of the Empire. Shiyraz
was the capital of the province and 'All b. al-Husayn made
it his headquarters. EI^, s.v. Pars; Le Strange, pp. 2I4.8-98
ft
2. Tab., Ill, 153ij., includes the shakiriyya in this revolt who
together with the ,jund succeeded in plundering the house of
'Abd Allah b. Ishaq and in killing a person known as
Muhammad b. al-gasan b. Qirim while 'Abd Allah escaped
ft
safely from their hands. Cf. Yaqubi, III, I83.
3. Yaqubi, III, 183.
318
al-Bukharl whose help enabled them to expel the ruler of
Fars, al-Husayn b. Khalid, and set up their own independent
4
governor away from the Tahirids 1 influence. When Muhammad b.
*
~ «
'Abd Allah b. Tahir came to know of the inflammatory situation
*
in Fars and the expulsion of his agent he immediately arid
# •
4
openly deplored such an act ion,. designat ing one of his men
9
known as 'Abd Allah b. Ishaq as governor of the province.
Ibn troops to
the area at once and suppress the revolt by severely punishing
9
9 0
the chief of the outlaws. As soon as the jund learned about
9
4
the success of the new governor and his strong support they
9
4




the new and powerful ruler. 'Abd Allah b. Ishaq had no
intention of placing heavy restrictions on the citizens but
4
4
intended rather to punish their leader; therefore he accepted
the loyalty of the Jund. Then he placed 'All b. al-Husayn
4
4
under arrest for a certain period of time but. later released
him.1
Once again Fars came under the direct rule of the
Tahirids whose position was somewhat reinforced in the area
4
by this victory. But their power did not last long in the
♦
•
province and eventually the rebels in Fars succeeded in
separating themselves from the Tahirids. This was mainly




b. al-Husayn with the mission and sent him out to fight
1. Yaqubi, III, 183.
319
I '
against the Kharijites in the border area between Pars-and
4
■J
Kirman. Ibn Ishaq probably thought that the easiest way
*
to rid himself of 'All b. al-Husayn was by sending him to
fight the Kharijites. But 'All could not overcome, his
0 *
* &
desire for power and prestige; therefore during his advance
to the border area he corresponded with a few of his followers
s
in Pars, informing them that he intended to revolt against
the new governor. The .jund, however, immediately associated
4
themselves with 'All due to the tyranny of 'Abd Allah b.
*
. 4
Ishaq who had refused to give them their own arzaq. 'All then
*
9
went ahead with his intrigue and instead of continuing his •
*
4
progress towards the Kharijites* area he returned to Pars
intending to end Ibn Ishaq^ rule in the province. When
4
'Abd Allah b. Ishaq learned about this plot he fled to
9
Baghdad leaving the province without a ruler. By so doing
*
'J 4
he encouraged 'All to fulfil his main objective: to march
%
on the area and take control of' it. As soon as he entered
4
Pars, the jund once again recognised 'All as governor of the
province. When the news of this grave situation reached
$
*
Baghdad, the Tahirids reacted strongly, deploring the cruel
4




of Baghdad sent one of his men known as Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah
b. Nasr b. Hamza al-Khuza 'I to lead the troops against the
4
# «•
rebel. Even with these troops the Tahirids failed to re-
|
impose their authority on Pars; but on the other hand, the
1. Kirman was an extensive province .located between Pars,
Maqran, Sistan and Khurasan. It was famous for its







rebel was not able to achieve a decisive victory over his
• •
enemy either. Thus, clashes between the two hostile forces
#




offering more opportunities, as will be discussed below, for
» •




and expel 'All together with the Tahirids. Surprisingly
enough our sources do not mention the role of the Tahirids
in Khurisan in this conflict and why they did not send
troops to reinforce the Baghdadi army. They .were probably
9
9
involved in quelling the uprisings in the surrounding area
of Khurasan and other provinces.
9
« < •








sincere and reliable policy of their representatives in these
9
V
regions. The Tahirids, who were the target of these rebels
#
and who were eventually vanquished by them, were not strong
enough to suppress all the uprisings. Therefore, they
9
regretfully decreased their hold over these provinces while
*
e
the war-lords enthusiastically continued their military
campaigns in order to extend their authority and become the
j
9
rulers of the provinces over which they had bean exerting
9
their military power. The serious conflict in Samarra
ft
was the main reason for the disintegration of the Muslim
0
I
Empire, .the continuous struggle for power between the Caliphs
9





operating with their agents, the Tahirids, in'order to gain





control of the area. Moreover, this conflict offered many
*





on the political scene, terminating in the establishment of
'
several semi-independent states in various provinces,
t 4
#
particularly under the command of non-Arab leaders. It' must
be borne in mind that neither the rebels in Pars nor any of
• W
the non-Arab elements intended to set up a state fully
9
9




to hold positions of power in their own vicinity, and whenever
4
0
they found an opportunity to extend their control to the .
4
9
.surrounding area they tried to do this, not at the expense
9 •
9
of the 'Abbasids* dignity,, but rather at that of the other
local officers. On the other.hand, the war-lords always
0
maintained their traditional loyalty to the Caliphs of
4
l
Samarra which enabled them to retain these positions of
4
authority. Professor W.M. Watt believes that the war-lords
4
were men who came to rule in their own right. Though the
4
4
Caliph was powerless against them, they were content, in
0
♦










It must be remembered, too, that by now there were four
4 0
rival rulers in the eastern provinces who were competing
0
against each other in an attempt to extend their authority.
I
The Tahirids, who were the legitimate deputies, of the
Caliph, proved to be the greater losers although they had
,
0
the burden of maintaining security and the integration of



















the Empire. Their delicate position did not help them
in providing a continuous supply of armed forces in order to
•
•
be aible to rule efficiently. When they.failed to achieve
9







In Pars and Slstan there was competition between 'Ali b.
0
Husayn and Ya 'qub al-Saffar whose power now seemed to exceed
a





both 'All and Ya'qub sought the Caliph's acknowledgement of
0
a »
their rule in the region of Pars. It is reported that 'All
0




critical situation in the eastern provinces which had arisen




who could not even maintain their power over Sistan and Harat
%
9
which consequently fell under the direct rule of Ya'quh al-
t
V
Saffar. 'All asked the Caliph to authorise him to take over
the governorship of Kirraan as well as the province of Pars
1
■ over which he was already exercising his control. Mean-
|
%
while, Ya'qub al-Saffar had sent a letter to the Caliph
0
.asking him to grant him the rulership of Kirraan. The
0
Caliph, who had not enough power to combat these adventurers,
0
9 9
found an opportunity to play them off one against the other;
%
no matter who succeeded, the Caliph was the real winner.
• 4
• 9
Therefore he sent a message to both of them, simultaneously
4
- O




As soon as Ya'qub received the Caliph's message
0
1. Tab., Ill, 1698; Sibt, IX, 286a.



















indicating acknowledgement of his authority over Kirman,
9
4
he marched with his combatants tox^ards the area. When 'All
9
A




learned about Ya'qubfs manoeuvres he immediately despatched
» •
9
his army, under the command of one of his officers known as
Ta^Wq b. al-Mughafll/.s. 'All b. al-Husayn possibly regarded V
Ya'qub's campaign as a challenge to his authority in Kirman




Therefore, ya3«l b. al-Mugh.all-is moved towards the city of
Kirman, under the instructions of 'All b. al-Husayn, pro¬
ceeding Ya'qub*s troops and entering the city before the
9
arrival of his enemy. When Ya 'qub heard about this move he
✓
stationed his army at some distance from the city, avoiding
any direct confrontation with the invaders and after a while
*
— rr
Ya qub succeeded in entering the city, in taking TaQrfq captive
— 1 ^
and in extending his authority to include Kirman. It is
9
obvious that this victory proved a serious threat to the
position of 'All b. al-Husayn who carefully followed the
fortunes of his troops from his headquarters in Shiraz. As
soon as Ya'qub had settled his affairs in Kirman he moved
•
«





remaining power of his rival 'All b. al-Husayn. Eventually
Ya 'qub succeeded in invading Shiraz and captured his arch
9
— P
enemy 'Ali b. al-Husayn. This victory was of great importanc
1. Tab., Ill, 1699-1700; Sibt, IX, 286a.
*
2. Tab., Ill, 1702-1705J Kamil, VII, I3O-I3I; cf. Yaqubi,
III, 187, who simply states that Ya'qub became so powerful
that he decided to invade Fars. So he marched with his
troops to the area which was under the- command of 'All b.
al-Husayn al-Qurayshi, who failed to win a victory over
Ya'qub's forces. 'All was captured after his defeat and





to Ya 'qub who successfully extended his authority to include
^ f 4




approval for his authority from the Caliph, al-Saffar as usual
#
• T
sent valuable presents to the capital, which was probably
4
the easiest means to gain the Caliph's support. But al-■
4
Tabari mentions that in 256/870, ih the early days of al-
« « •
Mu'tamid's reign, a revolt broke out in Pars against the
4
Caliph's agent, al-Harith b. Sima al-Sharabl, who was
P
murdered at the hands of the rebels, which shows that
Ya'qub al-Saffar did not continue his rule over Pars. OnA •
9
9 •
the other hand, Ya'qub continued his expansionist policy and
s
4
succeeded in 259/873 in invading Nishabur> taking prisoner









his final downfall in 265/879.
Ya'qub al-Saffar succeeded eventually in establishing
his authority in the eastern provinces of Slstan, Kirmin and
9
4 4
Pars in addition to his successful, raids and expansion in
0






this latter region. The main reasons which encouraged him
4










Tahirids and his hatred of the 'Abbas id family.
9
4




of collapse as a result of the continuous revolts in the
9
-
1. Tab., Ill, 1706'; D. Sourdel, "'Abbasid Caliphate", CHI,
I, 129.
2. Tab., Ill, 1839; Ibar, III, 29^-95 , 308.
3. Tab., Ill, 1880-82; Kamil, VII, 180-81.-
provinces. The main factors which led to these uprisings
0
were the struggle for power among the 'Abbasids which
0
weakened their solidarity and prevented them from maintain-
0




duction of Turks into the army. This decade marked the
0
beginning of the disintegration of the 'Abbasid Caliphate
0
0
which, immediately after this period, was confined to the
region of Iraq and held little or no responsibility for the
0
other areas, despite the religious respect for the Caliphs
0
♦ «
felt throughout the Empire.
t
9
The Caliphs had dealt with the revolts in various ways,
9
0




the strategy employed by them and the economic importance
0
of the area concerned. In order to maintain their direct
0




suppress any revolts in the provinces which were of great
%
0
importance to the capital and were mostly inhabited by Arabs.
0
0
When a province came under the leadership of a non-Arab,
0




regionj such was the case of Ibn Tulun in Egpt. As far as
the remote regions were concerned, the Caliphs of the period
%
« > '
followed the policy of their predecessors, offering the local
leaders the right to govern their area on the condition that
> *





included their names in the Friday prayer and on all coins.
*
*
These local leaders indeed needed the recognition of the
0 •
4
Caliphs in order to gain the support of their subjects who
r



















This decade of anarchy has always been regarded as a
*
sort of interregnum in the history of the 'Abbasid Caliphate
*
and the occupants of the office treated as de-personalis.ed
*
■puppets, undeserving of sympathy or attention. In many
✓
'




produced no single individual of outstanding value or ability;
it put forward no new ideas which could be of influence in the
9 v
future and it degraded the very foundations on which the
Islamic Empire was presumed to rest. But, despite all this,
it did have a cautionary lesson for succeeding generations;
and, when 3een in the context of 'Abbasid policies since the
I
foundation of the dynasty, there was a certain inevitability
%
m
in the troubles it experienced.
*
The wholesale importation of men of nomadic background,








stability of the community; and when the ruler actually
9
chose to base his authority on such elements it could be no
+ «
longer in doubt that some such anarchy would eventually
result. In seeking the origins of this troubled period one
should, first, look to the dynasty itself and to the reasons
4
why it could not feel secure in the support of^people who rL~
s




The common assumption that the 'Abbasid revolution
9
fundamentally changed the basis of rule in the Islamic state
4











government, the family was little different from the
ft
Umayyads. Whereas with the latter the constant intrigues













elements on which the new state had first established itself.
Despite the emphasis that was to be placed on the Caliphs*
0
role as Imam as well as Amir al-Mu'minim and the introduction
» 0




of supreme authority was still a military power sufficient to
o




secured from within the state itself it was felt necessary
• •
to recruit it from outside.
0
Had a strict discipline been imposed on these slave
troops, and had their functions in the state organization
*
0 <
been clearly defined, they might have been a more constant
and reliable element within the military establishment.
However, since the time of their first introduction they had
been treated as the Caliph*s private possession, which he
jealously g&arded against any attempt at incorporation into
0
the society. They were conditioned to respect him alone,
0
but when he showed himself as weak and vain, and incapable of
0
9




and, indeed, without any true purpose. In this way their








as much victims of the disorders as its authors.
The real source of these disorders was the struggle
ft




on to some extent since the inception of the dynasty. How¬




lack of any family cohesion within the dynasty, when he
ft ♦
ft




It would have been strange had they-not read the lesson that
\
this implied and begun to realise the extent of the power
\
that had been placed in their hands. They were confirmed
ft
in this awareness by the behaviour of al-Muntasir once he
ft ^
ft
had achieved the Caliphate; the treatment he meted out to
ft









remained. A1-Musta'In proved no different in the callous
treatment to which hewas prepared to subject his own relatives
^ ft
in order to secure his fULCii\r-e. 3 and, like his predecessor,
he was ready to indulge the Turks in whatever they wished,
to enlist their co-operation.
ft
With al-Mu'tazz the degradation of the 'Abbasids
%
' y
reached its nadir. With the murder of one brother, al-Mu'ayyad
*
ft
and the banishment of the other, al-Muwaffaq - the latter
ft
who had actually been his ally in the struggle with al-
Musta 'In — he diowed himself deaf to all appeals except to
ft
his own personal interests. Nor did his successor, al-Muhtadl,
ft •
9









Turkish officers against al-Mu'tazz, and on becoming Caliph
P
<1
he behaved no differently towards his family than had the
latter. Al-Mu'tamid, but for the fact that his brother
•i
al-Muwaffaq seized the effective control of the state and
o
deprived him of a voice in its operations, would probably
0
have been no different. .His reign marks the realisation
%
m
on the part of the 'Abbasid family of what this anarchy would
ultimately imply for themselves; and it is indicative of how
\




period of a few years it could be almost totally eliminated,
m 0




One may reasonably ask why in this troubled decade in
✓




shown even token.respect by his own minions, the office was
0
0
allowed to remain within the 'Abbasid family and not trans-
0
»
ferred to one or another of the various pretenders to the
4
Caliphate, or even to one of their own leaders; The answer
0
must be, of course, the religious significance which the
0
office had acquired in the century of its existence within
this one dynasty, and the influence it exercised over large
A
sections of the population. Thus, though the Turks them-
A
selves might have nothing but contempt for the Caliphs,
whom they were juggling to their own caprice, it was only
0
through their agency that they were able to extend their
0
0
authority over the community as a whole. They were not
0
seeking a revolution, nor did their protests proceed from
any deep sense of grievance; they took advantage of the
0
weakness that had befallen the Caliphate, and it was wholly
4
0
in their own interests that this weakness should be maintained
0
by filling the office with venial, intimidated men who could







. Nor is there anything to suggest that the Turks had any
4
4




satisfaction of transitory ambitions, and these were for the
c •
<
most part provoked by jealousy among themselves. Apart
from having the organ iz at ion cf the jund modified so that they
%
might have the benefits of being registered therein, not a
9
single institution of the state was affected by their brief
hour of authority. It is true that the confidence of society
4
4
in these institutions was for a time shaken, but the century
9
over which they had been developed allowed them to gain a
strength which'could not be sapped by the mischief of the
4
moment. To the extent that the Turks had social ideals,
*
V




expression; for the law of the steppe could have little
application in the civilized environment of Baghdad and
♦
Samarra, even if there had been a uniformity in their tribal
backgrounds.
The unity which these Turkish slave troops exhibited
%
• •
from time to time must be regarded as being of a class rather
• 4
4
than an ethnic solidarity. Despite the fact that, if only
0
for convenience of arrangement and communication, Turks from
0
the same area, speaking the s.ame dialect must have been
4
barracked together, not one of our sources Uses a tribal
4
designation for any of the groups that figured in their
4
0
activities. The contemporary historians use^'the name






intruders from the citizen element in the society; and
ft
i
what further distinctions they might possess among them-
0
0
selves they either did not know or did not think important





Turks themselves did not stress their tribal origins' so as




first brought to Iraq as the private army of the Caliph,
conscious efforts were made to keep them separate from the
0




even after they had taken into their own hands all the power
of their so-called masters. But because they were permanent
9





demanded that they maintain a degree of unity that would
►
permit of co-operation in matters of .mutual concern, and for
as long as they were able to behave with some sort of harmony
%
they seemed to thrive.
■
.





have been a legacy of the tribal particularism of which they
• •




and the stages of the decline of-their power can be marked by
dissentions among themselves provoked by envy, leading to out¬
right clashes. One could understand more deeply the nature
0
of the alliances and the intrigues among the Turkish generals
$
♦ •
if some information were available about the composition of
0
9 »
their respective followings, and it may be that many of the
0
events that are presented in a purely Iraqi context may
0




of distant tribal attitudes. But this we cannot know; and
332









corps, distinct from the standing army as well as from the
0
4
people as a whole, isolated them from any sympathy or support
9
that could have been solicited from these quarters; and their
4
own behaviour as unassimilated intruders into the society
4
was calculated to alienate the feelings of all with itfhom
they were thrown into contact. For, in fact, they were un-
assimilable and once their presence passed from the precincts
0
of the palace into the body of society it was inevitable
4
4




utterly. In the event, it was they who were rejected, and
by this was demonstrated the inherent soundness of the
Islamic society which had developed in Iraq.during the first
century of the *Abbasid Caliphate.
*
In historical perspective it can be said that they
4
were the real casualties of the anarchy which they provoked;
*
9
only a few of their leaders gained a transitory importance
0
0
and advantage out of the melee, while the majority were left
in a state of confusion and insecurity which made them
9
* 9





seeking men. At no time did they show any awareness that
%
the basic condition for their own continued well-being was
9
9
a strong and resolute Caliph; and when they lent their
0
v
support to undermining their masters they were destroying











Islamic Empire in that it brought an awareness to the
*
9
Caliphate of the realities of its .situation. The provinces
i
9 •
taking advantage of the relaxation of control from the
#
centre, win recognition as the autonomous entities they
9
always were, responsible for their own destinies. The
0
Caliphate, henceforth, will accept.only the commitments
»





of his office to exact all possible tribute and respect
» •




outside the natural boundaries of his home-land, or accept
responsibilities beyond the human resources that this could
\
9
afford. The traumatic experience of the Turkish fitna
1 9 9
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